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ABSTRACT
The first part o f our thesis will explore the nature and history o f  the development of 
Hegel’s reconciliatory self-determining philosophical science, by demonstrating how 
Hegel radicalises and reformulates the essence of skepticism as the principle of 
determinate negation. We will attempt to elucidate precisely why the persistence of 
external skepticism represents nothing more for Hegel than abstract dogmatism and 
philosophical naivety. In the second part of our thesis we will concentrate upon early 
19th century post-Hegelian skeptical responses to Hegel’s speculative idealism. We 
will argue that Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard all attempt to disrupt what they 
see as the oppressive self-satisfaction of Speculative Reason by elaborating a skeptical 
attack upon Hegelianism in the name of the particular. Each thinker attempts to 
articulate a skeptical opposition to what they respectively argue to be Hegel’s 
illegitimate effacement of the particular within the totality o f speculative reason itself. 
They each seek to return to an irreducible point of entry take Hegel back with them, to 
take him back ‘outside’ of the system of reason and return him to the particular. We 
will begin by analysing Schelling’s attempts to confront Hegel with the ‘Real Being’ 
he accuses Hegel o f effacing from the very beginning through the illegitimate identity 
o f thought and being. We will then examine Feuerbach’s attempt to deconstruct 
Hegel’s dialectic of sense certainty in an effort to return Hegel to the irreducible 
sensory quality o f Being. We conclude this part with an analysis of Kierkegaard’s 
arguments for what he understands as the ‘paradox’ of faith. We will show that 
Kierkegaard’s efforts are aimed at bringing Hegel into proximity with this paradoxical 
faith in order to demonstrate his failure to comprehend the true nature of faith. The 
skeptical attacks of all three thinkers will be rigorously examined in the light of 
Hegel’s understanding o f the relationship between skepticism and philosophy that we 
will have outlined in the first part of our thesis. Our aim will be to show precisely how 
and why they ultimately fail to articulate a radically heterogeneous skeptical position 
with regard to Hegel’s speculative idealism. By demonstrating the precise nature of 
their failure we will set the scene for our discussion of Levinas’s skeptical relation to 
Hegel in the third part o f this thesis. It will be our contention that Levinas successfully 
elaborates a response to Hegel’s speculative reason that clearly continues upon the 
trajectory initiated by the three 19* century post-Hegelian skeptics that we have 
examined, and that what ultimately marks his success in articulating a genuinely 
heterological thought will be the extent to which he precisely avoids the failures we 
have identified.
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PART ONE - HEGEL AND SELF-ACCOMPLISHING SKEPTICISM
I - Introduction
One of the gestures associated with the development of post-Kantian German 
Idealism is the supposed ‘radicalisation’ o f skepticism. We will attempt to show how 
such a gesture is developed by Hegel’s thought whereby skepticism is radically 
reformulated, internalised and elevated to the level of self-consciousness and then 
progresses to a genuinely systematic and scientific philosophy. The importance for 
Hegel of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy is evident from his early 
philosophical work. In 1802 Hegel published a substantial and lengthy article entitled 
‘On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different 
Modifications and Comparison o f the Latest Form with the Ancient One’ in the 
Kritisches Journal der Philosophic' . In this article Hegel responds to Schulze’s 
skepticism.1 2 H.S. Harris in his introduction to the English translation of the article 
describes it as ‘the falling stone that started an avalanche in his intellectual 
development’.3 Hegel clearly denies that Schulze’s skepticism has any real 
significance, and argues rather that the important element of skepticism for 
philosophy is to be found in a more thoroughgoing skepticism. In fact the only 
significance Hegel seems to accord to the modem variant of skepticism is the degree 
to which it can be juxtaposed and counterpoised to genuine skepticism. Such a 
juxtaposition facilitates Hegel in formulating a complex account of the relationship 
between genuine or authentic skepticism and philosophy. We will argue that one can 
discern in this article the very origin of Hegel’s mature understanding of the 
relationship between authentic skepticism and philosophy Indeed, one can recognise 
a remarkable continuity throughout all of Hegel’s major work with the views argued
1 C.W.F. Hegel. 'On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy. Exposition of its Different 
Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One' in G. di Giovanni A  H.S. 
Harris cds, ttetween Kant amt Hegel: Texts In the Development o f Post-KantUm Idealism, translated, 
with Introductions by G. di Giovanni A  H.S. Harris (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackctt Publishing 
Company, Revised Edition 2000) (Hereafter BKH)
2 In 1792 Gottlob Ernst Schulze reintroduced a variety of Humean skepticism in the wake of Kant in a 
work that appeared anonymously under the title Aenesidemus. Oder Veber die Fundamente der von 
dem llerm  Prof. Reinhold In Jena (ielieferten Flemenlar-Philosophie. This work presents itself as a 
dialogue between Hcrmias, a proponent of transcendental philosophy, and Acncsidcmus. a Humean 
skeptic. It consists largely of a critical examination of Rcinhold's F.lementarphilosophie. but is also an 
attack upon Kant himself.
2 Ibid, p.239
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for in this article, particularly in relation to his understanding o f  Ancient and so-called 
Modem skepticism, their relationship, and the superiority of the former.4 What 
emerges from this early paper is the very beginning o f his understanding of the role 
skepticism performs within speculative reason itself, i.e. the principle of dialectic as 
the true activating principle of self-movement in reason. We will begin by outlining in 
detail Hegel’s arguments in this paper before turning our attention to the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit, a work Hegel characterises as a “self-accomplishing 
skepticism”5. We will examine how Hegel attempts to reclaim the very essence of 
Ancient skepticism as the negative-critical aspect (or principle of dialectic) inherent 
within genuine speculative philosophy as such, which is understood by Hegel as the 
movement o f ‘the grasping of opposites in their unity or o f the positive in the 
negative.’6
4 See, for example. Phenomenology o f Spirit. #59, p36, #79, pp.50-1, #197-230, pp. 119-138; 
Encyclopaedia l.ogic. #32. addition, pp.69-70, #39 Zusatz, p.80; lectures on the History o f Philosophy. 
pp.328-373; Philosophy o f Right. #31, p.60
5 1 adopt this translation following R. Williams' footnote in his work Recognition: Eichte and Hege on 
the Other (Albany: SUNY, 1992): ‘The German is “Dieser sich vollbringende Skeptizismus” which 
both Baillic and Miller translate misleadingly as “thoroughgoing skepticism." As if Hegel were a 
thorough skeptic. The verb “vollbringen” docs not mean “thorough," but rather “to accomplish, to 
effect.“ In view of the reflexive form it is better translated as self-accomplishing ’ P. 117
‘ G.W.F. Hegel, Science o f lx>gic p,56
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II - The Different Forms of Skepticism and Their Relationship to Philosophy
Hegel’s essay ‘On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its 
Different Modifications and Comparison o f the Latest Form with the Ancient One’ is 
ostensibly a review of G.E. Schulze’s Critique o f Theoretical Philosophy. In the 
course of this essay Hegel distinguishes between three distinct forms o f skepticism: 
Ancient Greek skepticism (particularly Pyrrhonism), Academic skepticism 
(particularly Platonism), and the modem variant of skepticism (represented here by 
Schulze). Hegel maintains that authentic Pyrrhonian skepticism should be recognised 
as having no positive side and existing as an absolutely corrosive force o f negativity. 
He suggests that the Academic skeptics are best understood as incorporating this type 
of genuine skepticism as the element o f dialectic within a coherent system or 
programme of philosophical reason, whereas the contemporary variant advocated by 
Schulze merely postulates a form of skepticism that opposes theoretical, speculative 
or metaphysical philosophy and upholds a form of empiricism derived from Hume. 
Hegel’s aim in this essay is to understand why the modem variant of skepticism has 
developed as fundamentally anti-philosophical. For Hegel the anti-philosophical 
rhetoric o f contemporary skepticism represents a degradation of the essence of 
authentic skepticism and its relationship to philosophy. He argues that by returning to 
the absolute negativity of authentic Ancient skepticism one is able to reformulate a 
relationship between skepticism and philosophy whereby the negativity of genuine 
skepticism is recognised as being internal to reason rather than opposed externally to 
reason.
Hegel begins his essay by outlining how Schulze, in his Critique o f theoretical 
Reason, attempted to provide an exposition o f  theoretical, speculative or metaphysical 
philosophy, discover its ‘original sin’ and then bring skepticism to bear upon it. He 
identifies Schulze’s target as philosophy conceived as ‘the Science of the highest and 
most unconditioned causes of all conditioned things whose actuality we are otherwise 
certain of.’7 For Hegel what such a view amounts to is the idea that through the use of 
reason a cognition o f Teal things’ is supposed to be acquired, or that there are things 
beyond or behind the mere appearances o f things which are discoverable through 
abstract principles and concepts rather than given in experience. Schulze’s
7 Schulze. Kritik I, pp 26-27, cited by Hegel. BKH, p.317
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understanding o f theoretical, speculative or metaphysical philosophy is, Hegel claims, 
unnecessarily crude. In this respect Schulze’s positive skepticism resembles the 
Humean prototype in the way it construes theoretical or metaphysical philosophy, and 
more importantly its refusal to go beyond what it takes to be the indubitable ‘facts of 
consciousness’ or the ‘given’. For Schulze, as it was for Hume, the ‘given’ in 
consciousness has ‘undeniable certainty’. Such skepticism, Hegel argues, is 
insufficiently radical to deserve the name, and is itself vulnerable to an older and more 
authentic negative skepticism. For Hegel a skepticism that is not truly radical is 
neither genuine nor coherent and merely co-exists with the dogmatism o f everyday 
common sense and ordinary consciousness.
However, Schulze argues in the Critique o f Theoretical Philosophy that the variant of 
skepticism he advocates in opposition to philosophy represents a more genuine and 
perfect form o f skepticism than the ancient form. Thus, he claims that contemporary 
positive skepticism is explicitly directed against the judgments peculiar to philosophy 
itself, i.e. those judgments concerning the ‘grounds’ outside the compass of the 
knowledge given by experience. For Schulze the ancient skeptical form itself is 
nothing more than the contemporary variant imperfectly realised. Schulze’s 
justification for this view is that the older form of skepticism also acknowledged a 
basic cognition of appearances through the senses together with a general conviction 
of the existence of things by ‘which every rational man has to be guided in his active 
life .’*
Hegel thinks that Schulze seriously misrepresents the spirit of ancient skepticism here 
and he sets about restoring its genuine and implicit virtue. Hegel cites the ancient 
Greek skeptics Pyrrho and Aenesidemus in support of this effort. Pyrrhonian 
skepticism was a highly developed practice of argumentative enquiry that aimed to 
disclose the worthlessness o f all forms of dogmatism associated with the 
indubitability o f sensory appearance. Such a corrosive form of skepticism became 
formalized according to a number of modes, tropes or patterns of argument, of which 
the ten modes or tropes of Aenesidemus are the most conspicuous. These patterns, 
which result in epochs (a complete suspension of judgment and the cessation of all
" Ibid p.595, cited by Hegel. BKH. p.320
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definite assertion beyond the mere acknowledgement of immediate appearances), 
constitute the very essence o f skepticism for Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines o f 
Pyrrhonism. It is, he states:
‘A capacity for bringing into opposition, in any way whatever, things that appear and 
things that are thought, so that, owing to the equal strength o f the opposed items and 
rival claims, we come first to suspend judgment and after that to ataraxia (tranquillity, 
freedom from disturbance).’9
Conflicting appearances cannot be equally true or equally real; there remains a need 
for a criterion o f truth in order to determine which one should be accepted. However, 
the skeptic demonstrates that there are no intellectually satisfactory criteria that we 
can trust and use. The skeptic is left with conflicting appearances and opinions, and is 
unable to discover any reason for preferring one to another; therefore he is bound to 
treat all as having equal strength and being equally worthy (or unworthy) of 
acceptance. Such is the outcome of the skeptic’s discovery of the equal strength 
(isotheneia) of opposed or equipollent assertions. The skeptical sequence for Sextus 
Empiricus is conflict, undecidability, equal strength (isotheneia), epoche, and finally 
ataraxia. There is an implicit acknowledgment of appearances within this realm of 
ancient skepticism, but Hegel argues it is merely a pragmatic acknowledgment, which 
has no significant philosophical implications as far as he is concerned Thus, mere 
statements regarding appearances are neither true nor false, and certainly do not imply 
an absolute indubitability regarding appearances of reality in the way Schulze 
suggests:
‘It and the limited consciousness, fulfilled with its ‘facts’ is not set up as the principle 
of an indubitable certainty in general opposition to Reason and Philosophy, least of all 
as bragging against them. Rather this conviction was designed as the smallest possible 
tribute that could be paid to the necessity of an objective determining [world].’10
9 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o f Pyrrhonism, translated by R.G. Bury (London: Heinemann. 1933) I,
P*
10 G.W.F. Hegel. BKH, p.320
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Contrary to Schulze’s argument, the ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics did not elevate the 
pragmatic consciousness of appearances to the rank of a knowledge objectively 
asserted. Hegel cites Sextus Empiricus to clarify this point, and shows how he argued 
that we live by pragmatically taking account of phenomena, in accordance with the 
ordinary understanding o f life, but without making any fundamental theoretical 
commitment or assertion:
‘Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, 
undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.’11
Hegel argues that for Sextus Empiricus it is merely a psychological ‘fact’ that we 
cannot doubt the phenomenon that presents itself, the very appearing of the 
appearances as such. However, for the skeptic it must remain a mere phenomenon. 
We cannot but accept it as the guide for our actions, but it may in fact mislead us, thus 
our psychological conviction can never be any real guarantee of truth in the way 
Schulze maintains. Hegel attacks Schulze’s view that the real target o f ancient 
Pyrrhonian skepticism was not the indubitable certainty of sense perceptions but the 
fa d s  placed behind and beyond them by dogmatic metaphysical philosophers. Hegel 
asks:
‘What would the ancient sceptics have said to a bastard offspring of this kind, a 
skepticism which can come to terms with glaring dogmatism?’12 13
By resituating Pyrrhonian skeptical concerns firmly back within the realm o f 
dogmatic indubitable certainties regarding sensory appearances, Hegel is able to 
demonstrate the absence in genuine skepticism of any polemical opposition to 
philosophy. In fact Hegel argues that in order to discern the genuine strength of 
skepticism it is necessary for one to go back and reconfigure the entire relationship 
between skepticism and philosophy. One must begin to read that relationship 
otherwise than mere perpetual opposition in the way Schulze had maintained. Indeed, 
Hegel argues, one must pursue the original insight of the Academic Skeptics
11 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o f l*yrrhonism, I, p. 2.1 For an excellent account of Pyrrhonism and its
lack of theoretical commitment sec: M. Williams' ‘Scepticism Without Theory' in Review o f  
Metaphysics 4 1 (March 1988), pp.547-588
13 G.W.F. Hegel. Ibid, p.322
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regarding that relationship, i.e. that ‘skepticism itself is, in its ownmost heart, at one 
with every true philosophy.’13 Thus, he claims, the absolute negativity of authentic 
skepticism is not an opponent or nemesis of philosophy, but an integral element 
within genuine philosophical reflection and method. It must, he argues, be recognised 
as the necessary negative, critical and introductory element of genuine speculative 
philosophy. Skepticism and speculative philosophy thus go hand in hand; skepticism 
is not so much ‘directed against philosophy as for it.’14
Hegel distinguishes the ancient form of skepticism into two distinct types, one 
directed against reason and another that is not. The extreme form of skeptical 
detachment associated with ancient Pyrrhonism, i.e. the maintenance of a pure 
negativity in relation to knowledge, forms the latter type, whereas skepticism directed 
against dogmatically maintained argumentation forms the essence of the former. For 
Hegel this division of distinct skeptical approaches became blurred by Sextus 
Empiricus’ 2nd century account of Pyrrhonism. Sextus, despite initially 
acknowledging the existence of a distinction, conflated the Pyrrhonian skeptical 
tropes that maintain a pure negativity in relation to  knowledge per se with those 
skeptical tropes explicitly concerned with opposing forms of dogmatic argumentation. 
Hegel argues that genuine Pyrrhonian skepticism must be distinguished from a type of 
ancient skepticism confined to opposing dogmatism, and that Sextus clearly failed to 
maintain this distinction. Indeed, for Hegel, it is Sextus’ original conflation that 
accounts for the historical slide towards the anti-philosophical stance of skepticism 
represented by Hume and Schulze. Thus it is Hegel’s contention that from Sextus’ 
conflation of the two types of ancient skepticism into one form, i.e skepticism as 
opposition to dogmatism, the essence of skeptical opposition becomes reconfigured as 
a fundamentally anti-philosophical one. Indeed, Hegel argues, it is the uncritical 
maintenance o f Sextus’ original conflation which acts to historically submerge or 
efface the genuine radically of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism and which, in turn, 
explains how skepticism is able to develop historically from being a force opposed to 
dogmatism to being a form of dogmatism opposed to philosophy. This development 
represents for Hegel the degradation of the spirit o f  genuine skepticism towards its 
utterly moribund contemporary manifestation within the work of Schulze. He writes:
14 Ibid, p.330
9
‘The turning of skepticism against philosophy, as soon as philosophy became 
dogmatism, illustrates how it has kept in step with the communal degeneration o f 
philosophy and o f the world in general, until finally in these most recent times it has 
sunk so far in company with dogmatism that for both o f them nowadays the facts of 
consciousness have an indubitable certainty, and for them both the truth resides in 
temporality; so that, since the extremes now touch, the great goal is attained once 
more on their side in these happy times, that dogmatism and skepticism coincide with 
one another on the underside, and offer each other the hand of perfect friendship and 
fraternity’15
For Hegel the first set of skeptical tropes discussed with Sextus Empiricus’s account 
belong to the older authentic negative Pyrrhonian skepticism and, Mike all philosophy 
generally’16 are primarily directed against common-sense ordinary consciousness. The 
second set are directed toward or opposed to dogmatism and subsequently philosophy 
per se. Hegel argues that these tropes were developed much later than the original 
Pyrrhonian tropes of Aenesidimus and were a distinct feature of Sextus Empiricus’s 
account of Pyrrhonism. Significantly, for Hegel, they became conflated with the first 
set in Sextus Empiricus. The original set of tropes provide a means, Hegel argues, by 
which one might liberate oneself from being mired in finitude through a strategy o f 
indifference:
Mn the face o f this indifference everything that the phenomenal world, or the 
understanding offers, grows shaky, and in the shaking o f everything finite, according 
to the skeptics the ataraxia secured by Reason enters.’17 *
Hegel claims it is through the standpoint o f absolute skepticism that the skeptic is able 
to discern amidst the chaos and confusion of appearances what is true, i.e. the 
‘equanimity that is secured by reason, the natural possession of which constitutes the 
difference between beast and man.’1* For Hegel the positive side of such absolute 
skepticism resides in its character as absolute neutrality or indifference to the
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
11 Ibid, p.331
"Ib id
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necessity o f nature. The ten original tropes associated with ancient skepticism are 
simply and solely aimed at the dogmatism of common-sense ordinary consciousness. 
All o f them, he claims, are concerned only with the finite, and the understanding, or 
the cognition of the finite. As a consequence this type of skepticism is not in any way 
directed towards philosophy, but against ordinary common sense that holds fast to the 
given, the fact, the finite, and adheres to it as certain, as secure, as eternal. The basic 
skeptical tropes undermine this certainty but in a way that is close to ordinary 
consciousness itself, i.e. they themselves call upon appearances and finite cases for 
assistance, and recognise their untruth by way of their diversity, along with the equal 
right of all o f  them to count as valid. He argues that such a movement signals in itself 
the very beginning o f philosophy in that it represents the very initiation of the 
‘elevation above the truth which ordinary consciousness gives, and the presentiment 
of a higher truth.’19 Therefore the truth of absolute negative skepticism for Hegel 
resides in its ability to elevate the freedom of reason above the necessity of the given 
in appearances. Skepticism treats that necessity as nothing, but at the same time, he 
claims, ‘honours that necessity supremely.’20
Hegel now turns his attention to the later tropes of skepticism presented by Sextus. 
These five skeptical tropes concern the evident diversity of common opinions and of 
the teachings of philosophers, which lead to the presence o f irrevocable and 
insurmountable incommensurability between various philosophical ideas; the 
presence o f an infinite regress, i.e. for one grounding principle a further ground is 
required, for this still another again, and so on ad infinitum, the demonstration of the 
necessity o f relationship; the right to begin with any assumption or presupposition, 
and the demonstration o f  circularity whereby that which is to serve as the proof of 
another proposition itself needs, for its own proof, the proposition to be proved by its 
means. He argues that these tropes are not aimed specifically at ordinary 
consciousness alone, rather they are aimed more generally at dogmatism and 
ultimately philosophy. For Hegel ‘the intent of these five tropes is quite distinct from 
the tendency of the first ten, and...they only concern the later orientation of 
skepticism against philosophy. ’21 He recognises the strength of these tropes against
19 Ibid, p.332
20 Ibid, p.333
21 Ibid, p.335
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what he terms ‘dogmatism on finite bases’, but argues that they are useless when 
brought against philosophy since they themselves contain reflective concepts:
‘The five later tropes of skepticism, which make up the genuine arsenal o f its weapons 
against philosophical cognition, are wholly and exclusively related to [the] complete 
fixation of their dogmas and dividing lines.’32
Thus when these tropes are brought into opposition to philosophy he argues that ‘they 
fall apart internally, or are themselves dogmatic.’2 3 The two-fold nature of the type of 
dogmatism attacked by these later tropes of skepticism is a point reiterated by him 
much later in an illuminating passage from the Encyclopaedia Logic.
‘Dogmatism has its first antithesis in skepticism. The ancient sceptics gave the general 
name of ‘dogmatism’ to any philosophy that sets up definite theses. In this wider 
sense skepticism also counted properly speculative philosophy as dogmatic. But in the 
narrower sense dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the 
understanding whilst excluding their opposites. This is just the strict “either-or”.’24 25
Dogmatism in the narrower sense posits something as absolute by removing it from 
relation, qualification and conditioning. In this sense it consists in the abstraction or 
removal o f something from all context and relation. It lifts its absolute out of context, 
and seeks to  maintain it in fixed opposition to, or abstraction from, everything else. 
Dogmatism is thus one-sided and exclusive. When understood in this narrower sense 
it is roughly equivalent to the operation of the understanding for Hegel, which he 
characterises as employing a discursive analytical procedure. For him the very 
essence o f such a narrow form of dogmatism is its abstraction from, and suppression 
of, relation, and the strength of the later tropes of skepticism emerges when it is 
brought to bear upon it. The tropes correct this dogmatic suppression o f relation by 
allowing ‘the opposite moment, from which dogmatism has abstracted, [to] make an 
appearance and so produce an antinomy.,2’
22 Ibid, p.332
21 Ibid, p.335
24 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Ijotfic, #32, addition, pp.69-70
25 G.W.F. Hegel. BKH, p.333
12
It is important for us to understand, however, that when Hegel considers this type of 
skepticism and its opposition to philosophy per se he rejects its claims for two 
reasons. First, such claims are powerless against genuine speculative reason precisely 
because they are themselves tropes of reason, and as such become inscribed within the 
totality of speculative reason. Secondly, such skepticism when brought into 
opposition with philosophy displays the same abstract one-sidedness or dogmatism 
that it aims to effectively displace. Thus Hegel argues:
‘As directed against Reason, on the other hand, they retain as their peculiar [character] 
the pure difference by which they are affected; their rational aspect is already in 
Reason. So far as the first trope (of diversity) is concerned, the rational is always and 
everywhere, self-identical; pure inequality is possible only for the understanding, and 
everything unlike is posited by Reason as one [and the same].’36
The very movement o f heterogeneity and incommensurability associated with 
skeptical equipollence itself (posited in the first trope as the notion of diversity in 
reason) is actually wholly within reason itself. The equipollent heterogeneous moment 
is itself a moment of reason posited in opposition to another, dogmatically abstracted 
moment of reason, and cannot be otherwise. For this reason Hegel argues that 
skeptical equipollence cannot articulate an otherwise than reason absolutely opposed 
to reason. Reason itself is characterised by him as fundamentally One, as self-identity, 
as relationality itself, whereby all the heterogeneous moments of rational skeptical 
equipollence can be demonstrated to be moments o f self-relation. Thus skepticism 
fails to articulate a valid opposition to speculative philosophy.
Having dealt with the first of these five later tropes of skepticism Hegel turns his 
attention towards the fourth and fifth tropes. He argues:
‘Since the rational is relation itself, the [terms] stand in relation to each other, which 
are supposed to ground one another, when they are posited by the understanding, may 
well fall into the circle, or into the fifth, the trope o f reciprocity, but the relational 
itself does not, for within the relation, nothing is reciprocally grounded. Similarly the
“  Ibid, pp.336-7
13
rational is not an unproved assumption, in accordance with the fourth trope, so that its 
counterpart could with equal right be presupposed unproven in opposition to it; for the 
rational has no opposed counterpart, it includes both of the finite opposites, which are 
mutual counterparts, within itself.’27 *
Hegel claims that it is not a matter of reason having to ground itself in such a way that 
it necessarily falls into undecidability or circularity. Rationality just is relationality 
itself, not a mere moment o f relation. Hence there is no element o f  reason itself that is 
reciprocally grounded by its ‘other’, in the way that specific moments within reason 
may be shown to be so grounded by other moments. For Hegel reason can never have 
the characteristic associated with the fourth trope, i.e. that of a mere assumption or 
presupposition to which another assumption or presupposition could just as easily and 
justifiably be taken up. He argues that what skeptical equipollence genuinely 
challenges here is the ultimate validity of any dogmatically assumed positions within 
rationality by demonstrating that another dogmatically assumed position can just as 
easily be posited in opposition to the original. However, he shows that both the 
original and the equipollent assumption or presupposition are related as moments of 
reason itself. As such, no equipollent assumption or presupposition opposed to reason, 
or site outside of reason, could itself be articulated in an effort to demonstrate the 
view that reason per se has itself merely the status of an arbitrary assumption or 
presupposition. Hegel now uses these insights to consider the second and third of 
these later five tropes of skepticism and summarily dismisses them as representing 
any kind of real challenge to reason in the following passage of the essay:
‘The two preceding tropes [second and third] both contain the concept of a ground 
and a consequent; according to which one term would be grounded by another, since 
for Reason, there is no opposition of one term against another, these two tropes 
become as irrelevant as the demand for a ground that is advanced in the sphere of 
oppositions, and repeated endlessly (in the second trope, of the infinite regress). 
Neither that demand, nor the infinite regress, is of any concern to Reason.’**
27 Ibid, p.337
21 Ibid, p.337
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For Hegel such a form of skepticism merely masquerades as a form of absolute 
negativity when it explicitly opposes itself to philosophical reason per se. It 
represents, he argues, a degenerate, abstract form o f dialectic, precisely because it 
operates with those tropes merely concerned with abstracted moments of reason itself, ,
or the finite element of reason. Thus when it attempts to bring itself to bear upon 
philosophical reason per se it attempts to pervert the genuine infinity of reason into a 
notion o f finitude:
‘Since these tropes all involve the concept of a finite [world], and are grounded on 
that, the immediate result of their application to the rational is that they pervert it into 
something finite; they give it the itch of limitedness, as an excuse for scratching it.’29
Having provided an account of the historical decline and degeneration of skepticism 
into its modem Schulzian variant Hegel returns in the essay to the issue of genuinely 
radical skepticism. What remains admirable for him about Pyrrhonian skepticism is its 
persistence and maintenance despite inevitably refuting itself through the self­
reference o f its own absolute skepticism. Thus, by demonstrating absolute uncertainty 
through the negative process of equipollence it must inevitably undermine its own 
claims for such uncertainty. Such extreme skepticism is itself openly refuted in its 
movement towards the notion that ‘nothing is certain’, yet persists as the absolutely 
negative force of equipollence despite refuting itself. This is the most profound and 
significant element of genuinely negative skepticism for Hegel30 as he comes to 
reconsider its relationship to, and function within, speculative philosophy. Clearly 
genuinely negative skepticism does not aim to elevate itself to the point of becoming a 
dogmatic doctrine; rather it aims to persist as the force of the negative, ever present to 
corrode and undermine all forms of dogmatic and abstract certainty by asserting their 
opposites via equipollence and demonstrating their equal validity. These assertions are 
of course themselves open to being subjected to the negative force of equipollence, as 
are indeed any assertions whatsoever. Therefore, authentic negative skepticism 
actually resists positing any positive assertions outside of its corrosive negative 
stance. Hegel writes:
29 Ibid, p.337
30 It is also for Levinas the most significant aspect of skepticism, as we will demonstrate later in this 
thesis.
IS
‘Since it holds back altogether from expressing any certainty or any being, it does not, 
on its own account, have any thing, any conditioned [being] of which it could have 
knowledge; and it is not obliged to shove either this [empirically] certain thing, or 
another one that would be behind it, into the shoes o f philosophy, in order to bring 
about its fall. Because of the orientation o f skepticism against knowing in general, it is 
impelled, since it sets one thought against another, and so combats the ‘is’ of 
philosophical thought, to sublate the ‘is’ of its own thought likewise, and thus to keep 
itself within the pure negativity.’* 31
Through what he calls the sublation o f the ‘is’ contained within its own movement, 
skepticism becomes consciously self-referential (i.e. consciously self-refuting), and 
thereby expresses for Hegel its very height. However, in the very attempt to maintain 
such a radical negativity in opposition to objective reason, skepticism becomes 
inevitably perverted into a form of solipsistic self-certainty. In doing so skepticism 
ceases to be genuinely skeptical, and ironically becomes itself a target of the truly 
radical, negative, objective and genuine skepticism. Such a movement, from the 
seemingly unsustainable objectivity of radically self-referential, skepticism towards 
the conceit of a seemingly sustainable subjectivism within skepticism, represents for 
Hegel the key to understanding the dissolution o f the truth of skepticism. Such
*f'“ "  ’> ** """3
skepticism rests, he claims, upon the ‘sundering of the rational, in which thinking and w , 
being are one.’32 He argues that this sundering of the rational and the insistence upon 
the opposition between thinking and being, i.e. the understanding made absolute, «■ 
constitutes the ‘endlessly repeated and universally applied ground of this dogmatic 
skepticism’33, and indeed represents the ground for the persistence o f skepticism 
within the post-Enlightenment era. For Hegel this degeneration of skepticism must be 
understood as emerging from a stubborn refiisal to recognise the truth of the positive 
within itself. This becomes evident at the very moment skepticism recognises its self- 
refutation by the very negativity that it posits as a universal principle.
11 Ibid, p.337 
32 Ibid, p.339
31 Ibid, p.339
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Hegel argues that genuine ancient skepticism is a negative force directed against the 
certainties o f ordinary consciousness. However, Sextus, in his account of Pyrrhonism, 
conflates this genuine skepticism with a skeptical opposition to philosophical 
dogmatism. For Hegel this type o f  skepticism inevitably becomes dogmatic in so far 
as it persists in an absolute opposition to philosophical reason. The positive truth of 
genuine negative skepticism emerges as the recognition o f it as the free, critical, 
negative element of dialectic implicit within philosophical reason. Genuine skepticism 
cannot be sustained as abstracted from philosophy; the choice, Hegel argues, is clear 
and stark -  either recognition o f its necessary inclusion within philosophical reason or 
degeneration into the merely dogmatic type of subjective skepticism associated with 
Schulze. For Hegel genuine speculative reason necessarily involves a genuinely 
skeptical equipollent dimension that functions internally to de-absolutise the dogmatic 
and abstract claims of the understanding. Such a dimension clearly emerges within 
Hegel’s mature philosophical works, first at the phenomenological level in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit where it serves to de-absolutise distinct historical shapes (or 
( iestahen) of consciousness and self-consciousness, and then later to de-hypostasise 
the distinct categories at the logical level in the Science o f Logic. Thus, Hegel argues, 
skepticism is not ultimately opposed to speculative philosophy, but joins the efforts of 
speculation in opposing dogmatism in precisely the narrower sense, namely the 
dogmatism that subsists through the suppression o f relation. Equipollence becomes a 
recognizable characteristic of the operation of what Hegel comes to characterise as the 
principle of immanent dialectic. There it becomes incorporated within the principle of 
what we will term ‘auto-equipollence’, and has a positive and determinate speculative 
significance. This is the idea o f  the self-generation o f opposites or self-othering, 
together with the notion of the self-overcoming of that differentiation whereby an 
absolute identity itself comes to be constituted by difference. Thus as Hegel will come 
to write in the Encyclopaedia Logic
i,
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‘What is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided 
determination in it, and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the contrary, being a 
totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a 
state of separation from one another united within itself.’14
M G.W.F. Hegel. Encyclopaedia l.oyic. MM. addition, p.70
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Clearly for Hegel the absolute negativity of genuine skepticism is not an opponent or 
nemesis of philosophy, but an integral critical element within genuine philosophical 
reflection and method. Skepticism and speculative philosophy thus go hand in hand; 
skepticism is not so much ‘directed against philosophy as for it.’33 When articulating 
this view within the essay on skepticism Hegel cites the testimony of Diogenes 
Laertius regarding the influence of Pyrrhonism on ancient philosophers. Relying upon 
the evidence of such testimony, Hegel writes:
‘True philosophy necessarily involves a negative side of its own. ..which is directed 
against everything limited, and thereby against the heap of the facts of consciousness, 
and their indubitable certainty.’35 6
Hegel argues that Schulze disregards this type o f skepticism, preferring to maintain 
his polarised version of separated negative skepticism, i.e. skepticism vs. dogmatism 
as philosophy. He traces Schulze’s fault back to a misrepresentation of a division 
identified by Sextus Empiricus’s between the philosophy that included skepticism 
within itself as part of its methodology, and the skepticism that separated itself off and 
posited itself as opposed to dogmatism. The former Sextus identifies as the 
‘Academics’, which presumably would have included Plato (indeed Sextus maintains 
that there is a ‘great measure of agreement between the Academics and skepticism.’37) 
As we have seen, Schulze presents the separated form of skepticism as being 
fundamentally anti-philosophical, and completely disregards Academic skepticism.
For Hegel, however, following Sextus Empiricus’s insight regarding the ‘Academics’, 
Plato’s Parmenides represents the realisation o f the consonance between genuine 
ancient negative skepticism and philosophy. In the quest for truth undertaken within 
that dialogue, and the strategy Plato has Parmenides recommend to Socrates, there is a 
rejection o f specific doubts regarding the truths o f the understanding and its modes of 
cognition, in favour o f a much more thoroughgoing and rigorous doubting. Indeed, 
Hegel maintains ‘it is intent on the complete denial of all truth to this sort of
35 G.W.F. Hegel, BKH, p.330
34 Ibid, p.323
37 Ibid, p.330
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cognition’3*, in favour o f a much profounder notion o f truth. This more profound 
notion of truth emerges when Parmenides says to Socrates:
‘You must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of 
that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not.’* 39
And:
‘Concerning whatever you might ever hypothesize as being or as not being or as 
having any other property, you must examine the consequences for the thing you 
hypothesize in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever 
you select, and in relation to several o f them and to all o f them in the same way; and, 
in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to 
whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize as 
being or as not being. All this you must do if, after completing your training, you are 
to achieve a full view o f  truth.’40
Parmenides’ comments to Socrates come in the first part o f the dialogue, just after the 
young Socrates has been allowed to articulate his theory of forms. Parmenides 
criticises Socrates’ philosophising as not being sufficiently liberated (torn the 
parochial values of ordinary opinion, and claims that when Socrates talks of the good, 
the just and the beautiful he loses himself in their particular features and does not truly 
think of them as forms. Parmenides insists that one must consider the consequences of 
positing not only the being of the chosen subject but also its not being. Through this 
insistence he claims to  undermine the partisanship of the advocate in favour o f the 
uncommitted ‘indifferent’ spirit necessary for genuinely philosophical thinking. Thus, 
to entertain the possible not-being o f ‘X’ is to put a check on any unquestioning 
presupposition that ‘X ’ is. Parmenides’ strategy should have the effect of liberating 
one’s thought about ‘X’ from the grip of a dogmatic commitment to it as it first 
appears, and o f enabling the detached and open-minded attitude that is a prerequisite 
to genuine rational reflection.
"  Ibid, p.323
39 Plato. Parmenides, translated by M L. Gill A  P. Ryan (Indianapolis: Hackctt Publishing Co.. 1996)
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40 Ibid. I3ftb-c, p. 140
For Hegel the type of skeptical epoche advocated by Plato’s Parmenides does not 
constitute an abstraction from or opposition to reason, but is itself the negative side o f 
the genuine cognition o f the Absolute. It is thus the very principle o f genuine negative 
dialectic, which produces Reason itself as its Positive side. Hegel acknowledges that 
Plato’s Parmenides initially appears wholly negative but argues that to conclude thus 
is to ignore the way that it functions as the necessary propadeutic toward the 
‘purification of mind, and freedom of spirit’ which clears the way for the ‘letting be’ 
of the genuine truth of reason. Hegel argues that the type o f skepticism that emerges 
from Plato’s Parmenides is one ‘implicit in every genuine philosophical system, for it 
is the free side of every philosophy.’41
Michael Forster in his book Hegel and Skepticism argues that Hegel’s views here 
regarding Plato’s Parmenides are erroneous, claiming that when writing of this and 
other Platonic dialogues Hegel ‘radically misunderstands them, reading into them his 
own dialectic method and its purposes in a very unconvincing way’42. He argues that 
‘Hegel in effect reads his own dialectical metaphysics into works which. . . generate 
contradictions merely as aporia to be resolved later.’43 However, it is our view that 
such a reading o f Hegel is deeply flawed. To recognise the full extent of Forster’s 
error it is necessary for us to briefly examine Hegel’s comments in the Lectures on the 
History o f Philosophy, specifically the sections dealing with dialectic and Plato in 
Volume 2.
Hegel states there what he calls the ‘Notion of true dialectic’ as showing forth ‘the 
necessary movement of pure Notions, without thereby resolving these into nothing; 
for the result, simply expressed, is that they are this movement, and the universal is 
just the unity of these opposite Notions.’44 He immediately acknowledges that we will 
not find within Plato a fully developed consciousness that this is the nature o f 
dialectic, but that we can nevertheless discern the presence of the dialectic itself 
Thus, contrary to Forster’s account, from the very beginning of his exposition Hegel
41 G.W.F. Hegel. Ibid, p.324
42 M.N Forster, lleyel and Skepticism  (Cambridge. Mass./London: Harvard U P . 1989) p.173
43 Ibid, p.249
44 G.W.F. Hegel, lectures on the History o f Philosophy, translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson 
(Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) Vol. 2, p.49
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acknowledges that it is going to be a matter of discerning elements of the genuine 
notion of dialectic from Plato rather than merely reading Plato as transparently 
expressing that genuine dialectic. He acknowledges that there are very real difficulties 
in discerning the genuine notion of true dialectic in Plato simply because the 
manifestation of the universal form is developed from ordinary conceptions. Whilst 
beginning with ordinary conceptions may appear to make knowledge easier, he claims 
that it really makes it much more complicated:
‘It introduces us into a field in which there is quite a different standard from what we 
have in reason, and makes the field present to us, when, on the contrary, progression 
and motion take place in pure Notions alone, the other is not remembered at all. But in 
that very way the Notions attain greater truth... Since both are there brought together, 
the speculative element begins to appear as it is in truth; that is, as being the only 
truth, and that indeed through the transformation of sensuous opinion into 
thought .. Contrasted with merely external reality, it is rather the ideal that is the most 
real, and it is was Plato who perceived that it was the only real, for he characterised 
the universal or thought as the true, in opposition to what is sensuous. ’45
He argues that by being directed against the form o f the finite, Plato’s dialectic has the 
effect of confounding the particular, by bringing forth the negation implied within it. 
The particular is proved not to be what it is, and passes into its opposite, into the 
limitations which are essential to it. A crucial function associated with this aspect of 
the Platonic dialogue was the bringing of the universal in men to consciousness. 
However, Hegel claims that in this form the Platonic dialectic is not ‘yet dialectic in 
its true form.’46 Precisely because the universal which has emerged from the 
confusion of the particular, i.e. the true, beautiful and good, was at first undetermined 
and abstract, it becomes part of Plato’s endeavours to determine this universal in 
itself:
‘This determination is the relation which the dialectic movement in thought bears to 
the universal, for through this movement the Idea comes to these thoughts which 
contain the opposites of the finite within themselves. For the Idea, as self-determining,
45 Ibid, p.5<)
46 Ibid, p.52
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is the unity o f these differences, and thus the Determinate Idea. The universal is hence 
determined as that which resolves and has resolved the contradictions in itself, and 
hence it is the concrete in itself; thus this sublation of contradiction is the affirmative. 
Dialectic in this higher sense is the really Platonic; as speculative it does not conclude 
with a negative result, for it demonstrates the union of opposites which have annulled 
themselves.’47
For Hegel the ‘speculative dialectic’ initiated by Plato is the very thing that is most 
important yet the most difficult and often overlooked aspect of his thought. He argues 
that it is crucial that we bring serious attention to bear upon the element of Plato’s 
dialectic that deals with the pure thought of reason, from which he distinguishes the 
understanding. Indeed, for Hegel:
‘Plato’s true speculative greatness, and that through which he forms an epochê in the 
history of philosophy, and hence in the history of the world, lies in the fuller 
determination of the Idea.’48
By coming to consider this genuine element of dialectic in Plato we ‘must keep to the 
wearisome path, and allow ourselves to be pricked by the thorns and thistles of 
metaphysics. For behold, we then come to what is best and highest, to investigations 
respecting the one and many, Being and nothing.’49 For Hegel it is the later dialogues, 
specifically the Sophist, Philebus and especially the Parmenides, that deal with the 
dialectic in this ‘higher signification’. Crucially, he argues that their aim is not merely 
a negative one, something associated perhaps with the earlier dialogues that seek 
merely to confound opinion or understanding, or to awaken a sense of the necessity of 
knowledge. Plato’s dialogues cannot be reduced to merely negative skepticism. 
Rather, Hegel’s substantial claim here is that these three dialogues themselves 
express, albeit in prototype form, the ‘abstract Speculative Idea in its Pure Notion.’* 30 
They thus demonstrate a much richer and more complex relationship between 
skepticism and speculative philosophical reason.
41 Ibid, p.52 
4* Ibid, p.53 
49 Ibid, p.S5
30 Ibid, p.56
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In the Preface to the Phenomenology o f Spirit Hegel considers again the question of 
skepticism’s relation to speculative philosophy. Here he argues that skepticism qua 
skepticism operates at the level of the merely one-sided negative insight, ‘a dead end 
which does not lead to a new content beyond itseir. His Phenomenology is to proceed 
differently as a ‘self-accomplishing skepticism’, where the highest truth of negative 
skeptical equipollence has been recognised as the determining element of negativity 
within speculative reason itself. Thus the specific content, in the f^rn. of liliU p C S  V I  
Gestalten of consciousness, is conceived as containing the negative within itself as the 
very principle functioning to produce its equipollent other. This is what Hegel terms 
‘determinate negation’ as opposed to the mere negation associated with skepticism 
qua skepticism. Thus determinate negation emerges as what we will term the ‘auto- 
equipollence’ of the specific content itself. The notion of a ‘self-accomplishing 
skepticism’ is, we will argue, closely aligned with the notion of the autonomy of 
reason for Hegel. He argues that if philosophical science is ever to become elevated 
beyond mere received opinion in its attempt to obtain justified knowledge it must 
legitimate its own terms from within itself immanently and freely. The terms must not 
be arbitrarily assumed, presupposed or merely inherited from the tradition. For this to 
occur philosophical science must liberate itself from all notions of a given foundation 
and become radically .»^-grounding instead. It is this radical self-grounding that we 
will argue is the explicit purpose of the Phenomenology o f Spirit. Hegel writes:
‘What spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of [true] knowing. In this element 
the moments o f spirit now spread themselves out in that form of simplicity which 
knows its object as its own self. They no longer fall apart into the antithesis of being 
and knowing, but remain in the simple oneness of knowing; they are the True in the 
form of the True, and their difference is only the difference o f content.’51
Hegel’s great insight here lies in his understanding that for philosophy to become 
elevated to the ‘element of true knowing’ it must become radically self-grounding and 
proceed by way of an internal immanent determinate negative dialectic, and not 
through the exercise of any external reflective application o f reason. This is because
" G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit. #37
such application would always have the status of merely arbitrary presupposition. It 
must then begin without any mediated determinate content as such, and yet develop a 
mediated content out of immediacy, indeterminacy, and without any extraneous terms. 
It must be an immediately self-determined determinacy and mediacy. For Hegel such 
genuine philosophical science is impossible unless thought is able ultimately to 
liberate itself from the inherent abstract opposition of consciousness as understanding, 
i.e self and other, thought and being, mind and world. Such oppositions have the 
status of fundamental presuppositions, an assumed ground or foundation for 
philosophy, which must ultimately be deconstructed. We will argue that the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit must be understood as enacting that deconstruction of the 
presuppositions of consciousness, to the point where there can no longer be any 
sustainable antithesis proposed between ‘being and knowing’32:
‘Pure Science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness It contains 
thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its 
own self in so far as it is equally pure thought ’33
The notion of determinate negation displayed throughout the Phenomenology of 
Spirit's deconstruction o f the Gestalten of consciousness and self-consciousness is 
Hegel’s way of referring to the positive or progressive aspect o f  the dialectic. It is 
determinate negation which makes the conceptual movement a constructive one and 
not a purely corrosive, destructive or negative one. The negative dialectic associated 
with authentic skepticism (and identified by Hegel in the early skepticism article) is 
understood here as an external critical tool which reduces all possible theses, 
arguments, and positions to contradictions through equipollence, without offering any 
positive doctrine. When reflecting upon the path of the Phenomenology o f Spirit, 
Hegel writes in the Introduction to the Science o f Ixtgic
‘Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external, negative activity which does not 
pertain to the subject matter itself, having its ground in mere conceit as a subjective 
itch for unsettling and destroying what is fixed and substantial.’34
See W. Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations Rethinking Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) for
an original outline of this viewpoint.
”  G.W.F. Hegel, Science o flxtg ic , p.49
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Notwithstanding his suspicions expressed here regarding the inherent conceit of such 
skepticism, he does grant that this negative aspect constitutes an important part of the 
speculative dialectic, much as he had in the earlier skepticism article. However, this 
recognition is by no means the whole story, for here skepticism is to be conceived as 
‘the negative that fails to see the positive within itself’55 Indeed:
‘The exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative 
procedure.’5<s
In the Phenomenology o f Spirit Hegel argues that skepticism fails to recognise that the 
negative is something inherent within the content at hand itself, preferring through 
conceit to insist upon being an external negative imposing itself upon the content. We 
want to argue for a clear continuity between this view of skepticism and the one found 
in the earlier article In the Phenomenology o f Spirit Hegel reconfigures the entire 
methodology of equipollence associated with genuine negative skepticism as the 
negative operative within any given content (Gestalt of consciousness or self- 
consciousness). Skeptical equipollence itself becomes transfigured and identified as 
the very nature of the immanent production of the equipollent other from out of the 
content itself. However, it is understood here as wholly internal rather than the 
imposition o f  the equipollent other via an external force, i.e. as in authentic 
skepticism. Skepticism is reconfigured as a ‘self-accomplishing skepticism’ 
characteristic of the internality of the content itself. In order to understand this 
reconfiguration we must consider how Hegel contrasts it with the external form of 
skepticism. He undertakes this contrast by considering the form of external skeptical 
consciousness itself as a distinct form (Gestalt) of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit.
When considering the external form o f skepticism in the Phenomenology o f Spirit 
Hegel concentrates upon what he had earlier identified in the early skepticism article
M Ibid, p.55-6
"  G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, #79, p.5l 
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as the degenerate form o f subjective skepticism.57 But now rather than bringing it into 
conjunction with authentic skepticism as he had done in early paper (which remains 
from the perspective o f the Phenomenology o f Spirit's aims merely an exercise of an 
external force upon h) he must be understood now as subjecting it purely to the 
rigours of its own inherent negation, a negation that has a determinate positive result. 
By articulating a wholly internal critique of degenerate subjective skepticism he is 
able to demonstrate a move beyond the merely dogmatic alternation associated with 
this form of skepticism. He achieves this by developing a sophisticated understanding 
of the immanent determinate negation, akin to genuine skepticism, contained within 
the form of subjective skepticism itself. The continuity here with the earlier article on 
skepticism consists in the demonstration of the unsustainability o f the subjective form 
of skepticism and the critical force of a purer and more radical form o f internal 
skepticism. There is, however, a crucial difference in that for Hegel now the more 
radical form o f internal skepticism is not to be understood as merely a superior ‘form’ 
when contrasted with subjective skepticism. Rather it must be understood as the 
negative immanent to  subjective skepticism itself. Hence it is this immanent negative 
which is to be understood as the radically critical force involved in its own 
overcoming or deconstruction. It is, therefore, a self-overcoming or self­
deconstruction i.e. a wholly immanent critique. In fact we would argue that such a 
view is perfectly consonant with Hegel’s arguments in the early skepticism paper. 
Indeed, precisely because of the contrast between authentic and degenerate subjective 
skepticism and the consonance between the former and genuine speculative 
philosophy that Hegel argues for in the early paper, we might argue that this paper be 
understood as the very genesis of Hegel’s notion of self-accomplishing skepticism or 
immanent critique in the Phenomenology o f Spirit.
With regard to his reconfiguration of what we will call universal skepticism (as 
opposed to what Hegel himself will term subjective skepticism), jHegel’s immanent 
speculative dialectic is that dialectic which is not merely negative, but which 
understands negativity as inherent within positive content, and is able to discern and 
preserve something positive in the demonstration of the content’s falsity, j Something 
is then preserved in the negation with which we are able to continue. So rather than
51 G.W.F. Hegel, BKH, see p.338.
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the movement of alternation associated with external equipollent skepticism, Hegel 
conceives internal critique as a determinate path of immanent dialectical progression 
There is thus a cumulative effect throughout a series o f wholly immanent 
contradictory positions of consciousness and self-consciousness right up to the point 
of Absolute knowing:
‘In speculative thinking...the negative belongs to the content itself, and is the 
positive, both as the immanent movement and determination o f the content, and as the 
whole of this process. Looked at as a result, what emerges from this process is the 
determinate negative which is consequently a positive content as well.’58
For Hegel immanent speculative thought is able to show how given abstracted 
Gestalten of consciousness and self-consciousness transform themselves into their 
contradictions, i.e. how they negate themselves. It is then able to think both elements 
of the dichotomy together and discern the true nature of the unity o f the contradiction,
something which skepticism qua external skepticism could never do:
(\c«/X0
‘The speculative or positively rational apprehends the unity o f the determinateness in 
their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their
transition.’59
The immanent speculative philosopher does not rest with the ‘truth’ of contradiction 
qua equipollent skepticism, and so does not rest with the merely alternating fate of 
repetitive contradiction. Rather, immanent speculative philosophy observes the very 
movement of contradictory positions, namely the immanent movement from one 
content or position into its other, and is able to discern a higher truth than that 
obtained by skepticism. The negative is thereby understood to have positive 
implications. It is in the introduction to the Phenomenology o f Spirit that Hegel 
contrasts the notion of determinate negation with the very negation most associated 
with skepticism:
“  G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, #59, p.36
59 G.W.F. Hegel. Encyclopaedia h>gic, #82
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‘The skepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness 
cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes 
along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same abyss. But when, on the 
other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely as a determinate negation, a 
new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made 
through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of 
itself.’60
*" C.W.F. Hegel. Phtmtmtnolagy o f Spirit, #79, p.5l
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Ill The Self-Accomplishing Skepticism of the Phenomenology o f Spirit
Having outlined Hegel’s response to skepticism’s inability to recognise not only the 
negativity inherent within the content itself but also the positive implications of such 
an understanding, we must now examine Hegel’s exposition of the instantiation, 
development and self-overcoming of skepticism in the Phenomenology o f Spirit. The 
fundamental movement is concerned with the failure of skepticism to recognise its 
own determinate negation when it becomes a self-referential skepticism, i.e. when it 
becomes its own negation. In this way it fails, he argues, to recognise the positive at 
the heart of its own absolutely negative, skeptical, equipollent position; attempting 
instead to maintain itself dogmatically as a persistent external negative, corrosive and 
destructive force. Thus skepticism itself, when considered as a Gestalt of 
consciousness or as subjective skepticism, becomes the focus o f Hegel’s 
phenomenological deconstruction at a certain moment in the Phenomenology o f Spirit.
His discussion of subjective skepticism occurs within the context of his account of the 
development of the freedom o f self-consciousness, and in particular its relation to 
Stoicism. For Hegel the stoical notion of consciousness necessarily leads to the 
skeptical one; or as he puts it, the ‘truth’ of stoicism is skepticism; ‘skepticism is the 
realisation of that which stoicism was only the Notion’.61 The skeptic’s consciousness 
of the nullity of every determinate principle is at the same time an implicit 
consciousness of his own subjectivity in the form of the capacity to critically assess 
all principles and is the principle against which all determinate principles are to be 
asserted. On Hegel’s view the skeptic’s subjective retreat is a retreat into an inner 
form of freedom and independence. The skeptical subject’s freedom resides in its lack 
of determination by any criterion or principle that is ‘other’ than itself, that is, external 
or alien to itself. It is, on the contrary, self-determining and in-itself:
‘Skepticism. . . is the actual experience o f what freedom of thought is. This is in-itself 
the negative and must exhibit itself as such. ’62
61 Ibid, #202, p. 123
“ Ibid
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Anything that looks abstract, fixed and true can be shown, the skeptic argues, to be 
only relative to a particular subjective point o f view, including even that subjective 
point of view’s view o f  itself. The skeptic thus applies the kind of reflections that for 
the stoic constituted independence of thought to thought itself, thereby demonstrating 
that what was taken as fixed and known by the stoics was in fact relative and open to 
question. The skeptic’s point is that when the impersonal point of view assumed by 
the stoic is applied to itself it turns out to be self-undermining. Thus, the stoic’s 
attempt to achieve an impersonal point of view leads to the insight that there really is 
no such impersonal point of view and the conclusion that there can only be subjective 
and relative points o f view. True independence of thought thus requires one to be a 
skeptic:
‘Through this self-conscious negation it procures for its own self the certainty o f its 
freedom, generates the experience o f that freedom, and thereby raises it to truth. What 
vanishes is the determinate element, or the moment of difference, which, whatever its 
mode of being and whatever its source, sets itself up as something fixed and 
immutable.’63
The skeptic seemingly achieves a true freedom of self-consciousness, i.e. nothing can 
count for him unless he takes it as counting, and the skeptic understands that nothing 
can count as knowledge for him. He thus focuses on his own activity of ‘taking things 
to be such and such’. Skepticism is, as Hegel characterises it, the ‘negative’, a 
subjective point of view taking itself and itself alone to be that which sets the 
standards for what is to  count as a claim to knowledge, taking itself to have shown 
that all the putatively universal points of view are really only subjective. It then argues 
that no subjective point of view can succeed on its own terms. Nothing can therefore 
count as stable and independent for this type of skeptic except the skeptic’s own 
consciousness o f the relativity o f everything else.
Let us briefly consider and contrast Hegel’s account of skepticism here in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit together with the earlier skepticism article. In the early 
article he writes:
63 Ibid, #204, p. 124
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‘This purely negative attitude that wants to remain mere subjectivity and seeming, 
ceases ipso facto, to be something for knowledge. He who stays holding fast to the 
vanity of the fact that “it seems so to him”, “that he is o f the opinion that. . he who 
wants his utterances never to be taken as objective assertions o f  thought and 
judgement at all, must be left where he stands. His subjectivity concerns no one else, 
still less does it concern philosophy, nor is philosophy concerned in it.’64
Here the ‘purely negative attitude that wants to remain mere subjectivity’ ceases, he 
claims, to be of concern to philosophy. However, in the Phenomenology such 
subjective negation becomes a crucial feature in the development towards the 
understanding o f the freedom of self-consciousness. What he earlier identified as the 
negative associated with genuine skepticism becomes the very principle of self- 
critical immanent determinate negation operative throughout the entire 
Phenomenology. The maintenance of a determinately subjective skeptical viewpoint 
becomes understood here as:
‘Wholly contingent, single, and separate ... a consciousness which is empirical, which 
takes its guidance from what has no reality for it, which obeys what is for it not an 
essential being, which does those things and brings to realisation what it knows has no 
truth for it.’65
He continues here with the understanding of degenerate skepticism that he had 
outlined in his earlier skepticism article; i.e. the view that subjective skepticism is 
explicitly governed by an uncritical relation with empirical notions He also 
maintains, as he had earlier, that subjective skepticism determines itself to be an 
external force o f negation. For Hegel in the Phenomenology o f Spirit such a self­
understanding forms a distinct shape of consciousness and begins the very process of 
realising the implicit absolute freedom o f the self-conscious subject. However, he 
argues that as such it inherently converts itself into ‘a consciousness that is universal 
and self-identical; for it is the negativity o f  all singularity and all difference’.66 In this
M G.W.F. Hegel, BKH, p.338
65 G.W.F. Hcgd, Phenomenology o f  Spirit, #205, p. 125 
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sense its contingent singular subjective skepticism is implicitly negated, not through 
the activity of an application of an external negation such as the principle of 
equipollence associated with Ancient skepticism, but rather through an internal 
immanent negation of the matter itself. It is, one might say, ¿«//'-negation This 
immanent self-negation of subjective skepticism must seemingly assume the detached 
universal point o f  view to see that all claims to knowledge are themselves relative to a 
subjective point o f view. The subjective skeptic thus finds himself in what seems to be 
an elementary contradiction from which he cannot extricate himself:
‘This consciousness is therefore the unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes 
back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other 
extreme of the contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering. It 
does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together.’67 *
Hegel argues that skepticism announces an absolute vanishing o f essential being in 
doubt, but that the very pronouncement o f such doubt is, and that this form o f 
consciousness, as skeptical doubting, 'is the vanishing that is pronounced’ 611 It 
attempts to affirm the ‘nullity of seeing, hearing etc.’, yet ‘it is itself seeing hearing, 
etc.’.69 Thus, he claims, its ‘deeds and its words always belie one another’:
‘But it keeps the poles of this its self-contradiction apart, and adopts the same attitude 
to it as it does in its purely negative activity in general.’70
Skeptical consciousness discovers that it can preserve its independence not by 
affirming any particular claim to knowledge but only by affirming its own reflective 
activity itself. The skeptic, by keeping the poles of its self-contradiction apart through 
a form of dogmatic refusal, refuses speculative philosophy. As such the subjective 
skeptic remains a divided form of consciousness, caught between the two points of 
view he finds within himself, namely the contingent, purely personal point of view, 
and the detached, impersonal point of view. Hegel likens the refusal o f speculative 
philosophy represented by the persistence of skepticism to the situation o f ‘squabbling
61 Ibid
“ Ibid
“ Ibid
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self-willed children’, each just stating the opposite of the other for the sake of ‘the 
pleasure of continually contradicting one another.’71 However, speculative thought is 
able to discern a positive resolution away from the persistence of the repetition of 
merely alternating contradiction associated with subjective skepticism. Such a 
resolution emerges from bringing the contradictory elements within subjective 
skeptical consciousness together, rather than refusing the conjunction in the manner of 
subjective skepticism, and represents the determinate negation of subjective 
skepticism.
Hegel argues that when the skeptic concedes the division within himself, rather than 
refusing it, he ceases to be a skeptic. His subjective skeptical consciousness is negated 
through the concession, the skeptic now recognises and accepts the centrality of 
certain views for himself, and admits that he has no way of justifying those beliefs 
outside of his own contingently held point of view. Hegel calls this the ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’:
‘In skepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as internally contradictory. From 
this experience emerges a new form of consciousness that brings together the two 
thoughts which skepticism holds apart. Skepticism’s lack of thought about itself must 
vanish, because it is in fact one consciousness that contains within itself these two 
modes. This new form is, therefore, one which knows that it is the dual consciousness 
of itself, as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical, and as self-bewildering 
and self-perverting, and it is the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of 
itself...the Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, 
merely contradictory being.’72
The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ is to be distinguished from skepticism. The skeptic 
wishes to assert the supreme validity o f no point of view and thus finds itself 
wavering between both the subjective and the objective points of view, whereas the 
‘unhappy consciousness’ takes the wavering to be an essential feature of itself and the 
world. It is the self-conception of self-consciousness that discovers that it must hold 
both sides of the contradiction, that there is no way out of the contradiction, and that it
11 Ibid
12 Ibid, #206, p. 126
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must live with it rather than refuse it in its philosophical understanding. The ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ must take the two contradictory perspectives as fully opposing points 
of view; what is justified from one point of view is unjustified from the other. Thus 
the ‘unhappy consciousness’ takes the impersonal view to represent the unchangeable 
essential view and its own subjective point of view to be utterly contingent, 
changeable and unessential. It is ‘unhappy’ because it cannot take these two points of 
view to be indifferent to one another; each is essential and each contradicts the other. 
The movement of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ which Hegel then describes involves a 
return to the original guiding principle o f subjective skepticism, namely that it is its 
own thinking activity that allows things to count for it. Thus the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ eschews the notion o f itself as merely passive and receptive to the 
‘truth’, in favour of a preparatory activity whereby it is ready to ‘receive the truth’.
We have attempted to demonstrate throughout this discussion of the nature o f Hegel’s 
thought and its relationship to skepticism. We have argued that he recovers and 
develops the truth of authentic skepticism as a crucial element within his own 
philosophical work. This authentic skepticism is reconfigured by Hegel in his mature 
work as the negative principle or aspect of the immanent speculative dialectic, and 
becomes the notion o f negation as determinate self-negation, a negation that generates 
positive results immanently. We have also attempted to demonstrate the degree to 
which Hegel brings the truth of determinate negation (itself emergent from the 
consideration of authentic universal skepticism) to bear upon subjective skepticism. 
As we have outlined, the problems with subjective skepticism concern the degree to 
which it is governed by an uncritical relation with empirical notions and conceives 
itself as an external and independent force of negation. Hegel in the Phenomenology 
demonstrates how this subjective form of skepticism is, ultimately, philosophically 
unsustainable and is necessarily negated. However, Hegel also demonstrates how such 
skepticism contains a positive truth in the form of the critical negativity that emerges 
from its movement. The critical negativity, associated with the movement or dialectic 
of subjective skepticism, must be preserved as a crucial moment in the historical 
evolution of philosophical consciousness. In the next part of this thesis we will outline 
and examine three 19th century post-Hegelian attempts to persist with a type of 
skepticism ‘beyond’ Hegel. We will bring their respective skeptical positions back 
into proximity with a Hegelian response, beginning with Schelling’s skeptical
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characterisation of Hegel’s speculative idealism as merely negative philosophy, and 
his own claims for the elaboration of a Positive philosophy.
PART TWO -  THE 19th CENTURY POST-HEGELIAN SKEPTICS
I - Schelling’s Skeptical Criticism of Hegel
(i) Positive Philosophy and Skepticism
Schelling’s reading and subsequent critique of Hegel, his Deutungsperspektive' 
attempts to introduce a novel modality of skepticism into the Western philosophical 
tradition We will try to show how this modality emerges from the distinction made 
by Schelling between Negative and Positive philosophy. He characterises the 
fundamental flaw in Hegel's speculative idealism as its attempt to embrace a realm 
that he believes must be delimited and articulated by a Positive rather than a Negative 
philosophy 2 Indeed Schelling demonstrates the failure of Hegel’s philosophy by 
showing it to be a ‘Negative’ philosophy that insists on being able to explicate a 
‘Positive’ notion of real being He argues that by learning from Hegel’s singular 
failure subsequent philosophers are able to recognise the way that all types of 
‘Negative’ philosophies refute themselves by attempting to articulate a ‘Positive’ 
notion of real being from out of themselves. Thus skepticism persists (in the form of 
the presence o f positive and actual real being incommensurable to reason) and the 
post-Hegelian philosopher is able to sustain a legitimate opposition to speculative 
reason’s attempt to overcome the difference between thought and actuality. For 
Schelling this necessary skeptical opposition emerges from within speculative 
philosophy itself and provides the necessary means for the transition to a ‘Positive’ 
philosophy.
Schelling’s later philosophy bears a marked skepticism of Hegel’s view that a 
philosophical 'reason' can be constructed that is able to adequately account for there 1
1 This is Ihc German term which B. Uurkhardt introduces to describe Schclling's critical interpretation 
of Hegel in his book Hegel's Wissenschaft tier l.ogik im S/tannung/eld tier Kritik (Zurich: George Olms 
Vcrlag Hildcshcim. 1993), p. 17
'  My own understanding and account of Schclling's notion of Negative and Positive philosophy is 
largely based upon F. W.J. Schclling's lectures entitled On the History o f  Modem Philosophy, 
translation, introduction and notes by A. Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994) and 
the accounts given in A. Bowie's Schelling and Modem European Philosophy An Introduction, A. 
While's Absolute Knowledge: llegel and the Problem o f  Metaphysics (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press. 1983) and Schelling: An Introduction to the System o f Freedom (, Haven & I ¿melon Yale 
University Press. 1983), E.A. Beach's The Potencies ofdod(s) (Albany. NY: SUNY, 1994) and S. 
Iloulgalc's 'Schclling's Critique of Hegel's Science o f  Logic' in The Review o f Metaphysics, Vol 53 
No I, 1999
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being a manifest actual world. It is also marked by a move toward understanding a 
redefined notion of ‘freedom’ as a critical force existing outside of, and prior to, any 
such construct of reason. He argues that such a notion of ‘freedom’ must be 
recognised as the explanation for there being a primary disclosure of actuality beyond 
reason. To understand ‘what’ (Was) something ‘is’ through a rational construct is 
never to know ‘that’ (Daß) it exists, ‘that’ it is. For Schelling our knowledge of 
actuality is always prior to any rational construct; rather, knowledge o f actuality 
emerges from what he terms Vorstellung. Given this move (which Schelling argues is 
the move toward the realm o f ‘Positive Philosophy’) he clearly perceives Hegel’s 
philosophy to be the paradigmatic expression of systematic reflexive reason, i.e. a 
system of reason whereby thought ‘relates’ itself to pure essences (or the pure in- 
itself) through its own activity. He claims that Hegel merely perpetuates a 
philosophical tradition o f thinking the ‘what’ (fVas) of things. However, he argues 
that within Hegel’s philosophy an irreducible distinction or diremption between 
actuality and reason is manifested In other words, a type of internally generated 
skepticism persists. Indeed, Schelling credits Hegel with having unwittingly brought 
about the closure of a certain form of negative metaphysics by articulating a necessary 
distinction between pure reason and actuality He claims Hegel demonstrates that, 
despite its best efforts, reason is only ever capable o f  articulating an evolving 
determination of ‘what’ (Was) it is to be a certain kind o f  thing. In this sense he 
argues that ‘negative philosophy is entirely a priori in its procedures and 
conclusions’.1
Negative philosophy is restricted to merely being able to determine what is 
conceivable within thought or reason alone, and thereby what is possible. It can never, 
Schelling claims, establish ‘that’ (Daß) real being actually exists. In other words, 
rationality is restricted to representing either the possible a  priori structures of real 
being or proposing an a  posteriori analysis of real being but never the actual existence 
of being. The culmination of Negative philosophy in Hegel produces a skeptical 
insight regarding reason and provides an opportunity for beginning a Positive 
philosophy This Positive philosophy must begin with an absolute positivity regarding 
actuality, a positivity that cannot be entirely generated by thought or reason. Beach
’ E.A. Beach, The Potencies o f  Oodfs) (Albany, NY SUNY, 1W4), p.147
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writes that ‘Schelling characterises pure thought as pointing beyond itself toward a 
supplementary source of knowledge’.4 The implication o f this is that such a beginning 
must precede philosophical reflection and reason and that its source is utterly 
heterogeneous. One problem that has to be addressed by Schelling is how one is to 
gain access to such a beginning when we appear to have moved ‘beyond the strictures 
of rationalistic philosophies’.3 The traditional route marked out by the history o f 
Negative philosophy only ever assumes that a certain kind of being (i.e the being of 
an a priori concept within reason itself) will serve as an adequate notion of absolute 
being. However, such necessary absolute being must have always already ‘been there’ 
before it is possible to generate an understanding of it as a possible necessity, i.e 
‘that’ (l)aß) being is precedes ‘what’ (Wav) being is. Such necessary actuality can 
never be articulated within pure reason in any other way than negatively, i.e. the 
necessity that real being cannot not be. Negative philosophy thus fails to disclose the 
absolute plenitude of existence or the fact ‘that’ (Daß) being is In order to establish 
the nature of actuality we must fall back on something ‘other’ than ‘mere’ reason. 
This something ‘other’ is what Schelling terms ‘sensuous’ and ‘pure’ Vorstellung or 
‘metaphysical empiricism’, and through this notion he is able to suggest the existence 
of a means for a direct consciousness or intuition of things in contrast to pure thought 
or reason. This notion of metaphysical empiricism remains distinct from pure thought 
or reason and is characterised by Schelling as an immediate revelation rather than an a  
priori possibility or a posteriori description As Beach writes of the notion in his 
study, it is ‘an immediate empathetic encounter with the spirit of another being’ or ‘a 
direct experiential access to the supersensible realities’.6
Crucial to  understanding the way Positive philosophy is configured as a skeptical and 
disruptive force opposed to pure reason is Schelling’s claim that pure reason is always 
already conditioned by a relation to actuality and existence For Schelling absolutely 
necessary actuality is that which just necessarily exists since As Houlgate writes:
‘It excludes its own mere possibility by preceding all possibility. This means that the 
necessity of being itself is not one that is grounded in possibility, but one that is *
4 E.A. Beach. Ibid, p. 147 
'  Ibid,
* Ibid, p.l4X
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without any prior ground. It is the groundless necessity o f being’s simply being and 
having no other option apart from being.’7
The claim is that reason itself is irreducibly related to the freedom, independence and 
anteriority of that which Hegel had so systematically sought to encompass within 
reason It is this claim for the irreducible conditionality o f reason that provides the 
necessary impetus for the critical transfiguraton of Negative philosophy into a 
Positive one. Actuality is claimed as a conditioning ground of reason itself, and 
therefore an exteriority prior to the activity o f reason. Such a ground, Schelling 
argues, can never be completely sublated into that which it has conditioned. Thus 
Schelling’s Positive philosophy emphasises the brute materiality of being as 
irreducibly anterior to all conceptual speculation; as Beach writes, Schelling’s 
overriding concern for a Positive philosophy is with the ‘possibility of supersensible 
experience and the primacy of the suprarational’ .8
It is actuality absolutely outside reason that provides the very grounds for the post- 
Hegelian type o f skepticism. Schelling acknowledges that reason itself is able to reach 
a thought of the necessary actuality of being, but only negatively, i.e. at the level of 
conception and a possibility; it is unable to bring to mind the positivity and anteriority 
of actuality. He argues that Hegel’s entire philosophy, despite being motivated by a 
desire to determine actuality or real being, can only ever conceive real being 
negatively, i.e as being what cannot not be, simply because it withdraws in to the 
realm of pure thought:
‘Hegel established precisely as the first demand on philosophy that it should withdraw 
into pure thinking, and that it should have as sole immediate object the pure concept. 
Hegel cannot be denied the credit for having seen the merely logical nature o f the 
philosophy which he intended to work on and promised to bring to its complete 
form.’9
1 S. Houlgatc, Ibid, p.9
1 E.A. Beach, Ibid, p  172-3
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By withdrawing into pure thought Hegel is only ever able to think what is thinkable 
rather than what is actual, and Schelling attempts to prove that Hegel is ultimately 
constrained by the modesty implicit to reason. Despite its immodest pretensions to 
have discovered actual/real being in thought, Hegel’s philosophy remains confined 
within mere self-identity never really encountering the genuine otherness of being. 
Schelling argues that the consequence of Hegel’s immodesty (whereby real being is 
posited and identified with the structure o f  the merely conceivable) is that real being 
existing prior to and beyond reason becomes effaced. The merely conceivable 
becomes posited as the ultimate structure o f  the Absolute Idea or Concept, and as the 
structure of the very possibility of real being, i .e. if there is to be real being it must be 
rationally constructed. However, despite its efforts to articulate real being in this way 
Hegel’s philosophy remains a paradigmatic expression o f Negative philosophy and 
cannot but fail in its attempt to provide a systematic rational understanding of real 
being. For Schelling the irreducible truth o f  real being is that it remains the exterior 
ground of reason itself rather than something discovered and articulated by reason 
within a delimited realm of pure thought.
This characterisation o f Hegel’s philosophy as merely ‘Negative’ allows Schelling to 
initiate a sustained skeptical opposition to the Science o f Logic and Hegel’s efforts 
there to transcend the traditional limitations of reason within the implicit confines of 
Negative philosophy. He argues that Hegel’s Science o f Logic erroneously attempts to 
derive an entirely rationally generated knowledge of actuality; a fact revealed by the 
fact that Hegel’s withdrawal into pure thought was ‘as one can find stated on the very 
first pages of Hegel’s I-ogic, linked to the claim that the concept was everything and 
left nothing outside itself.’10 He understands Hegel to be arguing that there is nothing 
apart from reason in actuality itself precisely because the rationally conceivable is 
essentially all that there is. Herein lies the ‘deep flaw’, from Schelling’s perspective, 
with Hegel’s philosophy, and this ‘flaw’ grounds all of his subsequent criticisms of 
Hegel’s system:
‘Hegel is so little inclined to recognise his philosophy as the merely negative 
philosophy that he asserts instead that it is the philosophy which leaves absolutely 
nothing outside itself; his philosophy attributes to itself the most objective meaning
10 Ibid
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and, in particular, a wholly complete knowledge (Erkenntnis) of God and of divine 
things -  the knowledge which Kant denied to philosophy is supposedly achieved by 
his philosophy.’11
He objects to Hegel’s view ‘that everything only exists via what is logical’12, and 
argues that Hegel’s philosophy ignores or fails to recognise the ‘fact’ that real being 
occurs groundlessly ‘o f itself beyond reason As Houlgate writes, Hegel is for 
Schelling ‘an irredeemably panlogicist -  or indeed, logocentric -  philosopher, who 
conflates experience with what is simply conceivable’.13 Indeed this characterisation 
of Hegel together with Schelling’s conviction that ‘there is obviously something more 
than mere reason in the world, indeed there is something which strives beyond these 
barriers’14 provides the skeptical basis for Schelling’s specific criticisms o f the 
Science o f Logic. It is to these specific criticisms that we must now turn our attention 
in order that we may further consider Schelling’s skeptical strategy with regard to 
Hegel.
Fundamental to Schelling’s entire critique is an understanding that the Science o f 
Logic attempts to construct a completely presuppositionless and systematically 
rational account o f actuality or a rational science of real being. Hegel can never begin 
explicitly with the Absolute Idea of rational being, given that such a notion is 
precisely that which is to be systematically constructed by the project itself. He argues 
that ‘Hegel must go back with the concept to some beginning or other, where he is at 
the greatest distance from that which is only to come into being via the movement.’15 
In other words, Hegel must begin with the very least, i.e the most minimal thought of 
Being, and progress to the very most, i.e. the Absolute Idea of rational real Being By 
claiming to begin presuppositionlessly he means to begin the Science o f l.ogic in a 
thoroughly unconditioned way, i.e. without any assumptions concerning method, 
content or developmental path. He argues that beginning in this indeterminate way 
ensures that one begins with that with which thought must necessarily begin (i.e. with 
what it must immanently begin). Thus what must come first for thought (in the
11 Ibid, p,135
12 Ibid, p. 147
11 S. Houlgatc, Ibid, p. 19
14 Ibid
15 F.W.J. Schclling, Ibid, p l36
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absence of determinations) is also what is itselffirst for thought, i.e. mere being. For 
Hegel the notion of mere ‘Being’ best characterises the very thought o f  the utter 
indeterminacy with which thought has to begin. He writes:
‘It lies in the nature of a beginning that it must be being and nothing else. To enter 
into philosophy, therefore, calls for no other preparations, no further reflections or 
points of connection.’16
Schelling argues that despite Hegel’s claim for a presuppositionless beginning the 
Science o f lx>gic remains fatally and inevitably conditioned by a number of 
unacknowledged and perhaps unconscious presuppositions that serve to deconstruct it. 
For instance, he claims that it is conditioned by the unwarranted presupposition that 
knowledge o f Absolute Being is to be garnered by a science of ‘essences’. Thus he 
claims Hegel presupposes that an absolute knowledge of actuality or real being is 
itself generated by a withdrawal into purely rational thought. From Schelling’s 
perspective the extent to which Hegel position represents an unwarranted and 
unjustified presupposition is demonstrated by the degree to which it can be shown to 
be utterly and irreducibly dependent upon actuality. Therefore, Schelling insists upon 
the irreducibly dependent and conditioned status o f Hegel’s Science o f ¡A>gic, and 
claims that the necessary dependence upon actuality introduces an inevitable and 
implicit teleology into its discourse. He argues that ‘what always tacitly leads this 
progression is always the terminus ad quern, the real world, at which science finally is 
to arrive.’17
Indeed for Schelling the Science o f logic's conditionality is the one thing that allows 
it to fulfil its own promise of movement in thought. He denies Hegel’s claim that such 
movement is purely immanently self-determining by claiming that it is the 
unacknowledged presence of a thinking subject whose thought remains irreducibly 
conditioned by prior actuality that generates the necessary movement. The subject can 
never generate a legitimate understanding of positive actuality by artificially 
abstracting itself from it and withdrawing into the realm of ‘pure thought’. The very 
attempt, Schelling claims, represents the impossibly absurd spectacle of the *1
16 G. W.F. Hegel. Science o f  Utgic, p.72
11 F.W.J. Schclling, Ibid, p.138
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conditioned trying to efface its very conditions. Hegel’s efforts to obtain an absolutely 
objective and presuppositionless beginning drive him to attempt to suppress 
subjectivity itself, to negate ‘everything subjective, as pure being ...[is] ...being in 
which there is nothing subjective’ 18 Such suppression contributes to what Schelling 
terms a misleading and ‘monstrous’ semblance of immanent necessity within the 
realm of ‘pure’ thought. Hegel’s beginning can only ever be reached through the 
conscious abstraction of the subject, but in such a way that the subject not only 
continues to constitute the nature of the result of the abstraction, but also continues to 
condition the way that this abstraction is to be thought. What is dangerous and 
‘monstrous’ for Schelling is that this fact becomes effaced and unacknowledged in 
Hegel’s account whilst its unconscious presence and influence remains. Since this 
unconscious presence and influence remains repressed and unacknowledged in 
Hegel’s philosophy Schelling thinks that it is likely to exert an arbitrary effect to a 
much greater extent than if it were at least recognised and acknowledged. The irony 
for Schelling lies in the fact that it is precisely this arbitrary effect of the 
unacknowledged subject that generates the semblance of an immanent developmental 
trajectory in the Science of Ixtgic. Thus the Science o f Logic remains predetermined 
by that which is the most arbitrary; i.e. the subject’s unconscious drives and its non- 
rationally derived situatedness within actuality. Schelling writes:
‘The fact that he nevertheless attributes an immanent movement to pure being means 
no more, then, than that the thought which begins with pure being feels it is 
impossible for it to stop at this most abstract and most empty thing o f all, which Hegel 
himself declares is pure being. The compulsion to move on from this has its basis only 
in the fact that thought is already used to a more concrete being, a being more full of 
content, and thus cannot be satisfied with that meagre diet of pure being in which only 
content in the abstract but no determinate content is thought, in the last analysis, then, 
what does not allow him to remain with that empty abstraction is only the fact that 
there really is a more rich being which is more full o f content, and the fact that the 
thinking spirit itself is already such a being, thus the fact that it is not a necessity
"  Ibid, p. 136
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which lies in the concept itself, but rather a necessity which lies in the philosopher 
and which is imposed upon him by his memory.’19
Hegel’s claim to have effaced contingent subjectivity from the Science o f Ixjgic and 
his demonstration of a supposedly immanent and self-determined movement in pure 
thought is nothing more for Schelling than an elaborate illusion. He argues that a 
genuinely successful repression of the subject in thought would in fact result in the 
disappearance of all thought. He proceeds to consider a number of further necessarily 
contingent elements constitutive of the Science o f Logic, and argues that each is 
bound up with ‘traces’ of contingent subjectivity that Hegel presupposes and fails to 
acknowledge properly as necessary for the very activity of the Science o f Logic. Thus, 
for Schelling, language itself (together with the principles of logical thought) is 
undeniably at play at the very point of Hegel’s supposed immanent presuppositionless 
beginning. He argues that if we were to take Hegel’s claim for a presuppositionless 
beginning seriously it would logically exclude the possibility of language itself since 
the very nature of language is to perpetually invoke presupposed meanings that could 
only be genuinely effaced through a total effacement of language itself. This argument 
is analogous to the earlier claim regarding the impossibility of simultaneously 
effacing genuine subjectivity in thought and retaining thought. Where he had argued 
that the effacement of the subject would necessarily lead to the disappearance of all 
thought, he now argues that the disappearance of presuppositions implies the absolute 
disappearance of all language. I'hus, insofar as irreducible subjectivity and thought 
are inextricably bound up with each other, he argues that language and 
presuppositions are likewise bound up with each other. For Schelling the presupposed 
meanings implicit within any language can never be effaced through an act of 
abstraction itself articulated by language. He claims that even positing an absolutely 
presuppositionless beginning ‘presupposes the concept of presupposition, and as soon 
as | philosophy] says anything else, it utilises language, which it therefore also 
presupposes. If it wanted to presuppose nothing, it would have to deduce language 
itself. For a philosophy presupposing simply nothing, nothing would be left save to
19 Ibid, p. 138
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confront all speech with silence. The most complete philosophy would be the most 
silent.’20
For Schelling Hegel’s maintenance of language represents the paradigmatic ‘trace’ of 
the irreducible (yet unacknowledged) subjectivity within Hegel’s Science o f Logic. By 
maintaining language one has always already presupposed everything, and to claim 
otherwise (as Hegel appears to do) is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of 
language Schelling argues that it is only through the presence of a situated subject 
that such acts of abstraction are able to be effected within language, and that the 
unacknowledged presupposition of language represents ultimately the maintenance of 
the subject in an utterly arbitrary and contingent way
He also maintains that contained within such an unacknowledged presence of 
subjectivity are all o f  the concepts which are to be systematically integrated within the 
fabric of the Science o f lxtgic, e g. the principles of relation and the function o f the 
copula itself through which the different concepts or categories are to be related. By 
examining the opening triad of concepts (Being, Nothing and Becoming) in the 
Science of !x>gic Schelling attempts to demonstrate the presence of contingent 
elements of subjectivity through identifying specific traces o f assumed and 
unacknowledged categories, principles of logical relation and the copula involved in 
establishing logical identity. He argues that the notion o f Being can only serve as the 
beginning of a systematic development of the categories of real being if it is not pure 
and not indeterminate. Being must, he claims, always already be somehow 
determinate
‘It is an impossibility to think being in general, because there is no being in general, 
there is no being without a subject, being is rather necessarily and at all times 
something determinate , the being of the absolutely first thought could only be non­
objective, merely essential, purely primary (ursldnillich) being, with which nothing is 1
11 F W.J. Schclling, ( trundlegung der Positives Philosophic, ed. H. Fuhmiuns (Torino. Rottcga 
d’F.raMno, 1972), p .22t, translated and cited by A White in Absolute Knowledge Hegel and the 
Problem o f Metaphysics, p. IH
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posited except just the subject. Therefore the being of the first thought is not a being 
in general but already a determinate being.’21
It follows that when Hegel purports to demonstrate the immanent self-movement of 
the category of pure indeterminate Being into that of Nothing all he really exhibits is 
the inevitable unconscious contamination by subjective arbitrariness and the 
unintelligibility of the first concept. Thus Schelling claims that Hegel’s thought 
appears to be ‘driven forward only by a necessity which lies in itself, although it 
obviously has a goal it is striving towards, and this goal, however much the person 
philosophising seeks to hide consciousness thereof from himself, for this reason 
unconsciously affects the course of philosophising all the more decisively.’22 The very 
movement from Being to Nothing is itself generated by the unintelligibility of the 
thought of pure indeterminate being abstracted by the subject. The subject responds to 
such abstraction with the proposition ‘Being is Nothing’: ‘it is not at all being itself 
that finds itself, but rather I find it as nothing, and say this in the proposition’ 23 
Furthermore, there are only two ways Being and Nothing can be related in such a 
proposition; either as an empty static tautology, or as a genuine predicative statement. 
Since pure indeterminate being cannot posit itself as nothing, or as anything, and since 
a predicative judgment implicitly demands that it is posited by a real subject, 
Schelling concludes that the impersonal proposition ‘Being is Nothing’ is merely an 
empty static tautology. It is, therefore, the thinking subject who discovers through the 
very attempt to think pure abstract indeterminate being that it is nothing (i.e. is not 
anything) and subsequently claims the merely empty static tautology ‘Being is 
Nothing’.
For Schelling, since it is the subject who asserts such a proposition there really is no 
immanently self-determining development from pure indeterminacy. The posited 
move from Being to Nothing is merely an arbitrary contribution or imposition by the 
thinking subject of the copula, the is. By characterising the movement in this way he 
is able to argue that the meaning o f the identifying copula in the proposition ‘Being is 
Nothing’ cannot be explained as immanently emerging from within the indeterminacy
21 F. W.J. Schelling, On the lllstorv o f Modem Philosophy, p. 139
22 Ibid, pp. 138-9
23 Ibid, p. 140
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of pure being itself. Rather, the identifying copula is itself introduced by the situated 
thinking subject through its experience o f  the attempt to think pure indeterminate 
being abstractly. The identifying copula thus operates as a necessary unacknowledged 
presupposition in Hegel’s beginning, i.e. one that its own developmental movement 
cannot do without The concept of Nothing is introduced by the subject precisely to 
determine its experience of the effort to think absolute pure indeterminacy. It is, 
therefore, the subject who introduces and applies the identifying copula in an effort to 
impose a logical correspondence between Being and Nothing Being is Nothing for 
the subject precisely because that is its experience of the attempt to think the pure 
indeterminacy of Being
There is no real necessity to be discerned here beyond this arbitrary and entirely 
subjective judgement Schelling argues that all of Hegel’s concepts or categories 
remain fundamentally presupposed because they are all embedded in language, and 
that the notion of their self-generated immanent development occurs only through the 
conscious attempt at effacing the necessity of the presupposition. Immanence thus 
remains an elaborate illusion:
‘Hegel uses without thinking the form o f the proposition, the copula, the is, before he 
has explained anything at all about the meaning of this is. In the same way Hegel uses 
the concept nothing as one that needs no explanation, which is completely self- 
evident.’24
Hence Schelling has no fundamental argument against the idea that pure 
indeterminate Being is experienced in some immediate fashion as Nothing. He is 
merely skeptical of the immanent status granted to this idea by Hegel For Schelling it 
remains merely the arbitrary or contingent articulation of a thinking subject 
responsible for an act of abstraction to a notion of pure indeterminacy Since the 
subject is always already primordially related to actuality, it has always already 
predetermined the very end of such a process of thought as a systematically rational 
reconstruction of that actuality. Thus, he claims, the subject is always situated within
24 Ibid
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and conditioned by real being, prior to undertaking an abstractive logical account of 
Being.
The final aspect of Schelling’s attack on Hegel’s logical beginning concerns the 
claims for the immanence of the development of the notion o f Becoming from Being 
and Nothing:
‘One should not be surprised by. . . [the]...proposition , [i.e. Being is Nothing].. but 
rather by that to which it is supposed to serve as a means or a transition. From this 
connection of being and nothing, becoming is supposed to follow.’25
In the Science o f Logic Hegel demonstrates how the category of Becoming emerges 
from an immanent movement whereby Pure Being distinguishes itself from Pure 
Nothing, yet at the same time remains ‘unseparated and inseparable’ Each category 
vanishes into its opposite, and this immanent movement of vanishing now emerges as 
their truth. As Hegel argues, this immanent movement produces the category of 
Becoming:
‘Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the 
other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference 
which has equally immediately resolved itself.’26
Schelling argues that the category of Becoming does not emerge in this purely 
immanent fashion but through being unjustifiably introduced as a qualification to the 
original identification of Pure Being and Pure Nothing He claims that Hegel reveals 
such a qualification when he describes the emergence o f this Beginning in the 
Lncyclo/xiedia Logic There he remarks that in the beginning the notion o f Pure Being 
is not ‘yet’ real Being; ‘the beginning, the matter [itself] is not yet in its beginning’. 
‘The little word yet is interpolated here’, Schelling argues, providing the statement of 
identity between Pure Being and Pure Nothing with a supplementary meaning. This 
supplementary meaning, he claims, is not an immanently self-determining one but an 
illicit teleological principle, externally imposed by Hegel, whereby Pure Being is
25 Ibid
J' G.W.F. Hegel. Science o f Logic, p.H.l
48
somehow to be viewed as Still Nothing or not yet actuality. Thus ‘it would become 
itself determinate and no longer being in general, but rather determinate being, 
namely being in potentia '21 ‘Pure Nothing’ is to be understood in the specific and 
therefore determinate sense o f Nothing yet actual or real, and it is only through this 
notion of a promised though not yet real Being that Hegel is able to introduce the 
notion of Becoming at all. However, he conceals the indebtedness of this notion of 
Becoming to the notion of the ‘not yet real Being’ behind the claim for immanent self- 
determining movement. Schelling argues that it is precisely the teleological notion of 
the ‘not yet real Being’ that reveals the true developmental force of the Science o f 
Ixtgic. The ‘not yet real Being’ remains throughout the very ground of the act of 
abstraction by a thinking subject and as such makes possible and conditions the 
logically reconstructed path back to real Being. ‘Becoming’ cannot represent the 
immanent development out o f the ‘unity’ of Being and Nothing; but is rather the 
abandonment by the thinking subject of abstract indeterminacy, o f Pure 
Being/Nothing, in favour o f a path towards a reconstructive rational movement, or 
recollection, of concrete actuality within reason. The subject, by being irreducibly 
situated within concrete actuality, not only determines the abandonment of Pure 
Being/Nothing to ensure a reconstructive path back to actuality, it also determines the 
very nature of that path back, thereby rendering that path arbitrarily subjective 
Indeed, Schelling views Hegel’s introduction of Becoming by the thinking subject in 
the Science o f Ixtgic as nothing more than a development o f or a radical restatement or 
recollection of the Kantian categories:
‘This becoming immediately divides itself up for him into moments, so that he moves 
over in this way to the category of quantity, and thus in general to the Kantian table of 
categories.’* 28
Thus for Schelling the notion of Becoming is introduced by a subject forced by 
abstraction to temporally dwell within an abstracted realm o f Pure Being/Nothing, the 
subject recognises this and uses its ‘memory’ of concrete situatedness within actuality 
(i.e within real Being) to ‘reason’ that Pure Being is merely abstract, indeterminate 
and Pure Nothing, and as such cannot be real Being ‘yet’. The thought that Pure Being
21 Ibid
28 Ibid
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is not yet real Being, that it is still Nothing, enables the thinking subject to introduce a 
notion of Becoming since it conceives Pure Being as ‘on the way to’ real Being. In 
this way the thinking subject projects itself upon a predetermined trajectory towards 
real Being, rather like Baron Munchhausen pulling himself out of the swamp by his 
own hair. For Schelling the developmental move within the opening triad of the 
Science of Logic is thus not immanent and cannot be, as Hegel had claimed, 
absolutely objective, pure and universal. Hegel surreptitiously introduces 
unacknowledged subjective teleological principles into his ‘purely’ immanent account 
of the derivation o f the logical categories of Being, and as such renders that account 
contaminated by arbitrariness and contingency.
Schelling’s efforts here are directed towards exposing the way in which Hegel’s 
system necessarily deconstructs itself; in other words, how he violates his own 
principle of immanence and autonomy. Schelling’s polemic can be concisely 
articulated by the proposition that the true Beginning is not at a ll at the Beginning, 
that there is always that which already precedes and remains prior, exterior to, and in 
excess o f such a beginning. He attempts to expose how even in Hegel’s supposedly 
careful ‘presuppositionless’ beginning there remain traces o f this excess, this 
exteriority, which not only merely remain in excess of or exterior to the Science of 
Ixfgic but in fact necessarily condition it and provide the entire momentum for its 
development of categories. His criticisms all concern the location of these fault lines 
in Hegel’s supposedly autonomous or immanent account, such as the fissures within 
his purely logical beginning where an inevitable eternal exterior discloses its true 
constitutive power, a constitutive power utterly irreducible and indivisible.
(ii) 7he Hegelian Response to Schelling
An adequate response to Schelling’s critique (his Hegel-Kritik) must consist in a re­
reading of what Hegel understands presuppositionlessness itself to mean and how 
exactly it relates to philosophical science. Such a re-reading will attempt to 
demonstrate that the principle of presuppositionless beginning is not at all a demand 
for a regression to a primitive form of consciousness where there could be no other 
immanent possibility apart from silence. Indeed, if one concentrates solely upon the 
text of the Science o f Logic (specifically its prefaces and introductions) a more
50
complex notion of presuppositionlessness emerges. Despite being absolutely justified 
extralogically by Hegel, the principle of a presuppositionless beginning pertains 
‘purely’ to the methodological principle of the Science oflxtgic itself. Thus, given that 
Hegel conceives the Science o f Logic as having no operative external methodological 
principle, its development must be radically autonomous and immanently self- 
determining. For Hegel pure logic must have no determinative principles outside o f 
itself; it must be the pure articulation of thought thinking itself .
‘What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists 
independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are 
supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the 
necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate 
truth itself.’w
It is important to understand how Hegel justifies this presuppositionless Science o f  
lxtgic extralogically and prior to the initiation of purely immanent thought. Hegel’s 
extralogical justifications are psychological, phenomenological, cultural, political and 
most importantly historical. The extent to which this principle of presuppositionless 
beginning is to be recognised as an extralogically mediated principle is demonstrated 
by Hegel’s introductory remarks concerning the Science o f Logic.
‘The need to occupy oneself with pure thought presupposes that the human spirit must 
already have travelled a long road; it is, one may say, the need of the already satisfied 
need for the necessities to which it must have attained, the need of a condition free o f  
needs, of abstraction from the material of intuition, imagination and so on, of the 
concrete interests of desire, instinct, will, in which material the determinations o f 
thought are veiled and hidden. In the silent regions o f thought which has come to 
itself and communes only with itself, the interests which move the lives of races and 
individuals are hushed ’M
From this and other similar statements it is clear that for Hegel the Science o f Logic is 
necessarily initiated from an ‘elevated’ standpoint brought about through the progress *50
21 G.W.F. Hegel. Science oflx>ific, p.50
50 Ibid, p.34
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of philosophy or reason throughout history. For Hegel Logic consists in 'holding off 
the contingency of ordinary thinking and the arbitrary selection of particular grounds 
-  or their opposites -  as valid.,J1 His comments appear to deny any possibility for 
regression to a prior standpoint of consciousness (albeit a basic primitive one) from 
where one could attempt to initiate a 'pure’ and ahistorical logic Rather, he argues 
that the ‘purity’ of logic itself emerges from an evolved and elevated philosophical 
standpoint. Thus it represents a complete move away from the historically discursive 
perspectives of consciousness and understanding. Therefore it represents a move 
beyond the realm of the externally bifurcating activity of consciousness (the history of 
which is outlined in the Phenomenology o f Spirit) towards a pure internally self- 
differentiating logic of being Thus for Hegel ‘Spirit, after its labours over two 
thousand years, must have attained to a higher consciousness about its thinking and 
about its own pure, essential nature’ ,J
Presuppositionlessness for Hegel is clearly a principle concerned solely with logic in 
that it allows for the first time in history the development and articulation o f a purely 
universal logic. However, it clearly remains a principle that has evolved from 
everything that has gone before, all of which, because of the emergence of such a 
principle, one is able to remove from having any active methodological influence 
upon the development of a logic. Once all that went before has been understood and 
recollected systematically it leads inevitably to an elevated standpoint whereby a 
presuppositionless beginning can be made The demand for a presuppositionless 
beginning does not deny (through a demand for primitive regression) all that has gone 
before; thus it is not a forgetting It does not represent the negation of the 
achievements of Spirit, of philosophy or reason, but is the conscious result of the 
systematic recollection of that progress. For Hegel the elevated standpoint permits the 
elevation of philosophical language to a point where a presuppositionless science (i.e., 
one free from determinate exterior methodological principles or the bifurcating 
activity of consciousness) becomes possible
What clearly emerges from Hegel’s introductory remarks concerning 
presuppositionlessness is a principle that is explicitly mediated by history, culture and 12
” Ibid, pp 58-9
12 Ibid, p 49
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philosophy, where the active mediating principle is the elevated language that 
develops within them. Hegel’s notion o f presuppositionlessness wears, as it were, its 
own presuppositions upon its sleeve; it is a principle explicitly aware of its mediated 
status as being absolutely crucial for its pure methodological application. In this 
sense, Schelling’s claim to have exposed the hidden presuppositions o f the active 
principle of presuppositionlessness itself is really quite beside the point. It thus 
remains to be shown that such explicit presuppositions crucial to the status of 
presuppositionlessness as an active principle are in fact imported as contaminating 
determinative factors into the Science o f Logic itself. If  such presuppositions can be 
shown as being imported into the Science o f Logic and as operating there in a totally 
unjustified and arbitrary fashion, Hegel’s claims for the immanence of the 
development of the logical categories themselves would indeed be violated Having 
brought such presuppositions as language, intention, and the subject to the fore, 
Schelling claims to show the contamination of immanence in the most unconscious 
fashion. However a question remains as to whether Schelling is able to recognise the 
difference between those presuppositions that Hegel claims are in fact necessary to 
mediate the very emergence of presuppositionlessness, and their unconscious 
application and effect in the Science o f Logic. Hegel claims to be able to separate such 
presuppositions from the very activity o f presuppositionless thought by granting them, 
in his introductory remarks in the Science o f logic , a very precise status. They are, he 
claims, self-suhlating:
‘Pure knowing. . .has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation; it is without 
any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge; what is 
present is only simple immediacy. . . Here the beginning is made with being which is 
represented as having come to be through mediation, a mediation which is also a 
subiating of itself; and there is presupposed pure knowing as the outcome of finite 
knowing, of consciousness. ,M
To understand this point it will be necessary to consider the precise nature of the self- 
sublating mediated emergence of presuppositionlessness. This will entail an 
examination of the precise nature of the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit 15
15 Ibid, pp.69-70
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to the Science o f Logic since, as Hegel writes: ‘The Notion of pure science and its 
deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it.’34
From Hegel’s introductory remarks to the Science o f Logic it is clear that he has no 
problem whatsoever in acknowledging the fact that the standpoint from which it is to 
begin is itself a ‘result’. As such the ‘beginning’ presupposes a level of philosophical 
sophistication that has been brought about or mediated through history. These 
necessary mediations or presuppositions are characterised by Hegel as radically 
negative in character and are, he argues, self-sublating. By self-sublation Hegel 
simply means that the result that emerges reacts upon the presuppositions to negate or 
absorb them. Clearly the beginning of the Science o f Logic must be itself 
presuppositionless, i.e. it must be indeterminate and must not presuppose any external 
methodological principles for its developmental progress. However, it clearly does not 
have to be (and indeed cannot be) devoid of any presuppositions whatsoever -  it 
merely has to be free of those presuppositions that are epistemologically relevant to 
the logical realm, i.e. it has to be free of logical presuppositions. In order to 
understand how this distinction operates at the beginning o f Hegel’s Science o f Ix»gic, 
and how it is able ultimately to deflect some of Schelling’s criticisms, it is necessary 
to consider the ‘result’ o f the Phenomenology o f Spirit and the immanent transition to 
the Science o f Logic
As we outlined in the first part of this thesis, phenomenology is distinct from 
philosophy in that it does not claim to be able to discover the truth of being purely 
from within itself. Rather, it considers what various forms of consciousness ordinarily 
take themselves and their objects to be, and thinks through the inconsistencies and 
contradictions inherent within the manifold ways consciousness and its objects appear 
to them. Thus phenomenology compares beliefs about the content and object of 
various forms o f consciousness with the actuality of that content or object. Also it is 
not a ‘method’ as such, but rather a ‘description’ o f the immanently self-determining 
dialectical process whereby various concrete forms of consciousness attempt to 
implement themselves and through experience discover themselves to be deficient,
34 Ibid, p.49
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and so transform themselves into another form o f consciousness. This process is 
repeated with the essential truths of each stage being preserved in the transformation 
to the next stage of consciousness. This process is both determinate and progressive. 
We, the phenomenological observers, are merely there to ‘look on’, describe, and 
crucially, become aware of the immanently self-determining developmental continuity 
which is generated by the deconstruction of each concrete form of consciousness and 
its ‘objects’:
‘In fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the 
knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as the 
knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this 
knowledge.’35
The role of the phenomenologist is to discern the single ‘golden’ thread that unravels 
through the deconstruction of each form o f concrete consciousness. The 
phenomenologist is neither to ‘spin’ the thread nor participate in its unravelling, but 
merely to discover and follow its own unravelling. At the end of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit the final concrete form of consciousness achieved, termed ‘Absolute 
Knowledge’ by Hegel (but which is also characterised by him as true philosophical 
consciousness itself), is to be recognised by the phenomenologist as the absolute 
culmination o f the inherently intertwined continuity of all previous forms of 
consciousness. Absolute Knowledge must be understood if the meaning of the 
immanent transition to the Science o f Logic is to be understood as the positing of an 
absolutely necessary presuppositionless beginning to the science of thought. Absolute 
knowledge transforms the Phenomenology o f Spirit into a thesis or a propaedeutic 
concerning the precise nature of the relationship between Hegel’s Phenomenology and 
Science o f Logic. As W. Maker argues:
‘We can understand the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation if it can be seen 
as beginning with a determinate thesis and culminating in its self-elimination...the 
topic of the Phenomenology is a thesis -  a presupposition -  about how to begin 
philosophical science. For, if the subject matter o f  the Phenomenology is a thesis
"  G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, #85. p.54
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about how to begin science, and if its outcome is a self-constituted rejection of this 
way of beginning, then ...through this negative procedure of elimination the correct 
way of beginning science will have been made possible without being 
predetermined.,36
Hegel demonstrates the result of thinking that genuine philosophical science itself 
must be grounded in the certainty of a concrete form of consciousness. This 
demonstration emerges from the progressive recognition of a certain developmental 
continuity to the systematic deconstruction o f each concrete form of consciousness’ 
attempts to ground itself in self-certainty. Each form is demonstrated to be inherently 
self-refuting, and it is the demonstration of each of these forms’ self-refutation that is 
the Phenomenology o f Spirit's result. Hence a principle close to the heart of Western 
philosophy (namely the attempt by philosophical science to establish itself through a 
necessary determinate form of consciousness) is itself deconstructed. Determinate 
forms of consciousness are unable to achieve an ultimate location for grounding the 
structure of their own forms without simultaneously deconstructing it. This activity 
represents the very essence of the form o f consciousness Hegel terms ‘Absolute 
Knowledge’ in the Phenomenology o f Spirit. This form of consciousness ultimately 
represents an absolute deconstruction of all determinate forms of consciousness in 
relation to philosophical science, and as such is the deconstruction of all forms of 
predetermination or presupposition regarding thought. This process of deconstruction 
(brought about solely by philosophical consciousness) is, as we outlined earlier, what 
Hegel terms ‘self-accomplishing skepticism’. It is neither the result of an imposition 
nor an argument posited by the phenomenologist; rather it is merely the observation of 
the result of the development of each determinate form o f consciousness. Hegel 
claims at the end o f the Phenomenology o f Spirit:
‘In this knowing, then, Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped 
itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of consciousness [i.e., 
of the latter from its object], a difference now overcome. Spirit has won the pure 
element of its existence, the Notion... Spirit, therefore, having won the Notion, 
displays its existence and movement in the ether of its life and is ‘Science’. In this, the 14
14 W. Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking 11 eye l (Albany: SUNY, 1994), pp.86-7
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moments of its movement no longer exhibit themselves as specific shapes of 
consciousness, but -  since consciousness’s difference has returned into the Self -  as 
‘Specific Notions’ and as their organic self-grounded movement. Whereas in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of Knowledge and Truth, and 
is the movement in which that difference is cancelled, Science on the other hand does 
not contain this difference and the cancelling of it.’37
In Absolute Knowledge consciousness occupies its genuine element in that it is now 
capable of becoming pure self-relation. Consciousness/other distinctions that had 
plagued consciousness have been overcome at this point. Hegel is able to 
systematically demonstrate how each form o f consciousness that instantiated any form 
of consciousness/other distinction immanently refutes itself and necessarily 
transforms itself into a different kind of consciousness. Consciousness at the point o f 
Absolute Knowledge realises that thought’s only genuine imperative is to think itself 
in absolute purity. Its first ‘thought’ must then be no more determinate than the mere 
thought of its own being, which is an absolutely indeterminate being, being in 
absolute immediacy. Hence the beginning delimited by the Phenomenology o f Spirit 
for philosophical science is absolute pure indeterminacy, nothing more, nothing less 
Maker writes:
‘The Logic has a presupposition in the sense that the Phenomenology comes before 
and does something that, historically, needs to be done: it eliminates from scientific 
purview the notion o f cognition according to which cognising must involve 
presupposing. The Logic does not have a presupposition in the sense Hegel claims it 
does not: its method, content, and scientific character are not predetermined just 
because what has come before (the Ixtgic's presupposition) has made possible a 
consideration free of such predeterminacy by articulating the self-elimination of the 
structure of predetermining.’3*
By understanding the complex series of mediations that the Phenomenology o f Spirit 
presents together with their culmination and sublation in ‘Absolute Knowledge’ we 
are able to understand why it must be viewed as the necessary presupposition to 1
11 G.W.F. Hegel. Ibid. #805. pp.490-1 
“  W. Maker. Ibid, p.93
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beginning philosophical science presuppositionlessly. It also allows us to recognise 
the difficulties involved for Hegel’s critics and how important it is for them to be able 
to demonstrate that residual elements to thought remain and operate as surreptitious 
methodological principles or hidden presuppositions in the Science o f lx>gic. As we 
have already seen Schelling claims that contingently subjective elements such as 
language and logical relations operate surreptitiously within the Science o f Logic.
A significant element of Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel’s presuppositionless logic is 
this claim that the very use o f language to articulate it represents an unwarranted 
presupposition and has serious negative consequences for the notion of immanence. 
Schelling claims that language necessarily operates ‘nostalgically’ and imports 
‘memories’ o f its ordinary ‘use’ into everyday concrete reality. Given that everyday 
concrete realities are merely arbitrary constructions consisting of numerous 
illegitimate and unjustified metaphysical assumptions, Hegel’s naive use of language 
inevitably imports traces of such arbitrariness into the Science o f Logic, serving to 
contaminate its supposedly immanent development by introducing implicit traces of 
teleology. However, we will argue that such a claim fails to engage sufficiently with 
Hegel’s own subtle and sophisticated claims regarding the essence of language as an 
adequate means developed for articulating genuinely presuppositionless science. 
Hegel writes in the preface to the Science o f lx>gic that language is man’s ‘own 
peculiar nature’39, and that the familiar forms o f thought, ‘displayed and stored in 
human language’40, are themselves a necessary precondition or presupposition to 
genuine philosophical science ‘gratefully acknowledged’. However, they are a 
necessary precondition or presupposition to philosophical science in precisely the 
same way that the history o f the ordinary phenomenal forms of consciousness was, 
i.e. as self-sublating and essentially non-determinative for philosophical science
Hegel acknowledges that everyday language is dominated by the grammar, arbitrary 
conventions and most importantly the metaphysical presuppositions o f ordinary 
consciousness. However, in order to direct thought to pure categories of being 
language itself must be shown as a medium that in no way intrinsically determines 
what is expressed by its means. Whilst everyday language may be governed by
w G.W.F. Hegel, Science o f h>gic, p.31
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grammar, arbitrary convention and contingent metaphysical presuppositions, 
consciousness is able to relinquish and set them aside thereby permitting a genuinely 
autonomous and immanent articulation of the logical categories of being. Thus, for 
Hegel, the implications and conventions of everyday language have to be ‘discarded 
at its [philosophy’s] portals’:41
‘This business consists in holding off the contingency o f ordinary thinking and the 
arbitrary selection of particular grounds -  or their opposites -  as valid. But above all, 
thought acquires thereby self-reliance and independence. It becomes at home in 
abstractions and in progressing by means of Notions free from sensuous substrata, 
develops an unsuspected power of assimilating in rational form all the various 
knowledges and sciences in their complex variety, of grasping and retaining them in 
their essential character, stripping them of their external features and in this way 
extracting from them the logical element -  or what is the same thing, filling the 
abstract basis of Logic acquired by study with the substantial content of absolute truth 
and giving it the value o f  a universal which no longer stands as a particular alongside 
other particulars but includes them all within its grasp and is their essence, the 
absolutely True.’42
Given, as we have already shown, that the very beginning of the Science of Logic is 
an essentially mediated result (i.e. an elevated standpoint, the result of the self- 
sublation of oppositions in phenomenal consciousness) it is important to understand 
what the likely implications with regards to language are. Representative 
consciousness or thought (as demonstrated throughout the Phenomenology o f Spirit) 
is affected by contingency and unjustified arbitrary presuppositions. By immanently 
overcoming representative consciousness or thought in ‘Absolute Knowledge’, 
consciousness relinquishes these ideas and perspectives to the point where it allows 
itself to become a thinking determined by nothing apart from truth. When this occurs, 
truth or being cease to be something ‘other’ than thinking consciousness itself since it 
no longer holds on to its own thoughts over against what truth or being requires it to 
think. Rather, it is now constituted as a thinking consciousness by the very truth or 
being that it has to think. Absolute Knowledge thus does not entail or require a
41 Ibid, p.45
42 Ibid, p.59
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privileged access to being or truth, but the letting of the truth or the nature of being 
develop or unfold itself in thought alone. Thus, in Absolute Knowledge consciousness 
is able to articulate the realm of truly speculative philosophy, or pure science, as pure 
thought thinking itself.
It is important to realise that speculative language involves the relinquishing of 
associations, implications and conventions associated with everyday language 
Hegel’s speculative language does not merely operate at the level of a naive and 
unacknowledged presupposition (as Schelling argues) but involves a developed ability 
to relinquish all the traditional associations, implications and conventions of everyday 
language from the very beginning of the Science o f Logic. This developed ability to 
relinquish the contaminating features of everyday language is itself the result of the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit's articulation of the notion of Absolute Knowledge, whereby 
the oppositions of ordinary phenomenal consciousness and its prejudices are 
overcome. Thus:
‘Pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains 
thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or, the object in its 
own self in so far as it is equally pure thought.’43
It is important to consider how Hegel claims speculative language itself operates 
when ‘Spirit has won the pure element of its existence’44; for him it is able to 
relinquish and set aside the presuppositions of conventional representational language 
He claims that the Science o f Logic is the articulation of pure intellectual self-relation, 
i.e. pure thought thinking itself, where all references to exteriority are dissolved, 
relinquished or ‘sublated’ in the self-overcoming process of all consciousness/other 
structures in Absolute Knowledge Thus language itself (purged of all representational 
presuppositions) comes to articulate what the categories of pure thought are without 
any reference to an ‘other’. It has thus become speculative, non-representational and 
non-melaphysical. Speculative language is a language capable o f articulating a 
science of thought that is utterly presuppositionless and in no way reliant upon 
‘memories’ of the contingent associations, conventions and presuppositions present *14
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within everyday language. Speculative thought (because of its evolved status) is 
simply able to relinquish all contaminating traces from its discourse and merely attend 
to and articulate the truth of pure thought itself:
‘All that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific 
development is to consider, or rather, ridding oneself o f all other reflections and 
opinions whatever, simply to take up, what is there before us. Pure knowing as 
concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation.’45
Having shown how Hegel argues that the beginning of philosophical science 
presupposes a sufficiently developed language for adequately expressing what he 
terms ‘speculative propositions’ we will proceed by briefly examining how it 
functions in Hegel’s Science o f I.ogic, specifically how it succeeds from the very 
beginning in articulating the immanently self-determining emergence of the categories 
Being, Nothing and Becoming without necessarily involving the operation of 
contingent subjectivity as Schelling claims.
Within the speculative language developed within the Science o f Logic, the subject 
and predicate terms, e g. (A) and (B), are distinguished from the terms of a 
proposition with sensuous content. In ‘ordinary’ propositions the subject term (A) 
refers to a given Subject and the Predicate (B) characterises that Subject term (A) in a 
particular way. However, in speculative language the two terms, (A) and (B), become 
moments of an identity statement. Such a statement does not claim to state or establish 
that (B) is a quality or aspect of a given Subject (A), rather it claims that one category 
(A) is to be recognised as identical to (B). Such an identity is ‘speculative’ in the 
sense that it incorporates a necessary moment of ‘difference’ within this identity. 
Thus, although (A) and (B) are to be recognised as identical they are also to be 
simultaneously recognised to be different. In the speculative proposition the distance 
between (A) and (B) that exists in an ordinary proposition is therefore dissolved. Both 
terms are considered identical because the Predicate term (B) establishes what the 
essence of the Subject term (A) is. Difference emerges by one universal term, the 
Predicate term (B), establishing what the intrinsic essence of the other term, the
45 Ibid, p.69
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Subject term (A), is. It establishes that which the mere Subject term (A) cannot 
express, and which remains unexpressed until the Predicate term (B) is established. 
The Predicate term (B) is then itself a Subject in that it expresses the very essence of 
the original Subject term (A). (B) thus expresses what (A) essentially is. In 
speculative language the concreteness o f the Subject term dissolves into being itself 
expressed by a Predicate term. The Predicate term does not function as in ordinary 
language, i.e. to supplement our knowledge of the Subject term by acting as an 
external addition; rather, it acts to subtract from the Subject term, i.e. it removes the 
original concreteness of the Subject term However, it is a subtraction from the 
Subject term that can be negated by examination of what the Predicate term actually 
expresses or establishes. Speculative language transports thought, via the Predicative 
term (B), to reconsider the intrinsic complexity of the original Subject term (A) itself. 
Thought loses its initial abstract certainty in the concrete Subject term and, for Hegel, 
only an immanent articulation of the nature of thought in speculative language is able 
to recover the sense of certainty lost in the first speculative transition
From the perspective of Negative philosophy, Schelling argues, thought’s 
fundamental role is merely to determine ‘what’ something is through the use of 
predicates. Thus to determine something in thought is merely to attribute a predicate 
term to it, thereby establishing further what (A) is, i.e. being that cannot not be. 
Thought alone, Schelling claims, cannot bring before itself the very ‘thatness’ of (A). 
His move into Positive philosophy entails a suspension of thought’s activity as 
determining and attributing propositions to being, and simply positing necessary 
existence as exterior to it. However, Hegel’s development of a speculative language 
clearly does not demonstrate this characterisation of thought. For Hegel pure thought 
is not restricted to merely establishing abstract propositions or negative 
determinations of being; rather, thought is being itself, articulated through pure logical 
speculative reason Thus, at the beginning of the Science of l-ogic, thought is being as 
pure indeterminate being:
‘Being, pure being, without any fUrther determination. In its indeterminate immediacy 
it is equal only to itself. ,4i 46
46 G. W.F. Hegel. Science o f Logic, p.82
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And:
‘Pure being makes the beginning, because it is pure thought as well as the 
undetermined, simple immediate, [and because] the first beginning cannot be anything 
mediated and further determined.’47
Schelling argues that this thought of pure being is merely the most minimal concept 
reason can attempt to think. However, as a merely empty concept it is recognised as 
the thought of nothing. It is a static tautology for Schelling precisely because he 
judges the statement ‘Being is Nothing’ to have the structure of a mere predicate 
statement and therefore to essentially stale nothing. Pure being is equivalent to pure 
nothing from which nothing could immanently emerge; utter stasis is the only result 
from such a beginning. At this point Schelling invokes the structural necessity of 
hidden and contingent subjectivity as the force propelling Science of Logic forward. 
However, for Hegel the beginning o f the Science o f Logic with pure being is not first 
the thought of nothing but in fact the thought of [wre being, the thought of what is 
‘without any further determination’. For Hegel this pure being, being without 
determination, is experienced by thought first as nothing then becoming. Schelling 
argues that the thought of being as becoming emerges precisely because the utter 
stasis of the thought of pure being as nothing necessitates the arbitrary introduction, 
by a thinking subject’s ‘nostalgia’ o f its memory of concrete situatedness, a situation 
from which it has abstracted. For Hegel, however, the thought of pure being develops 
immanently into the thought of becoming precisely and only because the thought of 
pure being immediately vanishes into the thought of nothing:
‘There is nothing to be intuited in it...Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact 
nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.’48
And: 1
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‘This pure being is the pure abstraction, and hence it is the absolutely negative, which 
when taken immediately, is equally nothing.’49
It is purely an immanent movement in thought and as such in no way relies upon the 
surreptitious imposition of teleology through ‘memory’ in the way Schelling claims. 
By attempting to merely think pure being thought vanishes into the thought of pure 
nothing. Thus by thinking pure being one immediately thinks pure nothing, and this 
represents an immanent transition to a different notion than pure being, which pure 
being vanishes into. Clearly this transition articulates the efforts of pure thought and 
represents a genuinely immanent movement in thought. Teleology, for Hegel, clearly 
plays no role in the transition. Thought now attempts to think the developed notion of 
pure nothing:
‘Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence 
of all determination and content -  undifferentiatedness in itself.’50
In attempting to think the notion o f pure nothing thought discovers itself thinking the 
notion of pure being and thus immediately vanishes back into that notion. A 
distinction does initially emerge between pure being and pure nothing in that ‘it 
counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or thought’51, but it is 
a distinction that immediately vanishes when thought. In the thought of pure nothing 
‘nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and 
thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being.’52 By attempting 
to think pure nothing thought vanishes immediately into the thought o f pure being:
‘Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and 
thus altogether the same as, pure being.’53
We therefore have a speculative proposition, ‘Being is Nothing’, in which the two 
terms, although conceptually differentiated in thought, cannot in fact be held apart by
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thought, and therefore form an identity; i.e. that which defines being also therefore 
appears to define nothing. They are thus conceptually differentiated in that thought 
necessarily moves from thinking being (what is) to thinking nothing (what is not) and 
from nothing to being. This movement, which is an immediate vanishing movement 
of one into another, indicates that they are conceptually differentiated but that thought 
cannot keep them apart. Thought must either remain at the level of this eternal 
vacillation or come to consider the very movement itself by which one vanishes 
immediately into the other and then immediately back into the other. This process of 
immediate vanishing (this vacillation) is an identity, but certainly not a static one. 
Therefore it is not as Schelling characterises it, but is a genuinely immanent self- 
determined movement. It is from this movement in unity that thought is able to 
discern the emergence of the concept of becoming. Thus:
‘Their truth is, therefore, this movement o f the immediate vanishing of the one in the 
other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference 
which has equally immediately resolved itself.’54
Thought, by coming to focus upon this movement, is able to immanently discern a 
notion of that which enables the two categories of pure nothing and pure being to be 
themselves differentiated as related moments of becoming. The movement described 
here from being to nothing to becoming is a purely immanent one and clearly does not 
involve the interpolation of a notion of the ‘not yet real being’ or ‘being to come’ by 
contingent subjectivity. Indeed if one examines properly the very notion o f the ‘not 
yet real being’ (which Schelling claims is present in Hegel’s text and operates 
surreptitiously in its movement) one discovers that it occurs in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia 
Logic rather than the Science o f Logic. More importantly it does not occur within what 
counts as the purely immanent articulation of the movement of being. Schelling fails 
to recognise the presence of two very distinct elements in Hegel’s logical texts, and as 
such he fails to recognise the very character of Hegel’s statement concerning the ‘not 
yet real being’ in the Encyclopaedia Logic. The first element of Hegel’s logical texts 
consist of propositions articulated and developed within a purely speculative language 
free from the presuppositions associated with ordinary language. Thus it is this
M Ibid, p.83
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language that serves to articulate the purely immanent logical movement of thought. 
As we have shown, Hegel claims that such a language is able to operate 
presuppositionlessly and develop speculatively. The second element, clearly 
distinguished by Hegel, serves merely as a type of reflective commentary upon the 
immanent logical development itself. Here the language he uses is not purely 
speculative but more ordinary. To a certain extent it is a language engaged and 
embedded within the philosophical tradition. Thus Hegel constantly compares and 
contrasts his own logical development with that tradition, and often attempts to clarify 
the purely speculative logical development by contrasting it with everyday notions. 
The two types of language are in an entirely one-way relation whereby the reflective 
element clearly relates to the immanent logical articulation as clarification, but the 
logical articulation itself is entirely independent. Thus, the immanent logic is not 
influenced, affected, assisted or moved by any aspect of the reflective considerations 
whatsoever since it has relinquished all such associations. Hegel clearly states in the 
introductory remarks on the Science o f Ijogic that he will constantly make use of 
‘reasoned and historical explanations and reflections to make accessible to ordinary 
thinking the point of view from which this science is to be considered’” , and 
acknowledges that:
‘Such reflections may facilitate a general view and thereby an understanding of the 
development, but they also have the disadvantage of appearing as unjustified 
assertions, grounds and foundations for what is to follow. They should therefore not 
be taken for more than they are supposed to be and should be distinguished from what 
is a moment in the development of the subject matter itself.’56
Schelling fails to recognise or acknowledge the dual textuality of the Science o f Logic 
and is unable to distinguish the speculative language in which the logical development 
is itself articulated from the ordinary language in which his clarifying remarks are 
made. Indeed Schelling’s identification of a claim made by Hegel with regards to the 
‘not yet real being’ (a claim that Schelling argues reveals an implicit teleology at 
work within the logical articulation itself) actually occurs within a reflective remark 
made by Hegel upon the opening triadic movement of being to nothing to becoming
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His remark is made in comments upon Section 88 of the Encyclopaedia Logic 
regarding the concept o f ‘beginning’:
‘The beginning, the matter [itself] is no! yet in its beginning, but the beginning is not 
merely its nothing, on the contrary, its being is already there, too. The beginning itself 
is also becoming, but it expresses already the reference to the further progression.’57
These comments concern Hegel’s response as to why logic cannot begin purely with 
the notion o f beginning. For Hegel the notion of beginning implicitly contains a 
reference to ‘further progression’, thus the notion of beginning implies the non- 
immanently derived, and therefore presupposed, notion of becoming. Clearly the 
example of beginning that Hegel proceeds to give (an example containing the notion 
of the ‘not yet real being’) is one chosen from ordinary thinking in order to illustrate 
the involvement of the notions of being, nothing and becoming in it. It is a notion of 
beginning from ordinary thinking cited to assist in the comprehension of the pure 
speculative thought of being, nothing and becoming, and to show why Hegel does not 
begin with the idea of ‘beginning’ but with ‘pure being’. Hegel claims that such 
notions can be recognised within an ordinary (i.e. non-speculative) notion of 
beginning, a notion containing presuppositions. In such a notion the ‘matter [itself] is 
not yet in its beginning’.58 Hegel is merely attempting to demonstrate that the pure 
immanent abstract notions of being, nothing and becoming, and their unity, can be 
discerned already at the level of ordinary thought, and the purpose of such a 
demonstration is to assist the reader in the comprehension of the pure speculative 
Science o f Logic :
‘It is easy to say that we do not comprehend the unity of being and nothing.. But what 
is understood by ‘comprehension’ is often something more than the concept in the 
proper sense; what is desired is a more diversified, a richer consciousness, a notion 
such that this sort of ‘concept’ can be presented as a concrete case of it, with which 
thinking in its ordinary practice would be more familiar. Insofar as the inability to 
comprehend only expresses the fact that one is not used to holding onto abstract 
thoughts without any sensible admixture or to the grasping of speculative
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propositions, all we can say is that philosophical knowing is indeed quite diverse in 
kind from the knowing that we are used to in everyday, just as it is diverse from what 
prevails in the other sciences too. But if noncomprehension only means that one 
cannot represent the unity o f being and nothing, this is really so far from being the 
case, that on the contrary everyone has an infinite supply of notions of this unity; 
saying that one has none can only mean that one does not [re]cognise the present 
concept in any of those notions, and one does not know them to be examples of it.’59
An analogous discussion takes place in the introduction to the Science o f Logic where 
Hegel considers an alternative demand for a beginning, a beginning otherwise than 
with indeterminate being. Such a demand may take the form, he argues, ‘that a pure 
beginning be made. In that case, we have nothing but the beginning itself, and it 
remains to be seen what this is...thus we should have nothing at all beyond the 
general idea of a mere beginning as such. We have therefore only to see what is 
contained in such an idea’ .60 In thinking the bare notion of beginning, he argues, one 
recognises that it contains certain logical implications, and as such is clearly opposed 
to his notion of a genuinely presuppositionless beginning. The bare notion of 
beginning implies that there is nothing, but that there is something to come; it is 
therefore illegitimately teleological. ‘The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing 
from which something is to proceed’.61 For Hegel the attempt or demand to begin 
with a bare notion of beginning implies an unwarranted ‘not yet’, ‘the beginning 
points to something else -  it is a non-being which carries a reference to being as to an 
other; that which begins, as yet is not, it is on the way to being’62 It implies or merely 
refers to this ‘not yet’ because it already contains an unwarranted moment of 
mediation, and as such does not display a genuinely immanent internal speculative 
relation. Such a beginning, by already carrying with it a reference to the ‘not yet’, 
contains a relation within itself already; it is clearly an illegitimate relation from the 
perspective of presuppositionlessness and cannot display the type of genuine 
immanent and internal self-relatedness that Hegel will attempt to demonstrate within 
the articulation of an authentic immanent logic Thus he claims:
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‘The beginning ought not itself to be already -  first and an other; for anything which 
is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made.'61
Thus, it is clear that Schelling’s argument that the principle of the ‘not yet real being’ 
operates as an implicit arbitrary teleology for the Science o f Logic is based upon a 
fundamental misreading of the text. We can also recognise that Schelling’s criticisms 
of Hegel’s beginning in the Science o f Logic are seriously flawed, i.e he attacks 
supposedly unacknowledged presuppositions that Hegel already acknowledged; he 
misunderstands the self-sublating status of such presuppositions; he misunderstands 
the elevated status of the Science of Logic's presuppositionless beginning; he 
misunderstands the role of the Phenomenology o f Spirit in the development of a pure 
speculative language, a language elevated from representational language; and he 
mischaracterizes Hegel’s own reflective comments upon the Science o f lxtgic and 
conflates them with the logical articulation itself. All of these flaws together with his 
flawed characterisation of the Science o f Logic's opening development suggest that 
Hegel can, to a considerable extent, be recovered from Schelling’s attack. However, 
we must also recognise that Schelling’s critique o f Hegel, despite its obvious flaws in 
the shape of misreadings, misinterpretations and misrepresentations of Hegel, 
attempts to posit a distinctive skeptical strategy taken up by many other post-Hegelian 
thinkers Such a distinctive strategy is identified by an insistence upon a pre-originary 
realm or site that is exterior to and the condition o f speculative reason, upon which the 
challenge can be maintained. This pre-originary site and the subject’s irreducible 
relationship to it - i.e. the subject’s concrete situatedness within actuality -  provide the 
touchstones for this critical form o f skepticism. It is as if the primordial site o f  the 
Real, irreducible to reason, functions as an irreparable tear or derangement in the very 
fabric of speculative reason. This tear serves the philosopher who insists upon 
demonstrating how the Real persistently destabilises, disturbs, disrupts and undoes the 
stable fabric of the speculative totality of reason. The Real, for Schelling, acts like a 
thorn in the side of speculative reason, a thorn that it cannot ever forget, ignore or 
remove.
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From Hegel’s perspective Schelling’s skepticism of reason remains an uncritical, 
dogmatic and naive form o f empiricism or materialism unless Schelling is able to 
demonstrate the presence o f  irreducible and conditioning traces of the Real within the 
very specific type of Negative philosophy that Hegel’s speculative idealism 
represents. Schelling acknowledges that Hegel’s philosophy pursues an absolute 
understanding of the Real, i.e. that it is an idealist ontology However, for Schelling, 
Hegel’s idealist ontology cannot articulate the Real in pure thought other than in 
negative terms. It is unable to reach the Real. There remains an utterly irreducible 
ontological difference between ideated being and Real being or actuality. However, 
the only way Schelling can critically sustain such a difference is through being 
skeptical of Hegel, i.e. by demonstrating precisely how positive ontology pre- 
originally conditions Hegel’s claims for a purely self-determining and immanent 
idealist ontology. By doing this Schelling would be able to demonstrate that the 
irreducibility of the pre-original Real emerges as a necessary excess within 
immanence itself Such a demonstration would go some way to defending him from 
claims that his Positive philosophy of the Real relies upon naive, uncritical and 
dogmatic presuppositions. As Hegel writes:
‘I have been only too often and too vehemently attacked by opponents who were 
incapable of making the simple reflection that their opinions and objections contain 
categories which are presuppositions and which themselves need to be criticised first 
before they are employed.. there is something stupid -  I can find no other word for it 
-  about this didactic behaviour. ’64
As we have attempted to show, however, Schelling’s efforts to demonstrate the 
presence of the conditioning excess of the Real in Hegel’s Science o f Logic fail. His 
actual engagement with Hegel’s logic and his efforts to try and sustain the 
conditioning presence of the Real within yet beyond speculative logic and reason rely 
upon a number of misconceptions and misrepresentations of it Schclling’s failure to 
sufficiently engage critically with Hegel’s logic renders his persistent skepticism of 
speculative idealism and reason somewhat didactic, dogmatic and uncritical Thus all 
that appears to ground his own insistence upon the positivity o f the Real and an 
ontological difference between pure thought and Real being is his own didactic
M Ci.W.F. Ilcgcl. Science o f p.4l
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subjectivity. Schelling’s skepticism begins to resemble the type of dogmatic, external 
and subjective skepticism which, as we have seen, Hegel analysed in his work and 
showed to be philosophically unsustainable. The immediate development of 
Schelling’s insights and his skeptical strategy emerged within the ‘Young’ or ‘Left’ 
Hegelians (most notably Feuerbach) and Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelianism. We will 
argue that by understanding the development and refinement of these distinct 
skeptical approaches to Hegel we will be better placed to understand how they 
continue to inform and be mobilised within Levinas’s anti-Hegelianism, the subject of 
the third part o f this thesis. We will begin this effort by proceeding to examine in 
some detail the development of Feuerbach’s skeptical challenge to Hegel’s idealism 
as a radicalised notion of empiricism.
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Il - Feuerbach and the Persistence of Sensible Singularity
(i) Sensible Singularity and Skepticism
In his study of Hegelianism from 1805-1841, J.E. Toews65 notes that during the 
1820’s one of Hegel’s own pupils called Bachmann began to have and express grave 
doubts towards Hegel’s system of idealism as a ‘therapeutic reconciliation’ of reason 
and reality. Bachmann’s doubts are significant for they initiate from within the very 
citadel of Hegelian idealism itself a revolt against what Hegel took to be the impetus 
toward and ultimate need for reconciliation in philosophy and culture. Bachmann 
denied that the presence of the universal in religious life could ever, or perhaps more 
significantly, should ever be fully appropriated by thought or indeed expressed in 
philosophical or logical Hegriffe. Bachmann insisted that there remained an 
irreducible and persistent irrational element that could never be fully articulated in the 
self-conscious reality o f the state, and crucially, as Toews notes, ‘an irreducible 
“otherness” to the absolute experienced in religious feeling that philosophical 
concepts could not mediate or comprehend ’“  Toews notes that toward the end of the 
I820’s Bachmann was joined by a group of young philosophers and theologians also 
skeptical of Hegel’s absolute reconciliation achieved through the speculative dialectic 
of thought and being. They demanded, as Toews notes, ‘a progressive development of 
philosophy “beyond” Hegel’s allegedly “abstract system’” .67 What occurred within 
their arguments, discussions and publications between the 1820’s and the 1840’s, with 
their attempts to go ‘beyond’ Hegel, arguably continues to have a very profound and 
significant (albeit indirect) impact upon the entire anti-Hegelian tradition of late 19Ul 
and 20lh century philosophy.
For the early Feuerbach the advent of Hegel’s philosophy completes the long arduous 
dialectical journey of Spirit. The task of philosophy now was essentially to rationalise 
the world according to Hegelian doctrine. In the final transition from theology to 
Absolute Reason Feuerbach argues (along with other young Hegelians) that the 
redemption of the world through incarnate reason is finally at hand. The task of *61
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philosophy is to implement genuine reconciliation in the manner advocated by Hegel 
Indeed, it was precisely this movement from religious Vorstellungen to philosophical 
Begriffe that concerned Bachmann, Feuerbach and other Young Hegelians, and they 
set about what they saw as the necessary task of secularising eschatological 
Christianity. In order to understand Feuerbach’s subsequent skepticism regarding 
Hegelian speculative idealism, and his evolution of a thoroughly empirical philosophy 
based on sense perception as the primary source o f cognition, it is important to 
understand the way Feuerbach comes to comprehend and articulate a realm beyond 
Hegel’s speculative idealism We will see that such a fracture is initially articulated in 
the understanding of religion developed by Feuerbach, and how it becomes developed 
in texts directly critical of Hegel We will begin by considering in detail two of 
Feuerbach’s texts where this skepticism of Hegel becomes most explicit -  the 1839 
essay ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy’ and the 1843 book Principles o f the 
Philosophy o f the I''u lure.
By the late 1830’s Feuerbach’s thought develops to the point where he, like 
Bachmann, becomes increasingly skeptical concerning the orthodox Hegelian view of 
religion. He argues for the freedom and independence of philosophy from religion (for 
him the essence of religion resides outside the sphere of reason) by claiming that the 
proper sphere of religion is ‘feeling’. For Hegel ‘feeling’ is merely the lowest form 
and least satisfactory vehicle in which to express the genuine content of religion By 
situating the very essence of religion back in the sphere of ‘feeling’ Feuerbach 
implicitly challenges Hegel’s view, and by delimiting the essence of religion to the 
realm of ‘feeling’ he attempts to articulate a skeptical fracture within the systematic 
totality of reason. This skeptical fracture becomes an all-encompassing abyss as he 
proceeds to articulate further elements ‘beyond’ reason This widening of the abyss 
rests upon Feuerbach’s growing contention that genuine reality lies in the concrete, 
particular, individual being It is this conviction that allows Feuerbach to believe he is 
able to generate a skeptical opposition to the Hegelian perspective that holds the 
universal to be the sole mark of reality.
Following Strauss’s published rejection of the Hegelian notion of Christian 
incarnation in 1835, Feuerbach too rejects the very possibility of the incarnation of 
‘infinite’ Absolute Reason within any finite historical individual such as Christ This
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rejection together with a reformulated understanding o f  the essence of Christianity 
represents a fundamental and significant break with Hegel’s speculative ontology and 
initially provides Feuerbach and the other Left Hegelians with a supposedly legitimate 
strategy for moving beyond Hegel. By both rejecting the Hegelian notion of 
incarnation and delimiting a realm outside of Hegel’s system they are able to 
articulate a skeptical opposition. The redescription o f incarnation by Feuerbach 
involves reconceiving the life of Christ as a figure disclosive of the essence of reason, 
not as the immanent self-enclosed movement towards an absolute reconciliation with 
the divine, but as the immanent telos of a human existence in relation to sensuous 
reality. For Feuerbach the telos of world history is not to be conceived along the lines 
of the Hegelian presupposition of idealism and the need for an absolute reconciliation 
between a transcendent God and man, the infinite and the finite, but as the 
actualisation and self-comprehension of man’s inherent capacities and powers. This is 
what Feuerbach understands by ‘species-being’ and man’s relation to sensuous reality. 
For Feuerbach Hegel’s philosophy represents merely the ongoing theological tradition 
of mystifying finite sensuous reality into an element o f divinity, (albeit one configured 
by Hegel as able to be ultimately reconciled with the human through speculative 
reason). Hegel is understood by Feuerbach to merely perpetuate the tradition of 
obscuring the genuine element of man’s species-being and the true nature of his 
relation to sensuous reality.
A clear overview of the essence of Feuerbach’s mature challenge to Hegelian idealism 
is provided by two of his texts, first ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy’, 
published in 1839 and then Principles o f the Philosophy o f the Future68, published in 
1843. In both texts Feuerbach claims that the universal in Hegel’s speculative 
idealism is only a concept, abstraction, or merely a word, rather than reality itself He 
argues that one can never absolutely unite the particular (which belongs to real 
existence) with the general (which belongs to thought alone); there remains, he 
claims, ‘an immense difference. . .between the ‘this’ as an object of abstract thought 
and the ‘this’ as an object of reality.’69 In both of these texts it is the particularity of 
concrete being that becomes the criterion for genuine philosophy; genuine philosophy
“  L. Feuerbach. Principles o f the Philosophy o f the Future, translated by M. Vogel 
(Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 1986)
69 Ibid, #28, p.43
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must strive to preserve, express and represent that particularity. For Feuerbach it is 
only able to do this if its prime organon of cognition is sense perception, since it is 
only through sense perception that we are able to grasp concrete and true reality (the 
genuinely otherwise than thought). As we earlier outlined, Hegel’s idealism is 
characterised by Feuerbach as pure thought which ‘overlaps its opposite’, ‘claims for 
itself what belongs not to itself but to being’70, and by doing so is fundamentally 
mistaken. That is not to say that Feuerbach’s philosophy can be easily dismissed as 
irrational sensualism or naive empiricism, since, even for Feuerbach the radical task 
of philosophy remains one of articulating the judgments regarding concrete and true 
reality in intellectual terms 71 Philosophical and theoretical practice can only become 
real and objective, Feuerbach claims, if it is fundamentally grounded, determined and 
rectified by sensuous perception. We will return to this aspect of Feuerbach’s work 
later in this chapter.
In these texts Feuerbach attempts to bring a radically skeptical opposition to bear 
upon what he sees as the very principle of Hegelian idealism, i.e. the speculative 
identity of thought and being. For him the reality of being lies in the concrete and 
[xtrticular object rather than in the pure universal thought that claims to encompass 
and subsume in itself, and indeed claims to be, the whole of reality. Feuerbach writes:
‘A being that is not distinguished from thought and that is only a predicate or a 
determination of reason is only an ideated and abstracted being; but in truth it is not 
being.’72
Feuerbach argues that Being must be radically reconfigured as a notion of determinate 
being independent of, and preceding, the activity of thought. This determinate being is 
pre-originary and prior to the activity o f thought itself, and as such cannot be
70 Ibid. #29, p.44
71 Indeed it is precisely this that remains Fcucibach's fault for Marx. In the ‘Theses on Feuerbach'
Marx writes, ‘The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach’s) is that the object, 
reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of object or 
contemplation: but not as sensuous human activity, as practice: not subjectively... Hence in The 
Essence o f ( 'hristianity. he secs only the theoretical altitude as the true human attitude, while practice is 
understood and established only in its dirty Jewish manifestation. He therefore docs not comprehend 
the significance o f ‘‘revolutionary", of “practical-critical” activity.*. The Portable Karl Marx, cd. E. 
kamenka. (London: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 155
72 Ibid. #24, p.38
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legitimately reduced, through the activity of thought, to merely ‘ideated’ abstract 
being. For Feuerbach such an understanding of real determinate being emerges from 
within sense perception. Sense perception leads to a fundamentally dualistic 
worldview in which an irreducible object persistently confronts the subject in a 
manner otherwise than and irreducible to thought. He argues that no synthesis can 
legitimately mediate the chasm between the subject and object (whereby an elevated 
identity of the two might be attained). Rather, Feuerbach argues that it is the very 
essence of sense perception (when considered properly) to lacerate the self-satisfied 
identity of thought and being.
The sensible object has its own irreducible and determinate reality which cannot be 
mediated by thought into a higher or more concretely universal reality. Thus, the 
sensible particular cannot be reduced to having the status of a merely transitory 
moment in the rational and interior process of speculative thought. Feuerbach argues 
that the sensible object is ultimate, independent, exterior, and faces the subject. The 
subject does not determine the object through thought; rather, the object is always 
radically self-determining. Sense perception, Feuerbach argues, fundamentally 
honours and preserves the radical independence of the sensible object by conforming 
to it. For Feuerbach the object becomes reconfigured as the determining factor of the 
subject, rather than the other way around. Thus, only by passively exposing oneself to 
the radical independence of the sensible object is one able to receive the ‘truth of 
reality’.
Feuerbach attempts to reconceive the subject on the basis of sense perception, i.e. as a 
fundamentally passive agent largely determined by its natural environment. Man is 
fundamentally unable to alter the status of the radical exteriority of nature and 
consequently remains fundamentally and irreducibly determined by it. He argues that 
man’s essential liberation and fulfilment cannot come from any Hegelian idealist 
reconciliation but must come from an interior reorientation of man’s consciousness 
instead. Thus, man must remove the mystified notion of divinity and the 
hypostatisation of abstract notions. As such it is, therefore, not man as he is and 
nature as it is that requires transformation, only the illusions of traditional 
ontotheology • illusions perpetuated by Hegelian idealism - that oppress and deform 
man’s species-being and its relation to nature.
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Clearly Feuerbach’s skeptical opposition to Hegel’s idealism builds upon many of the 
insights originally developed by Schelling. Like Schelling, Feuerbach is concerned 
with opposing Hegel’s supposed identity of being and thought by arguing that it is an 
unwarranted presupposition that functions to obscure the exteriority of real being by 
configuring it as merely ‘ideated’ being and interiorising it within the speculative 
dialectic. Feuerbach asks wryly whether proceeding by means of such a 
presupposition Hegel is really able to demonstrate philosophy as the absolute truth ‘so 
that it can no longer be doubted, so that skepticism is reduced once and for all to 
absurdity?’73 Hegel’s reconciliation, he argues, is not a genuine reconciliation that 
successfully overcomes the real differences between two distinct and independent 
entities. Such reconciliation is merely a presupposition underpinning Hegel’s entire 
philosophy from the very beginning. Thus his reconciliation is only ever possible, 
Feuerbach argues, because there is never a genuine reconciliation to be made. By 
beginning and ending with thought Hegel’s reconciliation is entirely enacted within 
the confines of abstract thought, and does not represent a genuine reconciliation 
between thought and real being:
‘Hegel started from the assumption of Absolute Identity right from the earliest 
beginnings of his philosophical activity. The idea o f Absolute Identity, or of the 
Absolute, was simply an objective truth for him. It was not just a truth for him, but 
absolute truth, the Absolute Idea itself -  absolute, that is, beyond all doubt and above 
all criticism and skepticism.’74
Thus, Feuerbach claims, in Hegel the ‘otherness’ of thought (the sensible object) is 
always already within thought; thinking and its differentiation, the ‘otherness’ of 
thought, is thus within thought Hegel’s reconciliation of thought and being merely 
demonstrates the self-sufficiency of thought within a rational system. What Hegel 
really claims is that thought alone is ‘real’:
15 L. Feuerbach. ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', translated by Zawar Hanfi in The T'iery 
llrook: Selected Writings o f Ludwig b'euerbach (Garden City: Doublcday, 1972) p. 112
74 Ibid, pp. 118-9
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‘Hegel is a realist, but a purely idealistic realist or, rather, an abstract realist; he is a 
realist in the abstraction from all reality. He negates thought, namely, abstract 
thought; but the negation is itself within abstract thought so that the negation of 
abstraction is itself an abstraction. . . Hegel is a thinker who surpasses himself in 
thought; he wants to grasp the thing itself, but in the thought of the thing. He wants to 
be apart from thought, but within thought itself -  hence the difficulty in 
comprehending the ‘concrete’ notion.’75
Feuerbach rejects the legitimacy of ‘presupposing’ a principle of the identity of 
thought and being. It is not that Hegel fails to satisfactorily demonstrate such an 
identity, but rather that the principle itself is utterly untenable. For Feuerbach being 
and thought are utterly incommensurable, and Hegel’s immanent articulation of their 
identity proves to be the immanent identity of thought and ideated being, or merely 
thought’s self-identity. Such self-identity is, Feuerbach claims, presupposed by Hegel 
from the very beginning:
‘Hegel in his heart of hearts was convinced of the certainty of the Absolute Idea. In 
this regard, there was nothing of the critic or the skeptic in him.’76
Here an important element of Feuerbach’s criticisms o f Hegel becomes clear. By 
demonstrating Hegel’s presupposition of the absolute identity between thought and 
being Feuerbach shows how Hegel fa ils to be genuinely skeptical. By claiming to 
have discovered this blind spot of Hegelian idealism (i.e. real being), a blind spot that 
prevents him from being genuinely philosophically critical, Feuerbach is indeed very 
close and greatly indebted to Schelling. However, it is worthwhile looking in some 
detail at an essay Feuerbach wrote and published some four years before Principles o f 
the Philosophy o f the Future. This essay, entitled ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy’, greatly illuminates the way in which he reaches these skeptical 
conclusions regarding Hegel’s idealism in the Principles, and demonstrates 
substantial differences from Schelling in actually reaching them.
7'  L. Feuerbach, Principles o f the Philosophy o f the P'uture, #30, pp.48-9
76 L. Feuerbach, 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', p. I IS
The essay itself consists of a number of complex and interrelated issues that we 
should begin by identifying and separating. There is an initial critique of the Hegelian 
claim to an Absolute philosophy and the claim that it is absolute because it is 
presuppositionless From this initial critique Feuerbach develops an instrumental 
understanding of philosophical theory. For Feuerbach philosophical ideas are never in 
themselves the Absolute end of philosophy; thus philosophical ideas can never 
represent the actual structure of reality, but are merely instruments of enquiry into 
reality. Consequently, to identify a particular philosophical theory or system with the 
Absolute truth of reality (as Hegel’s philosophy appears to) represents a fundamental 
confusion for Feuerbach. Such a philosophy, he claims, merely hypostatises the 
means as the object of philosophy, i.e. reality. For Feuerbach Hegel’s Science of 
Ix>gic and Phenomenology of Spirit perfectly exemplify this confusion, i.e. the 
Science o f Logic's claim for an absolute ‘beginning’ with the thought of Pure Being as 
‘Being’ itself, and the Phenomenology o f Spirit's substitution of the thought of sense 
awareness for actual sense awareness. Feuerbach then argues that Hegelianism should 
be considered the final and most abstract form o f an idealist tradition marked by a 
progressive hypostatisation of self-consciousness. Feuerbach concludes his critique of 
Hegel with a radical proposal for a new philosophy based on what he terms human 
species knowledge. For Feuerbach human species knowledge is understood as a 
genuine dialogue of reason with reality that represents a move beyond the idealist 
tradition. For Feuerbach post-idealist philosophy must recognise that the basis of all 
human experience is sensuous rather than primarily theoretical. Idealism’s efforts to 
transcend and efface this primary sensuousness resulted in a blind anthropomorphism, 
i.e the hypostatisation of human categories as if they were objective or transhuman 
categories, and must, Feuerbach claims, be rejected.
Feuerbach’s initial discussion of Hegel in the paper concentrates upon the Science o f 
lAtgic. By critically examining the log ic's claims to be an Absolute philosophy he 
seeks to delimit its role to that of an instrument or a mirror for the recognition of one’s 
own thought activity, i.e. as ‘the picture gallery of reason’.77 The logical system 
cannot, he claims, be reason itself but merely its limited outward form. To confuse 
this formal representation with the material fact o f reason (i.e. the activity of thought 71
71 Ibid. p. 110
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itself) is a fundamental error, an error of hypostatisation. Hegel must be understood 
(contrary to his own self-understanding) as not actually incarnating the very essence 
of Reason, but merely giving a particularly rigorous and systematic model or 
externalised presentation o f the abstract form of reason. It is in this sense that 
Feuerbach claims Hegel must be recognised as a truly great philosophical artist. 
However, Hegel makes the fundamental mistake of taking the picture for the thing 
itself, i.e. mistaking the form  for the essence. He thus mistakes that in which thought 
itself takes a shape so that it may be articulated to others (through its representations 
in a system) for the way thought is in itself:
‘Hegel is the most accomplished philosophical artist, and his presentations, at least in 
part, are unsurpassed models o f scientific art sense and, because of their rigour, 
veritable means for the education and discipline o f the spirit. But precisely because of 
this, Hegel . . . made form into essence, the being of thought for others into being in 
itself, the relative goal into the final goal. Hegel, in his presentation, aimed at 
anticipating and imprisoning the intellect itself and compressing it into the system. 
The system was supposed to be, as it were, reason itself; all immediate activity was to 
dissolve itself completely in mediated activity, and the presentation of philosophy was 
not to presuppose anything, that is, nothing was to be left over in us and nothing 
within us -  a complete emptying of ourselves.’78
Feuerbach argues that the ‘Being’ at the beginning of Hegel’s Science o f Logic is not, 
and cannot be, ‘Being’ in itself, but only a formal concept of Being, i.e. Being as it is 
presented for thought in its recognisable (i.e. linguistic or conceptual) form. Reason as 
a linguistic or conceptual scheme does not, he claims, have the character of real 
Being; but is only an outward show or the shared form that provides the stimulus and 
model for one’s own thinking. Consequently the Science o f Logic's presentation of 
Being is essentially Being for an-other. It is the form under which thought grasps its 
objects and presents that understanding to another; indeed it is the form under which 
an intellectual community itself becomes possible. Language, as the material 
condition of communication, dictates this form; thus, the ‘unity of form and content’ 
is the unity of logical form alone (insofar as this is entirely derived from language
Ibid, pi 10-11
80
itself). This unity is entirely a matter o f the logical unity of language, as a conceptual 
scheme, rather than the alleged unity between thought and real being.
This understanding of the function of logic provides the ground for Feuerbach’s 
analyses of Hegel’s claims for an absolute or immediate beginning He argues that if 
we are to begin, as Hegel claims, with ‘pure, empty Being’, then in fact we begin with 
nothing at all. (As we saw earlier, Hegel himself asserted the dialectical unity of this 
kind of Being with Nothing). Feuerbach accuses Hegel of saying nothing at all, and of 
positing a fraudulent contradiction between the two concepts. Just as he attacks 
Hegel’s notion of Being, he proceeds to attack his notion of Nothing, and claims that 
it is not a concept at all, but the absence of a concept. Nothing, Feuerbach argues, 
since it lacks any determinations whatsoever, cannot be thought, only Being can be 
thought. For Feuerbach this fact demonstrates that the very essence o f thinking is to 
think determinatefy. Consequently, Feuerbach argues that thought can never transcend 
thinking anything but determinate Being, and that the Hegelian thought of Nothing in 
the Science o f Logic represents the very abdication of thinking reason:
‘If you therefore leave out determinateness from being, you leave being with no being 
at all. It will not be surprising if you then demonstrate that indeterminate being is 
nothingness. Under these circumstances this is self-evident.’79 *
The logical contradiction between Being and Nothing asserted by Hegel is therefore 
an empty and merely formal contradiction. The real contradiction, Feuerbach asserts, 
to this abstract concept of Being that Hegel posits ‘is not Nothing, but sensuous and 
concrete being. Sensuous being denies logical being; the former contradicts the latter 
and vice versa.'*0 Feuerbach thus claims to reinstate a genuine dialectical opposition, 
but in non-formal terms:
‘Dialectics is not a monologue that speculation carries on with itself, but a dialogue 
between speculation and empirical reality.’81
79 Ibid, p.113
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For Feuerbach genuine dialectic requires a ‘real’ opposition of sensory, empirical 
consciousness with speculative rationalism. The challenge, as Feuerbach reads it, is 
to demonstrate a resolution to this contradiction, which would, he argues, be the real 
measure or proof of Hegel’s thesis of the ‘reality of logical being’ .82 Hence:
‘Logical being is in direct, unmediated and abhorrent contradiction with the being of 
the intellect’s empirical and concrete perception. In addition, logical being is only an 
indulgence, a condescension on the part of the Idea, and, consequently, already that 
which it must prove itself to be. This means that I enter the Logic as well as 
intellectual perception only through a violent act, through a transcendent act, or 
through an immediate break with real perception.’83
At this point in the essay Feuerbach draws attention to the fact that Hegel considers 
the Phenomenology of Spirit as the necessary propaedeutic to the Science o f Logic84 , 
and as such deals there with the whole issue of empirical understanding and the 
‘certainty of the senses’. Consequently it is to this work that Feuerbach turns his 
attention, and asks ‘Does Hegel produce the Idea or thought out of the other-being of 
the Idea or thought?’85 Since for Feuerbach the ‘only philosophy that proceeds from 
no presuppositions at all is one. . . that produces itself out of its antithesis’86, it is 
crucial to examine whether or not Hegel successfully refutes rational empiricism in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. *
*2 Ibid
"'Ibid, p.116
M Thus, in the Introduction to the Science o f Isigic Hegel writes:‘In the Phenomenology o f Spirit I have 
exhibited consciousness in its movement onwards front the first immediate opposition of itself and the 
object to absolute knowing The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation o f 
consciousness to the object and has the Notion of science for its result. This notion therefore (apart 
from the fact that it emerges within the logic itself) needs no justification here because it has received it 
in that work; and it cannot be justified in any other way than by this emergence in consciousness, all 
the forms of which arc resolved into this Notion as into their truth.. .The Notion of pure science and its 
deduction is therefore presupposod in the present work in so far as the Phenomenology o f Spirit is 
nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness 
because, as the course of the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation 
of the object from the certainty o f itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty 
and this certainty with truth’, p.4X 
“5 Ibid
86 Ibid. p. 114
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Feuerbach explains that Hegel begins the Phenomenology o f Spirit (a chapter entitled 
‘Sense Certainty: On the ‘This’ and ‘Meaning’87) with an immediate form of natural 
empirical consciousness and attempts to demonstrate the immanent dependence of 
claims for immediate empirical knowledge of sensible particulars upon the categories 
of ‘This’, ‘Here’ and ‘Now’, categories which are neither finite nor particular but 
empty universals. Thus, when sense-certainty claims absolute certainty with regard 
to, for example, ‘this’ tree ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ house ‘here’ and ‘now’, each 
vanishes as a particular whilst the ‘this’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ remain as universal 
relations: ‘It is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty.’88 
Despite its inability to signify what sense-certainty really ‘means’, language, Hegel 
claims, expresses the real immanent truth of sense-certainty’s claims. We are shown 
to be only able to denote particulars by virtue of the universal terms ‘this’, ‘here’ and 
‘now’. Hegel demonstrates that what may initially be meant or intended by sense- 
certainty, i.e. the immediate certainty of sensory particulars, cannot be expressed in 
language:
‘It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is What we say is: 
‘This’, i.e. the universal This; or, ‘it is’, i.e. Being in general. Of course, we do not 
envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other 
words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. But 
language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we 
mean to say, and since the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and 
language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, 
or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.’89 90
For Feuerbach Hegel's demonstration of the immanent truth of sense-certainty 
represents an absurdly reductive reading of the genuine truth of sensory 
consciousness. He claims it is a reading where ‘thought is naturally certain of its 
victory over its adversity in advance ,9° He argues that Hegel’s reduction of sensory 
consciousness to the denotations ‘this’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ represents a reduction to 
empty universals whose reality is no reality at all and whose truth merely represents
1,1 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, pp. 58-66
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the truth of self-sufficient reason. For Feuerbach such universal relations are wholly 
derived from the radically particular, finite and temporal instances of ‘this’, ‘here’ and 
‘now’, and only such radically particular relations among concrete existences can 
constitute the ‘real’ content o f universal concepts. Feuerbach claims that insofar as 
sensuous consciousness is concerned, language is utterly irrelevant to establishing its 
truth: ‘Enough of words: come down to the real things!...To sensuous consciousness 
it is precisely language that is unreal, nothing.’91
Feuerbach argues that for sensuous consciousness, when properly considered, all 
words have the status of proper names or mere ‘signs by which it can achieve its aims 
in the shortest possible way.’92 For sensory consciousness, he maintains, language is 
merely instrumental, and cannot express its essence Therefore, rather than 
acknowledge that its claims for absolute certainty of sensuous particulars appear 
refuted by language, it ‘sees precisely in this a refutation o f language.’ 93 For 
Feuerbach Hegel’s demonstration of the ‘truth’ of sense-certainty in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit is nothing more than a ‘verbal game in which thought that is 
already certain of itself as truth plays with natural consciousness.’94 All Hegel actually 
refutes are merely logical claims regarding denotations within language concerning 
absolute particularity (i.e. ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘now’) rather than the real ‘this’, ‘here’ and 
‘now’ that form the real object of sensuous consciousness. This is because, Feuerbach 
claims, Hegel is not genuinely immersing himself within, or inhabiting, natural 
empirical consciousness in the way that he claims to be. Consequently, he treats the 
object of sensory consciousness only in the sense of an object for self-consciousness 
or thought, i.e. as an extemalisation of thought to be recovered within thought. Hegel 
begins the Phenomenology o f Spirit (as Feuerbach claims he had done in the Science 
of Logic) by means of an absolute break from the real object of sense consciousness, 
and the presupposition of an Absolute Identity between thought and being. He writes 
that Hegel ‘begins. . . not with the ‘other-being’ of thought, but with the idea of the 
‘other-being’ of thought.’95
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Feuerbach concludes that the Phenomenology o f Spirit when taken as the necessary 
propadeutic to the Science o f Logic, cannot be considered as ever having really been 
engaged with a genuine dialogue with the absolute alterity of the sensory object. Thus, 
Hegel can never be justified in considering sense-certainty as genuinely overcome or 
reliited. The Phenomenology o f Spirit, Feuerbach argues, is not a genuine 
phenomenology of consciousness (as sensory consciousness) itself, but merely a 
phenomenological logic. Like the Science o f Logic it represents nothing more than a 
dialectical monologue presupposing from its inception an Absolute identity of Being 
and thought. It is not, Feuerbach claims, a genuine dialectical dialogue between 
thought and the ‘other-being’ of thought, i.e. the sensible object. Despite Hegel’s 
claims, this genuine dialectical relation remains as much unthought in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit as it had in the Science o f Logic.
‘The same unmediated contradiction, the same conflict that we encounter at the 
beginning of the Logic, now confronts us at the beginning of the Phenomenology -  the 
conflict between being as the object of the Phenomenology and being as the object of 
sensuous consciousness.’96
For Feuerbach such a philosophy cannot have what he terms a ‘genetico-critical 
sense’; a sense that he claims is crucial to a genuine dialectical evolution of reason 
Thus:
‘A genetico-critical philosophy is one that does not dogmatically demonstrate or 
apprehend an object given through perception... but examines its origin, which 
questions whether an object is a real object, only an idea or just a psychological 
phenomena; which finally, distinguishes with utmost rigor between what is subjective 
and what is objective.’97
Like Schelling, Feuerbach emphasises the extent to which the empirical world, nature 
or actuality exceeds the structures of comprehension elaborated within the Hegelian 
system (a system characterised by Feuerbach as being merely ‘formal’ rather than 
substantive). Feuerbach’s own subsequent philosophy concentrates upon vindicating *91
96 Ibid
91 Ibid, p.123
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the independence and ‘reality’ o f the empirical world. For Feuerbach the genuine 
elevation of human reason is only possible by moving away from the idolatry of 
Hegel’s petrified system and towards engaging in a situated dialectical dialogue with 
empirical or ‘sensuous reality’. In this vein Feuerbach returns to his lifelong concern 
with secularising Christian eschatology. The ground for his attempt at secularisation is 
his claim that any adequate examination of the essence of religious consciousness and 
phenomena should be constructed upon what he terms ‘genetico-critical sense’, since 
the liberation from the weight of religious ‘illusions’ or spectres of the imagination 
can only come from a thorough understanding of the origins of such illusions. The 
Hegelian movement from religious Vorstellung to philosophical Begriff does not 
liberate man from such spectres but merely petrifies them into a mystical objective 
state. For Feuerbach Hegel’s speculative metaphysics of reconciliation represents the 
culmination of a historical and theological attempt to salvage a transcendental 
objectivity. The Science o f Logic merely expresses in philosophical Begriffe what 
religion (through its Vorstellungeri) had injected with elements of mystical 
imagination. A deconstruction of Hegel’s speculative reason through the disclosure of 
the degree to which its metaphysical categories rest upon mere spectres of 
imagination would culminate, Feuerbach argues, in the liberation from the weight of 
the ontotheological tradition and man’s encumberment by divinity.
(ii) -  The Hegelian Response to Feuerbach
Hegel’s response to Feuerbach’s criticisms would almost certainly concern the 
criticisms of sense-certainty and the way Feuerbach subsequently characterises 
speculative idealism. Hegel’s arguments in ‘Sense-Certainty’ demonstrate that the 
object of consciousness is not something whose concrete actuality is available to a 
pre-conceptual consciousness, passively and intuitively receiving presentations of the 
object. Indeed, he intends to demonstrate that the object of consciousness is not a 
simple and immediate sense particular but something much more complex, i.e. 
something that presents itself as an object whose identity is known through a concept.
Arguably, from the Hegelian perspective, Feuerbach’s account fails to recognise the 
precise nature of the arguments in the dialectic of sense-certainty and the notion of 
universality developed there. The first of Feuerbach’s errors lies in his neglect of the
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fact that the beginning of the Phenomenology of Spirit is determined by a descriptive 
analysis of the different attitudes successively adopted by consciousness towards its 
own knowledge, towards the relationship between its object and itself. Thus, Hegel 
must begin merely with the most primitive form of such an attitude, i.e. ‘knowledge of 
the immediate or of what simply is.’911 As ‘sense-certainty’ the attitude adopted by 
consciousness towards its object is one of immediacy, a sheer ‘givenness’ unmediated 
by anything else. Given this immediacy, the object is taken as being in no way 
dependent upon consciousness:
‘Our approach to the object must...be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing 
in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to 
comprehend it.’99
Thus, in this attitude consciousness takes the object to be an absolute, i.e. that which 
is ultimately available to it to be known. Moreover, it takes the knowledge so 
provided to be the ‘richest’, ‘truest’ and the most certain form of knowledge. ‘Richest’ 
in the sense that the object presents itself to consciousness in its absolute 
concreteness, and ‘truest’ because the object is immediately related to consciousness 
and as such nothing comes between them that could possibly distort consciousness’ 
knowledge This immediacy is the basis for consciousness’ certainty of its knowledge; 
and insofar as the object is immediate then consciousness’ knowledge is ‘immediate 
knowledge’, i.e. knowledge is identical with consciousness’ immediate access to the 
object itself. Consequently, knowledge cannot be any more certain than that which is 
itself identical to consciousness’ absolutely direct relation to its object.
Since consciousness takes its object to be utterly immediate, it takes itself to be the 
condition for such absolute immediacy. Hence, it takes itself to be nothing more than 
that which it is in relation to, i.e. its object. In such an immediate relation 
consciousness is nothing more or less than its direct apprehension of the immediate 
object:
'* G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, #90, p.58 
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‘The thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It is; this is the essential point for sense- 
knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. 
Similarly, certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection: consciousness is 
T ,  nothing more, a pure ‘This’; the singular consciousness knows a pure ‘This’, or 
the single item.’100
For Hegel the pure being of sense-certainty divides into two ‘Thises’, one ‘This’ as I, 
and the other ‘This’ as object, and he proceeds to reflect in his analysis upon this 
difference. What he will conclude is that neither is immediately present in sense- 
certainty, but ‘each is at the same time mediated’ Thus:
‘I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in 
sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I’.’101
Initially consciousness takes the object to be the essential term of the consciousness- 
object relationship, and itself the inessential term. This priority is reversed later in the 
dialectical development. Hegel simply asks whether such a relationship can be 
sustained. The immediate ‘this’ that consciousness takes for its essential object must, 
as immediate, be temporally and spatially locatable; it is, Hegel argues, the ‘Now and 
the Here’101. These temporal and spatial specifications are necessary indications of the 
very immediacy of the particular object; it is the way the thing is something which 
simply is, something merely present here and now. Hegel asks:
‘ “What is Now?” let us answer, e.g. “Now is Night”. In order to test the truth of this 
sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth 
cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything 
through our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall 
have to say that it has become stale.’“11
Hegel’s point here is not the merely banal one that Feuerbach seems to reduce it to, 
i.e. that ‘Now’ has different referents. Hegel is actually concerned with the very
Ibid, #91, pp.58-9 
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nature and character of the referent as such. Thus, by attempting to relate itself to that 
which immediately is, to that which is now, consciousness itself discloses that the 
‘Now’ vanishes, and can only be preserved through an abstract general negation:
‘The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not Night; equally, it 
preserves itself in face of the Day that it now is, as something that also is not Day, in 
other words, as a negative in general. This self-preserving Now is, therefore, not 
immediate but mediated; for it is determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now 
through the fact that something else, viz. Day and Night, is not. As so determined, it is 
still just as simply Now as before, and in this simplicity is indifferent to what happens 
in it; just as little as Night and Day are its being, just as much as it is Day and Night; it 
is not in the least affected by this its other being. A simple thing of this kind which is 
through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not- litis, and is with equal 
indifference. Thus as well as That -  such a thing we call a universal. ’104
Consciousness’ most primitive attempt to understand its relationship to an object, by 
characterising the object as a ‘This’ which is simply ‘Here’ and ‘Now’, actually 
discloses the object to be an empty universal determined by the most general form o f 
negation. Thus it merely persists through a series of undifferentiated ‘Nows’. Hegel 
proceeds to construct an analogous argument regarding the object characterised as 
something that is simply ‘here’. This object too can only be apprehended by 
consciousness as the maintenance of the vanishing of the ‘particular ‘here’s’, and 
‘again, therefore, the ‘This’ shows itself to be a mediated simplicity, or a 
universality.’105 The object o f sense-certainty is thus shown to be something for which 
abstract general negation and mediation are essential. However, all this leaves with 
regard to sense-certainty’s ‘object’ is what Hegel terms an ‘empty or indifferent Now 
and Here’, the ‘Here’ and ‘Now’ as the most abstract and empty universal. This 
reverses the very sense of the object taken to be the crucial element of sense-certainty, 
and for Hegel the certainty is now to be found in the opposite element:
‘The certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in knowing, which 
previously was the unessential element. Its truth is in the object as my object, or in its
104 Ibid, #96. p.60
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being mine; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled 
from the object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven back into the ‘I’.’106
For sense-certainty, at this point, its truth lies in the very particularity of the ‘I’, ‘in the 
immediacy of my seeing, hearing and so on.’107 The certainty of the object is entirely 
maintained by the fact that I grasp on to it. “ Now’ is day because /  see it.’108 
However, Hegel proceeds to demonstrate that the same dialectic operates here with 
the subject as operated with the ‘This’, ‘Here’ and 'Now'. Thus Hegel writes:
‘I, this T ,  see the tree and assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another T  sees the house 
and maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same 
authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing, and the certainty and assurance that both 
have about their knowing; but the one truth vanishes in the other.’109
Hegel claims that what is maintained here is merely the T  as an abstract and empty 
universal, an ‘I’ utterly simple and indifferent to what it sees, an ‘I’ that is a ‘simple 
seeing’ mediated by negation:
‘When I say T ,  this singular ‘I’, I say in general all ‘I’s’; everyone is what I say, 
everyone is ‘I’, this singular ‘I’.110
For Hegel this empty universality is characterised by the necessity to refer beyond 
itself but in an utterly indeterminate way. However, the very nature of the empty and 
abstract universality associated with the supposedly simple self-identity of the 
immediate object (‘This’ as ‘Here’ and ‘Now’) and the immediate subject (‘1’) 
necessarily refers beyond itself to what it is not. Its mediation by negativity is in the 
most abstract and general sense, i.e. it is indifferent to what it is not, and is merely a 
general form of negation. Empty and abstract universality thus refers, but in an utterly 
indifferent way. Consciousness as sense-certainty claims its object and subject to be 
utterly immediate and particular, but when analysed the particularity of its object and
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subject are disclosed to be mediated by the most general form of negation and to be 
nothing more than the most abstract and empty universal. Hegel’s arguments 
concerning language relate precisely to this point. Thus, he argues that when sense 
consciousness attempts to refer to its object or subject in language it necessarily 
attempts to indicate their particularity and immediacy in the only way it can:
‘It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: 
‘This’, i.e. the universal This; or, ‘it is’, i.e. Being in general. Of course, we do not 
envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other 
words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. But 
language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we 
mean to say. ’111
What we must recognise, contrary to Feuerbach’s presentation, is that Hegel’s 
arguments concerning language merely exhibit a philosophical point already 
demonstrated. Thus, when sense-certainty calls its object ‘This’ it attempts to refer to 
its object as a particular and purely unmediated thing. However, it fails, and language 
itself is able to demonstrate the essence of that failure. Referring to a particular in 
language always involves a necessary form of selectivity. However, the particular 
object as simply an empty universal involves no inner complexity or mediating 
features in virtue of which it could distinguish itself as ‘this’ from this or that other 
particular object. The object so conceived is not really a genuine particular object, 
rather it is only an empty ‘universal this’ or ‘being in general’. Hence in this way 
Hegel argues that ‘language...is the more truthful.’ However, Hegel’s broader 
philosophical point is that the object itself is the basis or ground for such a necessity. 
The object as a particular itself demands a more determinate form of mediation, and 
hence comprehension in terms of its mediation. Language is in this sense truthful to 
the object of sense-certainty; it is able to demonstrate that the bare immediate 
particular is not a genuine particular but an empty universality.
1,1 Ibid, #97, p .60
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Hegel proceeds to develop an analysis o f the various strategies by which sense- 
certainty, if it is not to dissolve itself into mere empty universals, tries to maintain the 
immediacy of the particular. As Hegel writes:
‘We reach a stage where we have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as its 
essence, and no longer only one o f its moments, as happened in the two cases where 
first the object confronting the ‘I’, and then the T ,  were supposed to be its reality. 
Thus it is only sense-certainty as a whole which stands firm within itself as immediacy 
and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto 
obtained.’112
Here the pure immediacy of sense-certainty attempts to preserve itself as a relation 
that remains self-identical. The ‘I’ as sense-certainty attempts to maintain itself as a 
pure act of intuiting; ‘I’ adhere to the pure ‘Here’ and ‘Now’ without comparing them 
to other ‘Here’ and ‘Nows’. Thus ‘I’ as sense-certainty, confining itself to one ‘Now’ 
or one ‘Here’, need to precisely indicate that point. Hegel proceeds to analyse how 
that immediate point is itself constituted and indicated by sense-certainty. He writes:
‘The Now is pointed to, this Now. ‘Now’; it has already ceased to be in the act of 
pointing to it. The Now that is, is another Now than the one pointed to, and we see 
that the Now is just this: to be no more just when it is. The Now, as it is pointed out to 
us, is Now that has been, and this is its truth; it has not the truth of being. Yet this 
much is true, that it has been. But what essentially has been is, in fact, not an essence 
that is, it is not.
There is here a movement within the essence of sense-certainty as a whole. This 
movement begins with an indication of a pure ‘Now’ asserted as the absolute truth. 
However, by indicating it, sense-certainty actually indicates not what is but what has 
been, as something ‘superseded’. In doing this sense-certainty actually sets aside its 
first truth. Sense-certainty then attempts to assert a second truth about the immediate 
particular, i.e. that what is has been, but that what has been is not. Thus, sense-
1,2 Ibid, #103, p.62 
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certainty sets aside the having been of the immediate particular, and negates ‘the 
negation of the ‘Now’, and thus return to the first assertion, that the ‘Now' /s ’114
That which is ‘Now’ can only be recognised as such by consciousness if it is 
recognised in more determinate opposition to the objects of past time. Thus, the thing 
itself, the object, holds within itself the opposition and negation, and as such becomes 
the very ground o f it being apprehended by consciousness at all. The present ‘Now’ is 
thus the negation o f its other, i.e. the immediate past, its having been. It holds within 
itself this opposition to its other, and indeed only by holding within itself this very 
opposition to its other can it be that which consciousness apprehends as something 
‘Now’ present. What this clearly demonstrates is that the very object of sense- 
certainty, i.e. the sheer immediate, is not in fact so. The object or referent is a 
thoroughly mediated object in that it is both itself and opposition to and the negation 
of its other. It is precisely this point that is fundamentally different from Feuerbach’s 
erroneous presentation. The pure ‘Now’ and its indication are thus constituted neither 
as immediate nor simple. In positing a pure ‘This’ sense-certainty actually 
simultaneously posits an ‘other’, i.e. the pure ‘This’ is superseded by its indication 
and this in turn becomes superseded in order to return to the first ‘This’. However, 
‘this first, thus reflected into itself, is not exactly the same as it was to begin with, viz. 
something immediate, on the contrary, it is something that is reflected into itself, or a 
simple entity which, in its otherness, remains what it is: a Now which is an absolute 
plurality o f Nows.’115
The indication o f the pure ‘Now’ by sense-certainty as a whole reveals itself as a 
moment that expresses what that ‘Now’ is in its truth. It can only be a ‘Now’ as a 
mediated result, or as a plurality of all the ‘Nows’ taken together. Thus the indicating 
of the particular ‘Now’ is the experience of learning that ‘Now’ is a mediated 
particular, a universal. However, now it is a universal mediated by a more determinate 
form of negation than in the divided formulations of the primary instantiations of 
sense-certainty. What Hegel demonstrates is that which sense-certainty initially takes 
to be the ‘richest’, ‘truest’ and most concrete kind of knowledge is in fact ‘the most
114 Ibid, #107, p.63
" 5 Ibid. #107, p.64
9 3
abstract and poorest truth.’116 It is based on a conception of the object that is supposed 
to be absolutely concrete, but is in fact the most abstract. Sense-certainty then 
discovers, from within its own experience of its relationship to  the object, that its 
conception of the object lacks any reference to the mediated concreteness that the 
object must possess. Furthermore, Hegel argues that sense-certainty itself 
demonstrates that the object must be minimally but necessarily taken as implying 
determinate mediation. Thus, consciousness’ object cannot be something immediate 
and indifferent to mediations since its very particularity vanishes into a merely empty 
form of universality. Rather it must be something that is self-identical by virtue of the 
mediations it itself involves -  it must be ‘mediated immediacy’. ‘Immediacy’ comes 
to be figured not merely as simple immediate self-identity, but a self-identity 
recovered within the object’s distinction or mediatioa ‘Mediacy’ now signifies not 
those features to which the object itself is indifferent, but rather those features through 
which the object is its self-identity, i.e. its ‘immediate’ self.
What is absolutely clear is that Hegel does not claim that the particular object of 
consciousness is wholly logical or merely an instance of a categorical universal. What 
he really claims is that the truth of consciousness’ initial primitive conception of its 
object as pure immediate particularity in sense-certainty is an abstract and empty 
universal. This bare form of universality implies an identity involving, yet thoroughly 
indifferent to, mediations. His point is that sense-certainty is neither an adequate or 
sustainable attitude to that which is, and is in fact a conception o f  the particular object 
too abstract to allow the object to account for knowledge of itself as a particular. 
Hegel demonstrates within the dialectical movement of sense-certainty that the object 
of sense-certainty, if it is not to dissolve into empty and abstract universality, must 
become a concretely determinate universal. With the development of this second, 
more determinate, form of universality the particular something is, by virtue of its 
own content, able to distinguish itself from other things. It must be, in itself, not its 
‘other’, i.e. not this or that. It must not be a purely immediate something but a 
concretely mediated immediacy. Hegel’s arguments do not at all conclude with the 
proposition that the particular must be subsumed as merely a logical instance of a 
categorical universal. What they in fact demonstrate is that the object of sense-
"*  Ibid, #91, p.91
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certainty must be concretely mediated in its self-identity if it is to disclose itself as a 
singular or particular thing at all.
For Hegel the movement of sense-certainty is the experience of learning that its object 
is a mediated universality, i.e. the self-identity of the immediate particular is itself 
sustained by being a concretely mediated immediacy. What the object is not is a 
‘boundary for thought’, a source of conceptualisable presentations whose real nature 
cannot be conceptualised. To deny this in the manner Hegel does is to claim that the 
very identity of sense-certainty’s object, as a source of intelligible presentations, is 
itself the object of a concept. Hegel does not at all deny the independent and distinct 
nature of the object; rather, he demonstrates that the very identity of the independent 
and distinct object is itself an object for consciousness not only through the 
preconceptual intuitions of sensory consciousness but also through a concept. In this 
Hegel remains a disciple o f Kant. Feuerbach’s form of empirical naturalism which 
holds that consciousness’ access to its object, the source of all intelligible 
presentations, is necessarily preconceptual and intuitive, is merely gratuitous and 
philosophically unsustainable.
As we have seen, contrary to Feuerbach’s claims, Hegel’s actual analysis is not about 
dissipating the particularity o f the sensory object. Hegel argues that the concrete 
singular object is disclosed as internally complex or mediated and is not at all a bare 
form of immediate particularity. Hegel’s analysis of sense-certainty discloses that the 
object is, at least, a self-identical concrete identity, involving a more determinate form 
of mediation, and an object whose identity is available to conceptualisation. This is 
revealed by the analysis undertaken by Hegel in the third stage of sense-certainty. 
This more concrete and determinate form of universality, a form able to make 
minimal distinctions, enables consciousness to progressively concretise its relation to 
its object through a series o f progressive revisions o f the concepts of the object’s 
identity. Hegel thus denies that the object is an ineffable beyond or an intuitively 
accessible ‘something’ which is yet inexplicably the very ground of language or 
thought. Hegel, contrary to Feuerbach’s presentation of his philosophy, in fact 
develops a conception of the object of consciousness that is more concrete than the 
one posited by Feuerbach’s empirical naturalism.
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Feuerbach clearly conceives his radicalised ‘genetico-critical’ empiricism as a more 
radical form of skepticism than Hegel’s speculative dialectic. His radicalised 
skepticism clearly operates with Schelling’s notions of Real Being, actuality, 
exteriority and his critique of Hegelian idealism’s inability to conceive them. This 
skepticism relies, as Schelling’s had, upon a demonstration of the extent to which 
Real Being exceeds the structures of speculative rationality elaborated by Hegelian 
logic to contain it. It also relies upon a demonstration of Hegelian speculative 
idealism as a strict formalism that can only think the Real in formal abstract terms. 
Where Feuerbach differs from Schelling is in his reformulation of the reasons for that 
formalism For him Hegel’s logical formalism emerges from a primary presupposition 
of the identity between thought and being which informs not only his logic but also 
his account of natural consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This primary 
presupposition prevents Hegel, Feuerbach claims, from articulating a genuinely 
skeptical dialectic between thought and real being, which in turn leads him to 
radically misconceive the very nature of sense perception and its object. By claiming 
to abandon this primary presupposition, Feuerbach attempts to reformulate and 
reconfigure sense perception itself as the means to understand the very nature of the 
Real. For Feuerbach, once the presupposition of the identity between thought and 
being is abandoned, sense perception becomes the means whereby the genuine alterity 
of sensory being is respected. Feuerbach seeks to demonstrate that sense perception, 
when ‘properly’ understood, allows a genuine dialectic between thought and Real 
being to be initiated, a dialectic that acts as a skeptically disruptive force to the self- 
sufficient and self-satisfied formulations of purely immanent speculative dialectic. 
Thus sensory being apprehended by sense perception functions to solicit reason itself 
into a more radical dialectic with externality. However, this dialectic cannot become a 
speculative totality in the way it does in Hegel’s Logic. This persistently skeptical 
force emerges, as it had done for Schelling, in a pre-originary realm of the Real and, 
when conceived properly in sense perception, functions to fracture Hegel’s 
speculative totality of reason. For Feuerbach the skeptical opposition to speculative 
reason is solicited by the Real rather than by an act of subjective assertion on his part.
An adequate Hegelian response to Feuerbach’s post-Hegelian modality of skepticism 
must consist (as we have already demonstrated) in the recovery of Hegel’s own 
analysis of sense-certainty or the certainty claimed for empirical consciousness and its
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objects. By examining the details of Hegel’s own analysis we have been able to 
clearly see that he does not deny the independence and distinctive nature of the object 
as concrete particular in the way Feuerbach claims. Rather, what he actually 
demonstrates is that the object as concrete particular is itself a genuine object for 
consciousness not merely through sensory intuition but, more determinately, as a 
concept. Feuerbach’s type of sensory empiricism merely represents the barest and 
emptiest form of awareness of the particular, and its insistence upon its privileged 
insight into the ‘truth’ of the particularity of sensory being represents nothing more 
than a dogmatic pre-conceptual certainty or faith. It attempts to articulate a pre- 
conceptual certainty in a pure heterological element of being. For Hegel such 
insistence is gratuitous, philosophically unsustainable and not worthy of being 
accorded the name ‘skepticism’. He clearly demonstrates in the dialectic of sense- 
certainty that it is determinate forms of universality that allow consciousness to 
sustain a concrete relation with a sensible and particular object, rather than 
Feuerbach’s type o f mystical pre-conceptual communion with the Real. For Hegel 
Feuerbach’s type of empirical naturalism always forgets this fact, and attempts to 
reassert a naive, dogmatic and uncritical form o f  sensory immediacy as a critical force 
to reason:
‘It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of 
its movement or of its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just 
this history. That is why the natural consciousness, too, is always reaching this result, 
learning from experience what is true in it; but equally it is always forgetting it and 
starting the movement all over again. It is therefore astonishing when, in face of this 
experience, it is asserted as universal experience and put forward, too, as a 
philosophical proposition, even as the outcome o f skepticism, that the reality or being 
of external things taken as Thises or sense-objects has absolute truth for 
consciousness. To make such an assertion is not to know what one is saying, to be 
unaware that one is saying the opposite of what one wants to say.’117
Clearly within the critiques o f Hegel offered by both Schelling and Feuerbach, 
Hegel’s philosophy becomes increasingly identified as the completion and fulfilment
Ibid. #109, p .65
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of an ontotheological tradition, namely the western tradition of unity, reconciliation, 
sameness, and identity. For them Hegel’s dialectical Aufhebung, despite yielding a 
degree of diversity within such unity, or difference within such identity, ultimately 
acts to domesticate a notion of the alterity o f real being within a merely formal and 
systematic dialectical ‘monologue’. In this sense, despite serious failings, it is 
Schelling and Feuerbach who must be recognised as initiating the gestures associated 
with the ‘post-modern’ search for an alternative to the philosophical tradition, an 
alternative that is beyond, as Derrida has put it, ‘Hegel again, always’." 8 Indeed, their 
skeptical strategies continue to inform and condition many readings of Hegel and the 
critical strategies of thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Deleuze"9, Derrida and 
Levinas18 *20
Despite the fact that their positions can be shown to occupy a naive, dogmatic and 
uncritical pre-Hegelian realm, what remains distinctive is how they attempt to 
articulate a form of skepticism from what they perceive to be an exterior implicitly 
disclosed by Hegel’s metaphysical closure, a transcendence in immanence (or as we 
have characterised it, the persistence o f skepticism). For Schelling this exterior realm 
is that of ‘actuality’, which is necessarily disclosed by Hegel’s Science of Logic as 
being the realm absolutely anterior to reason itself; and for Feuerbach it is ‘sensuous 
reality’ which he claims is always exterior to Hegel’s system but at the same time that 
which renders its very dialectic possible. Sensuous reality is reputedly obscured by 
Hegel’s system, and Feuerbach’s attempted recovery of it (by disclosing its implicit 
presence within Hegelian dialectic) supposedly enables him to articulate a ‘genetico- 
critical ’ analysis of Hegel and the ontotheological tradition. Despite demonstrating 
that Hegel’s account is crucially different from and superior to Feuerbach’s
118 J. Derrida. 'Tympan' in Margins o f Philosophy, translated by A. Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), p.xv
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have pursued farthest the problem of where to begin. He denounces the implicit presuppositions of 
philosophy in general, and those of Hegel in particular. He shows that philosophy must not begin with 
its accord with a pre-philosophical image, but with its ‘difference' from non-philosophy. (However, he 
supposes that this exigency of the true beginning is sufficiently met by beginning with empirical, 
perceptible and concrete being', p.319 Like Deleuze, what we will take from Feuerbach ultimately is 
the exigency to begin from 'difference' rather than the implicit presupposition of identity.
120 Levinas writes the following in his lecture course on ontotheology:'In contemporary thought in 
Europe, (the] significance o f a meaning before knowledge is beginning to be formulated in philosophy. 
There are no doubt conceptual potentialities to be found in Heidegger. But this possibility began to be 
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mart et le temps (Paris: Grasset. 1993) in English as God. Death and Time, translated by B. Bcrgo 
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presentation of it, and that many of his criticisms are seriously misplaced, it remains 
important to remain with these themes of ‘actuality’, ‘exteriority’, ‘excess’, 
‘particularism’, ‘anti-rationalism’, and ‘anti-ontotheology’, and recognise them as 
explicitly skeptical or anti-Hegelian. We must now explore how they converge and 
cross-fertilise within the anti-Hegelian skepticism of Kierkegaard.
We will not argue that there is a straightforward development by Kierkegaard of 
either of the suggested post-Hegelian philosophical trajectories of Schelling and 
Feuerbach. Thus there is neither a Positive Philosophy developed as a philosophy of 
religious myth (as pursued by the later Schelling) or the genetico-critical humanist 
anthropological development of reason suggested by Feuerbach However, within 
Kierkegaard’s work one can recognise a certain continuity regarding the interpretation 
of what might be referred to as Hegel’s presupposition concerning the impetus and 
need for reconciliation, together with the development of a radical skeptical trajectory 
as means for going ‘beyond’ Hegel’s philosophical system. Feuerbach’s defence of 
the irreducible particularity of being (despite resting upon a seriously misplaced and 
erroneous critique of Hegel’s treatment of sensuous particularity) clearly resounds 
within Kierkegaard’s thought and his own criticisms of Hegelianism. For Feuerbach, 
as we have seen, the Real is developed in skeptical opposition to Hegel’s idealism and 
is understood as sensory being accessible to genuine sense perception. Only in 
genuine sense perception, he claims, is being given as it really is without distortions 
or abstraction (as he understands Hegel’s speculative idealism to do). For him the 
mark of genuine being is its irreducible particularity and independent, self- 
determining, existence. We will see how Kierkegaard also maintains that genuine 
being is always particular, individual and resistant to the universal. Thus, his central 
category is that of the ‘single one’ in which alone truth and reality lies. Kierkegaard’s 
attack on Hegelianism is directed towards its ‘world process’ in defence of the ‘single 
one’ in order to safeguard, like Feuerbach, the reality of the particular and individual 
being.
For Kierkegaard the criterion of being is limited to the being of the human subject, 
and his concern is with the criterion for the authentic being that each individual 
person may realise. Kierkegaard’s concern is thus centred on the being o f  the 
individual human being and not on the wider ontological question of being in general.
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His concern is the ‘single one’, and in this sense his criterion for true being is internal 
and subjective. Truth and reality reside in the inner subjectivity and consciousness of 
the ‘single one’. The criterion offered by Kierkegaard is the ethical and religious 
dimension of our consciousness It is in the ethical and religious dimension that the 
‘single one’ grasps or, better, realises his authentic and genuine being. In experiencing 
himself as an ethical and religious person, the ‘single one’ realises his true being.
Thus, given the importance each gives to preserving the essential particularity of 
being, there remain important differences between them; the most important 
difference concerns their respective understanding of the very nature of that 
particularity. Whereas for Feuerbach the truth and reality o f  being reside in the object 
and are fundamentally public and external, for Kierkegaard they are, as we will see, 
essentially private and internal. We must proceed with an examination of 
Kierkegaard’s distinctively skeptical anti-Hegelianism and his attempt to preserve the 
element of subjective particularity, and this examination will provide a means for 
understanding the inception of the ethical significance o f the skeptical gestures that 
inform Levinas’s anti-Hegelianism.
100
I l l  K ierkegaard and the Paradox o f  Ethical Singularity
(i) Kierkegaard's Skeptical Relation to Hegel
This part of our thesis will examine the precise nature of Kierkegaard’s notions of 
silence, the secret and non-conceptual excess that are developed against Hegel. 
However, the approach adopted will begin by articulating the convergences between 
Hegel and Kierkegaard in order to better understand the subsequent divergences 
Niels Thulstrup in his study Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel121 claims that Hegel and 
Kierkegaard cannot be brought into dialogue because their positions are so 
fundamentally incommensurable. He writes:
‘If we compare the presuppositions, goals, and methods o f Hegel and Kierkegaard ..it 
becomes evident that the two thinkers as thinkers basically have nothing in 
common.’12 22
However, it is important to show that Hegel and Kierkegaard do in fact share a 
fundamental ‘presupposition’ regarding the ‘need’ or ‘imperative’ for philosophy. 
Both are broadly concerned with addressing problems associated with the attempt to 
achieve genuine or true subjectivity, or what Mark C. Taylor in his work on Hegel and 
Kierkegaard has termed ‘selfhood’.123 Hegel’s absolute idealism responds to the 
essentially bifurcated conditions of the subject, the ‘unhappy consciousness’ of the 
post-enlightenment era. Hegel’s speculative dialectic emerges from the orientation of 
the egocentric bifurcated subject and is developed into the demonstration of the 
immanent necessity for a transformation of this egology (i.e. abstract self-subsisting 
subjectivity) into Absolute objective Being and Truth. With this transformation Hegel 
claims to disclose the truly objective thought that resides within each particular 
bifurcated subject. At a precise moment within Hegel’s immanent dialectical journey 
to genuine ‘selfhood’ the subject ‘relaxes’ its narrow egology and becomes a reflexive
121 N. Thulstrup. Kierkegaard's Forhold til llegel (Copenhagen: Glydendal. 1967), in English as 
Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, translated by G.L. Stcngrcn (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1980)
122 Ibid, p.372
121 M.C. Taylor .Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (Berkeley & London: University of 
California Press. 1980) Our understanding of the convergences between Hegel and Kierkegaard is 
derived from the many insights provided by Taylor's work. 101
consciousness of itself and progresses to grasping itself in an immanently generated 
objective totality.
Kierkegaard’s thought, like Hegel’s, also emerges from a meditation upon 
subjectivity. Crucially it has come to signify an essentially post-Hegelian 
rehabilitation of ‘genuine’ subjectivity, or of contemporary individualism, and is 
characterised as fundamentally opposing the ‘immanence’ characteristic of Hegel’s 
speculative philosophy. It posits an ‘interruption’ in the form of an insistence upon an 
irreducible necessity for external synthesis in philosophical thought. Thus, 
Kierkegaard shares with Hegel a concern with the bifurcated subject (the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’) but diverges from him by articulating an opposing development in 
thought. His own meditations upon genuine subjectivity or ‘selfhood’ generate a 
move away from the perceived ‘nondifferentiation’ which speculative philosophy 
posits in its ultimate theory of genuine selfhood. Kierkegaard moves toward an 
articulation of an absolute irreducible ‘differentiation’ o f the self from the other, 
which in turn generated the irreducibility of external synthesis in philosophy. Clearly 
we should recognise that this path of ‘differentiation’ parallels the path initiated by 
Feuerbach. However, despite Kierkegaard’s divergence from Hegel, he continues to 
insist upon a specific crucial element in the development of genuine ‘selfhood’, 
namely the Christian Incarnation. Hence both thinkers share an insistence upon the 
crucial ‘revelatory’ aspect of the Incarnation for the achievement of genuine 
‘selfhood’ but of course diverge in their interpretations of it.
For Hegel ‘the identity o f the subject and God comes into the world when the fullness 
of time has arrived: the consciousness of this identity is the recognition of God in his 
truth’ 124 For Hegel the ‘fullness of time’ is regarded as the ‘true present’ in which 
time and eternity explicitly meet. The very condition constituting the fullness of time, 
and hence necessitating the Incarnation, is the emergence o f what Hegel regards as the 
‘unhappy consciousness’ within Judaism and Christianity itself. For Hegel the 
Incarnated Christ must be ultimately recognised as the Mediator in whom the 
extremes between which the ‘unhappy consciousness’ is tom are reconciled 
Kierkegaard, to a certain degree, pursues Feuerbach’s path with a return to a ‘flesh 174
174 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, translated by i. Sibrcc. with an introduction by CJ. 
Friedrich (New York: Dover Publications, ¡956), p.323
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and blood’ interpretation of the Incarnation. What Hegel regards as the essential 
reconciliatory power of the Christian Incarnation (the concrete reconciliation between 
finite subjectivity and infinite divinity) is for him the very element necessary for a 
transformation to genuine self-realisation, i.e. the elevation to Absolute Knowledge. 
However, Kierkegaard regards this speculative approach as a further self-alienation 
from genuine selfhood What Hegel interprets as the condition of self-estrangement, 
reconciled through Christian Incarnation, is, for Kierkegaard, emblematic of genuine 
self-fulfilment of selfhood. Christian Incarnation does not function for Kierkegaard as 
a necessary ‘station’ on the way to Absolute reconciliation; rather, it functions to 
concretise man’s essential bifurcation, his difference and separation from the divine 
or the infinite. This function of concretised bifurcation (which the Incarnation 
represents for Kierkegaard) establishes the truth of finite subjectivity. Kierkegaard 
rejects ‘Christendom’s’ historical mediation and Hegel’s speculative philosophical 
conceptual comprehension of the Incarnation. For him the ‘fact’ of the appearance or 
incarnation of the transcendent and eternal God in the form of a particular temporal 
finite individual was utterly contingent and a thoroughly positive revelatory event that 
can neither be historically nor rationally mediated. In contrast to the Hegelian notion 
of the ‘fullness of time’, the Kierkegaardian ‘event’ does not constitute an integral 
element of a continuous rational historical process, (i.e. it does not emerge necessarily 
through the immanent development of ‘spirit’) and as such represents a breach or 
interruption of immanence For Kierkegaard the Christian Incarnation ultimately 
represents the most radical ‘emphasising’ of the contingent, particular and non- 
immanent characteristic of all historical ‘becoming’.
To the extent that Hegel is occupied with and provoked by the disintegration or 
‘spiritlessness’ generated by the bifurcated condition of post-enlightenment 
subjectivity, Kierkegaard is preoccupied with and provoked by the ‘existential’ 
consequences that result from any absolute speculative identification of subjectivity 
and objectivity, with what might be termed the Hegelian ‘levelling’ or ‘rounding ofT 
of the pluralism or freedom of the existential subject Kierkegaard writes:
‘The whole existence of the human race is rounded off completely like a sphere, and 
the ethical is at once its limit and its content. God becomes an invisible vanishing
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point, a powerless thought, His power only being in the ethical which is the content of 
existence.’125
Kierkegaard is recognisably preoccupied with the condition of post-Hegelian 
subjectivity, a concern that originates within the thought of the so-called Left 
Hegelians, most notably Feuerbach.126 In contrast to Hegel’s view of the philosophical 
imperative that emerges from the condition of torment of the bifurcated ‘unhappy 
consciousness’, Kierkegaard argues that it is in fact Hegel’s response (which he 
characterises as the ‘levelling’ of existential subjectivity and its dispersal into the 
general or universal) which represents the true threat o f ‘spiritlessness’ and represents 
therefore a ‘genuine’ philosophical imperative. Kierkegaard writes:
‘The fundamental derangement at the root of modem times which branches out into 
logic, metaphysics, dogmatics and the whole of modern life, consists in this: that the 
deep qualitative abyss in the difference between God and man has been 
obliterated.’127
Kierkegaard must be recognised as fundamentally responding to and developing many 
of the anti-Hegelian/anti-speculative themes originally articulated by Schelling and 
Feuerbach. Feuerbach claims that Hegelian speculation ossified genuine thought 
(genuine thought being, for Feuerbach, that which is engaged with a ‘flesh and blood’ 
dialectical dialogue with the truth of sensuous reality) rendering it into a system that is 
akin to transforming it into a stone circle. Hegelian speculative reason is viewed as 
petrifying all genuine, living, breathing pluralist thought. Kierkegaard recognises and 
assumes that these implications are the genuine philosophical imperative of his time. 
Like Feuerbach he also considers that the post-Hegelian orthodoxy of speculative 
reason implies an essentially negative and spiritless consequence when extended to 
the situated existential subject. Speculative reason suggests the ‘concealment’ of a 
‘qualitative abyss’; it conceals the genuinely tom subject through its detached,
l2‘ S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio, translated by A. 
Hannay. p.78
126 It is worth noting that Kierkegaard himself attended Schclling's 1840-41 lectures. However, as 
Mark C. Taylor writes, Kierkegaard was deeply disappointed in them. Taylor writes: ‘He found little
new in them and soon ceased attending them. His acquaintance with Schelling’s lectures came through 
reading notes taken by other students.' Mark C. Taylor, Ibid, p. 19 
121 S. Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, edited and Van slated by H. & E. Hong, p.6075
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disinterested and disengaged consideration of it. Thus all the necessary passion 
associated with the genuinely tom subject is levelled out by speculative consideration. 
Speculative philosophy, Kierkegaard claims, gives ontological and epistemological 
privilege to universality and generality over the notion of isolated particularity. As 
such genuine truth can only emerge for it when the discrete, isolated particular is 
absolutely subsumed under or consumed by the universal or general that Hegel claims 
is immanent to it. Kierkegaard’s entire philosophical orientation emerges as a 
response to an imperative essentially announced in the aftermath of the dominant 
orthodoxy of post-Hegelian speculative philosophy.
To understand the way Kierkegaard develops these skeptical and anti-Hegelian 
themes it will be necessary for us to outline the main theses of two of Kierkegaard’s 
major pseudonymous texts, Fear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript.128 This analysis will itself be guided by an important insight provided by 
Mark C. Taylor’s work on Hegel and Kierkegaard. For Taylor Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous texts constitute an alternative ‘phenomenology of spirit’, marking 
distinct stages upon a trajectory towards genuine ‘selfhood’. Taylor writes:
‘Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings constitute the cast of characters through which 
he stages the dramatic struggle for authentic selfhood. Each pseudonym represents a 
particular shape of consciousness, form of life, or type of selfhood. . . Taken together, 
the pseudonyms present a coherent account of what amounts to a phenomenology of 
spirit analogous, though alternative, to the course plotted by Hegel. The 
Kierkegaardian forms of life are arranged as dialectical stages in the development of 
genuine individuality.’129
Hegel, Hegelian speculative philosophy and the ‘age’ that it constitutes is 
undoubtedly the main target of Fear and Trembling. Central to its challenge is an 
opposition to the Hegelian imperative for absolute and total disclosure of all aspects 
of the subject’s existence to reason. Kierkegaard understands Hegel’s general thesis to 3
l3* The focus here will be upon Kierkegaard's bear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments Vol. I: Text, edited and translated by H. & E. Hong 
M.C. Taylor, Ibid, p.92
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be that every mode of life and thought ultimately reveals itself to necessarily involve 
mediation:
‘The Hegelian philosophy assumes there is no justified concealment, no justified 
incommensurability. It is therefore consistent in its requirement of disclosure.’130
Kierkegaard is concerned with recovering from the Hegelian imperative of full 
disclosure the element of religious faith which is, for Kierkegaard, essentially non- 
disclosive, and to bring a halt to the Hegelian imperative or ‘urge’ to go further than 
faith whereby religious Vorstellung is superseded by philosophical Begrijfe. For 
Kierkegaard, ‘Today nobody will stop with faith; they all go further’.131 Kierkegaard’s 
skeptical anti-Hegelian endeavours in Fear and Trembling are clearly articulated in 
the preface:
‘Even if one were able to render the whole of the content of faith into conceptual 
form, it would not follow that one had grasped faith, grasped how one came to it, or 
how it came to one.’131
By invoking the Old Testament figure of Abraham, Kierkegaard, or rather his 
pseudonym in Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio133, brings Hegel and 
Abraham into proximity with the aim of making Hegel tremble. As part of this 
endeavour he formulates three questions. Can there be a ‘teleological suspension of 
the ethical’? Can there be an ‘absolute’ duty toward God? Can Abraham’s silence be 
ethically defensible? By bringing Abraham into proximity with Hegel, Johannes de 
Silentio aims to disclose the fundamental incompatibility of Hegelian speculative 
philosophy and genuine religious faith and responsibility. For Johannes de Silentio the 
Hegelian system (as a system of total disclosure) cannot contain the truth of religious 
faith, for the truth of that faith is concealed. For Kierkegaard the element of non­
disclosure is crucial to the very structure of religious faith itself. The element of non- *15
w> S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 109
151 Ibid, p.42 
“> 1 P 4 3
A. Hannay notes in his introduction to his translation of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling that the 
pseudonym ‘Johannes de Silentio’ is ‘allegedly borrowed from one of the Grimms' fairy talcs, “The 
Faithful Servanf''(p. 10). It is worth noting that in this story faithftrl John is petrified, literally turned to 
stone, for attempting to put into words, by way of an explanation, his faithful actions to his master.
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disclosure, the secret that is faith, exceeds Hegel’s speculative system with its explicit 
programme of absolute immanent disclosure. The Hegelian system, rather than 
perfecting Christian faith, disperses its essential ‘subjective truth’ into what Johannes 
de Silentio terms the ‘ethical’. Johannes de Silentio’s notion of the ‘ethical’ in Fear 
and Trembling is derived from a distinction between Moralität (morality) and 
Sittlichkeit (ethics, ethical life) found in Hegel’s philosophy.134 Hegel argues that 
Moralität is a historically unmediated ‘ethics’ of pure reason. Such an ‘ethics’ 
abstracts from ‘moral experience’ to such a degree that it cannot be truly adequate to 
it. For Hegel, Moral philosophy must reorientate itself towards what he terms 
Sittlichkeit, that is, the established laws and customs, institutions and practices, of the 
culture to which the philosopher belongs. This conception of the ‘ethical’ as 
Sittlichkeit includes the religious as ‘elevated’ within it, and it was this principle of 
‘ethics’ that Johannes de Silentio challenges with the religious faith of Abraham.
According to Genesis 22.1 Abraham is called upon by God to sacrifice his only 
beloved son Isaac. Abraham does not question God and obeys him despite God giving 
him no reason or explanation for his demand. Abraham says nothing of what he must 
do to his wife Sarah or Isaac, and, the next morning he leaves for the mountains of 
Moriah with Isaac. When Isaac asks him of the whereabouts of the lamb they are to 
slaughter and burn, Abraham replies that 'God will provide himself the lamb for a 
burnt offering’. At the moment Abraham takes his knife to kill his son, however, God 
orders him not to, having seen that Abraham was prepared to obey him and make this 
sacrifice. A ram is found and sacrificed in Isaac’s place. For Johannes de Silentio, 
precisely because he doesn’t ‘speak’ and gives no explanation or rationale for his 
actions, Abraham transgresses the ‘ethical’ order. The highest expression of this 
‘ethical’ order is what binds us to each other, but Abraham does not speak, he keeps a 
secret. Jacques Derrida in his work on Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling observes:
‘To the extent that, in not saying the essential thing, namely, the secret between God 
and him, Abraham doesn’t speak, he assumes the responsibility that consists in always 
being alone, entrenched in one’s own singularity at the moment of decision. . . But as 
soon as one speaks, as soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very
IM G.W.F. Hegel, ¡dements o f  the Philosophy o f Right, translated by H.B. Nisbct. edited by A.W.
Wood
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singularity. One therefore loses the possibility of deciding or the right to decide. Thus 
every decision would fundamentally, remain at the same time solitary, secret and 
silent Speaking relieves us, Kierkegaard notes, for it ‘translates’ into the general.’135
Hegelian Sittlichkeit cannot ‘contain’ this silent truth of Abraham’s faith. Nothing 
within the Hegelian notion of Siltlichkeil can ‘motivate’ or ‘justify’ Abraham’s 
actions, his ethical society can only demand that he must love and protect his son 
Isaac. Hegelian Sitllichkeil would then disperse the element o f true faith here and 
Abraham would be considered as transgressing his ethical obligations towards his son, 
and be condemned as a murderer. Johannes de Silentio insists that Abraham can only 
be considered as a murderer, rather than the ‘father of faith’, from the perspective of 
Sittlichkeit, and will remain condemned unless those laws, customs, and institutions 
associated with Sittlichkeit are ultimately considered to be merely penultimate norms 
that are subordinate to a higher law. This is what Johannes de Silentio refers to as the 
‘teleological suspension of the ethical’. Thus in order to recognise the essence of 
Abraham’s faith and be able to recover him from the necessary condemnation of 
Sittlichkeit it is necessary to recognise the truth of a higher allegiance than Sittlichkeit.
What is at stake here for Johannes de Silentio is the question o f the ultimate source of 
the moral law and my relationship to it, i.e. my ultimate duties and responsibilities. 
Johannes de Silentio questions whether such a source can be immanent within 
Silllichkeit, as Hegel argues, or whether it is always transcendent, an origin concealed 
from the reach o f Hegel’s immanence, an origin that exceeds it through its non­
disclosure Johannes de Silentio writes :
‘faith is just this paradox, that the single individual as the particular is higher than the 
universal, is justified before the latter, not as subordinate but superior, though in such 
a way, be it noted, that it is the single individual who, having been subordinate to the 
universal as the particular, now by means of the universal becomes that individual 
who, as the particular, stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. This position 
cannot be mediated, for all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the universal, it is 
and remains in all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to thought. And yet faith is this
1" J. Derrida. 'Whom to Give to (knowing Not to Know)' in The Gift o f Death. p.S9
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paradox...or else faith has never existed just because it has always existed. And 
Abraham is done for.’136
From the perspective represented by Abraham genuine selfhood is realised within the 
tom singularity of the subject’s decision, in utter isolation from others, and in 
opposition to Siulichkeit. It is realised by the total devotion to an absolutely 
transcendent God over against whom the individual always stands. The Abrahamic 
God is the transcendent Master who demands absolute obedience. However, God’s 
absolute transcendence allows for the possibility of a conflict between one’s religious 
commitment or responsibility and one’s personal desire and concrete ethical 
responsibilities. Given that such a conflict will inevitably emerge the faithful subject 
must follow Abraham’s example in foregoing all personal desire and suspending all 
ethical responsibility, even if this might mean going so far as to sacrifice one’s own 
beloved child. From the perspective o f Silllichkeil such action is incomprehensible, 
insane, wilful, or even evil. Since the command of the absolutely transcendent (i.e. the 
call to religious responsibility) is itself contrary to human reason (since it exceeds 
human reason and any ‘concept’ of responsibility) the religious subject has no ethical 
assurances that the judgement of Siitlichkeil regarding its actions is incorrect. Such 
ineradicable uncertainty generates an unavoidable and extraordinary level of 
insecurity, which in turn generates the inescapable ‘fear and trembling’ of religious 
faith.
Moves to evade the ‘fear and trembling’ of true religious faith and responsibility 
represents, Johannes de Silentio claims, the ‘temptation’ of the ethical. The 
‘temptation’ of the irresponsible Silllichkeil impels Abraham to speak, to give an 
account of his actions. It impels him to dissolve the singularity of his religious 
responsibility into the realm of the general or ethical. Derrida again captures this 
aspect of the paradoxical movement of ‘irresponsibilisation’ (which is the result of the 
‘temptation’ of the ethical) in the following lines from his study of Fear and 
Trembling.
1 w S. K ierkegaard . Ibid, pp. 84-5
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‘For Abraham, Kierkegaard declares, the ethical is a temptation He must therefore 
resist it. He keeps quiet in order to avoid the moral temptation which, under the 
pretext of calling him to responsibility, to self-justification, would make him lose his 
ultimate responsibility along with his singularity, make him lose his unjustifiable, 
secret, and absolute responsibility before God. This is ethics as ‘irresponsibilisation’, 
as an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between responsibility in general and 
absolute responsibility. Absolute responsibility is not a responsibility, at least it is not 
general responsibility or responsibility in general, it needs to be exceptional or 
extraordinary, and it needs to be that absolutely and par excellence: it is as if absolute 
responsibility could not be derived from a concept of responsibility and therefore, in 
order for it to be what it must be it must remain inconceivable, indeed unthinkable: it 
must therefore be irresponsible in order to be absolutely responsible.’137
Johannes de Silentio concludes that the truth of religious faith that emerges from the 
story of Abraham is not and cannot be the Hegelian self-consciousness of the ethical 
order; rather, it is the subject’s irreducibly personal relation to God, an absolute 
relation that ultimately relativises all cultural relation and subsequent responsibilities 
For Johannes de Silentio Abraham demonstrates that it is ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ the 
ethical spirit that the truth of the structure of responsibility are to be found, in a 
covenant of silence and secrecy between the subject and the Absolutely transcendent. 
Ultimately this covenant of silence and secrecy, this paradox of responsibility and 
irresponsibility, this absolute non-disclosure that is religious faith, exceeds Hegelian 
speculative dialectics and philosophy in general Derrida argues that what emerges 
with this paradox of responsibility/irresponsibility is the revelation of ‘conceptual 
thinking at the limit’13*; it is the paradox which marks the breach of the Hegelian 
system and the space for the movement beyond Hegel. Derrida forcefully argues, as 
Johannes de Silentio has already done, for the interruption of Hegelian philosophy, for 
a breach of the system, which is at the heart of the discourse of bear and Trembling.
‘The paradox cannot be grasped in time and through mediation, that is to say in 
language and through reason ..it remains irreducible to presence or to presentation, it 
demands a temporality of the instant without ever constituting a present If it can be
J. Derrida, Ibid, p.til 
“ Ibid, p.68
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said, it belongs to an atemporal temporality, to a duration that cannot be grasped: 
something one can neither stabilise, establish, grasp, apprehend, nor comprehend 
Understanding, common sense, and reason cannot seize, conceive, understand, or 
mediate it.’119
Within hear and Trembling there is a clearly announced assault upon Hegel’s 
presupposition of the need for reconciliation. Kierkegaard argues against such a 
‘need’, task or imperative arising from what Hegel terms the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’, the need for or task o f ‘reconciliation’ of the bifurcated subject within 
the concrete universal. For Johannes de Silentio the subject’s task is not to go 
‘beyond’ faith to a speculative concept, but to go ‘beyond’ the speculative concept in 
‘going back’ to the truth of religious faith. Johannes de Silentio insists upon the 
necessity of maintaining from the beginning the absolute separation of the subject and 
of recovering the subject from the ‘reconciling’ forces of Hegelian speculative 
philosophy. Kierkegaard’s assault upon what is understood to be the second element 
of Hegel’s presupposition, namely the presupposed nature of the ‘task’ of 
reconciliation, i.e. Hegel’s absolute or total speculative philosophical system, is in 
part outlined in the second pseudonymous work that we will consider here, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard, through his pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus, posits one major question - ‘how must the subject be constituted so that 
there remains a problem of how the subject is to enter into the correct relation to 
Christianity?’ Johannes Climacus begins by presenting himself as a type of Kantian 
thinker for whom the genuine Kantian dialectic prevails over the Hegelian immanent 
speculative dialectic, and challenges the Hegelian speculative project of resolving 
dissonance into harmony, difference into identity. For Johannes Climacus the function 
of the Christian Incarnation must be rethought in order to reassert the proper function 
of philosophy and to reassert the priority of traditional Aristotelian logic. For 
Climacus traditional logic is the formal principle that must be recovered in opposition 
to Hegel’s speculative immanent logic, and Climacus’s concrete principle is 
Christianity understood as the ‘absolute’ communication of the nature of subjective
1 w Ibid, p.f,5
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existence as opposed to Hegel’s understanding of Christianity as an imperfect version 
of the Truth that receives its ‘perfect’ expression within his speculative philosophical 
system. For Climacus the subject, the ‘unhappy consciousness’ is a destroyed 
synthesis, which as existing, contrary to what Hegel argues, does not possess the 
absolute capacity for reconciliation, or the capacity for recreating the ‘destroyed’ 
synthesis. By referring to the resistance ‘achieved’ by Johannes de Silentio in Fear 
and Trembling, Climacus argues that religious faith is the paradigm of such 
resistance, a resistance that discloses the truth of what he terms external synthesis in 
thought.
Climacus opens Concluding Unscientific Postscript with a discussion of the so-called 
‘objective’ problem of the truth of Christianity and concludes that upon the path of 
objectivity the subjective problems of the relation to Christianity are dispersed. From 
the objective perspective there is the problem of the objective truth of Christianity 
itself, rather than its truth for the existing subject. The objective account of 
Christianity has two distinct strands, according to Climacus. It can either be historical, 
so that one attempts to pursue an entirely authentic account of Christian doctrine, or it 
can be speculative, where the attempt is made, through pure thought, to conceptualise 
and thereby philosophically validate the truth of Christianity. However, for Climacus, 
the problem of the existing subject’s relation to Christianity cannot itself emerge for 
either of these strands of the objective account. On the path of the historical there can 
be no ultimate transition beyond mere probability to absolute objective certainty, and 
upon the speculative course there is a fundamental misunderstanding of both what 
Christianity is and what it is to be an existing subject in relation to it. For Climacus it 
is not reason as such that is essentially opposed to religious faith but ‘modes’ of 
reason that have forgotten or conceal their intrinsic limits as human, and consequently 
fall into self-deification. The modes of reason associated with Hegelian speculative 
thought have absolutised the ethical to such an extent that the subject’s absolute 
relation to God has all but disappeared. Religious faith has become indistinguishable 
from ‘socialisation’, and for Climacus Hegelian speculation renders religious faith 
into a merely abstract essence whose concrete essence is transformed into the ‘state’.
In addressing what is then the central concern of the work Climacus focuses upon the 
‘subjective problem’ itself. He invokes the figure of Lessing as the type of figure who
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isolates himself and does not articulate a historical or speculative objective system, 
but who is, rather, a ‘subjective’ thinker. This subjective thinker is interested in the 
question of his own uncompleted existence, which is still in the process of becoming, 
together with the question of thought itself. The subjective thinker realises that the 
two cannot be ‘separated’ through a reconciliatory conjoining o f the two and 
emphasises the role of ‘decision’. The subjective thinker realises the very anxiety of 
Pascal, who is ‘incapable of seeing the nothing from which he emerges and the 
infinity in which he is engulfed’.140 Climacus thus builds upon the understanding 
developed within Fear and Trembling that Hegel’s move ‘beyond’ faith is mistaken. 
For Climacus the Hegelian system promises to replace the objective uncertainty of 
Christianity with absolute certainty, and Climacus claims that it cannot legitimately 
achieve this since the system itself remains an interpretation, merely a perspective. Its 
presuppositionless status emerges from an act of decision upon what Climacus argues 
would remain only a perpetual act of reflection; ‘reflection can be halted only by a 
leap’.141 Further, the Hegelian system ‘levels’ or ‘rounds ofF the moment of 
passionate inward appropriation of religious faith by ‘reducing’ the subject to a 
merely impersonal observer devoid of existential identity. It effaces the moment of 
subjective decision. Climacus though, in addressing the ‘subjective problem’ struggles 
to maintain the very freedom or ‘space’ within which genuine subjective decision and 
genuine responsibility emerge.
Climacus characterises the Hegelian philosopher, in struggling to obtain Absolute 
Knowledge, as having to possess the absolute totality of the divine ideas and thus 
stand at the very completion of the historical process so as to encompass the totality of 
the unfolding of the Idea. The Hegelian philosopher is characterised by his efforts to 
‘reflect’ himself out o f  existence and into eternity. The subjective thinker (Lessing for 
Climacus) recognises that to view the world sub specie aeterni is to see the world as 
God sees it. However, if existence as subjectivity is conceived as an uncompleted 
existence (subjectivity is a process of achievement within time) and if logic is 
essentially atemporal, as Climacus insists, then a logical, philosophical system can be 
formulated, but not a system of being or existence. The subject’s existence is 
necessarily and perpetually dynamic whereas logic is static. Hence Hegel’s attempt to *S.
I*' Pascal. Pensees, translated with an introduction by AJ. Krailshcimcr
S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 116
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bring movement into logic, so as to be able to work out an immanent logical system o f 
being, is an impossible endeavour for Climacus:
‘Reality itself is a system for God; but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit for 
any existing spirit. System and finality correspond to one another, but existence is 
precisely the opposite of finality. It may be seen, from a purely abstract point of view, 
that system and existence are incapable of being thought together; because in order to 
think existence at all, systematic thought must think it as abrogated, and hence as not 
existing. Existence separates, and holds the various moments of existence discretely 
apart, the systematic thought consists of the finality which bring them together.’142
If subjective existence is an unfinished endeavour, a perpetual becoming, then the 
effort must, Climacus argues, be in all circumstances an effort toward a ‘specific’ 
goal; ethics as a consequence becomes crucial. The existing subject’s endeavour is 
simply an expression of his ethical attitude provided by whatever ‘specific’ goal he 
strives for in time. The subjective thinker, Climacus argues, must view the entire 
speculative endeavour as a comical attempt to do what is impossible for an existing 
subject, the abrogation of the subject’s very existence, its striving, decision and 
responsibility. Climacus maintains that abstract thinking is undertaken under the 
orientation of eternity, and as such averts its gaze from the process of subjective 
existence, which cannot reside within the repose of eternity but must always be in a 
process of ‘becoming’. For Climacus subjective thought is far from being easier than 
abstract speculative thought, indeed it is the more difficult since its task is to attempt 
to think the ‘particular’ rather than the universal. Hegelian speculative thought 
ultimately claims to overcome the principle of contradiction inherent within ‘unhappy 
consciousness’, to have ‘reconciled’ it to the universal, and as such thinks that it can 
be ‘correct’ in its progress within the ‘ether’ of Absolute Knowledge, the realm of the 
identity between thought and being. For Climacus no existing subject can ever find 
itself in this ether, in this pure sphere, thus Hegel’s claim to have overcome or 
reconciled contradiction is really of no interest:
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‘The difficulty that inheres in existence, with which the existing individual is 
confronted, is one that never really comes to expression in the language of abstract 
thought, much less receive an explanation. Because abstract thought is sub specie 
aeterni it ignores the concrete and the temporal, the existential process, the 
predicament of the existing individual arising from his being a synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal situated in existence.’14
However, Climacus does not merely mock Hegel’s claims or dismiss them; he 
continues by arguing that if Hegel insists that the reconciling of contradiction is valid 
for the sphere of subjective existence, then such an assertion is dangerous for it 
abolishes the ‘difference’ between good and evil and thus all ethics. For Climacus the 
ethical is the only truly important reality, a reality ultimately delineated by the 
subject’s relation to Christianity, and subsequent religious responsibilities. This 
relation is a relation o f non-disclosure.
Fear and Trembling expresses the Absolute Paradox of religious faith as non-rational, 
as fundamentally self-contradictory and irreducibly ‘absurd’. Rather than revealing 
the omnipotence of reason and the rationality of actuality, the paradox of religious 
faith confronts Hegelian speculative philosophy and philosophy in general with the 
limitations and boundaries and irrevocably separates the rational and the actual. Thus 
faith and reason, religious belief and philosophical knowledge, are not implicitly one, 
an ontotheology, but are fundamentally antithetical. Climacus, in true Kantian spirit, 
insists that reason must make it clear that the Absolute Paradox cannot be understood 
and must disclose to the subjective thinker that the paradox really is a paradox. 
Against Hegel’s claim that the Incarnation discloses the absolute immanence of God 
in Being and thus the ‘homogeneity’ of the divine and the existing subject, 
Kierkegaard argues for an Absolute Paradox of the incarnated God-Man (Christ). The 
function of the Incarnation is to disclose the absolute radical transcendence of God 
and the ‘heterogeneity’ o f  the divine and the existing subject
141 Ibid, p soi IIS
Against Hegel’s speculative revision o f the principles of identity, difference and 
contradiction, Kierkegaard reaffirms traditional Aristotelian logic.144 He argues that 
Hegel’s effort to mediate opposites merely collapses distinctions essential to concrete 
subjective existence. He attempts to use the radical insight into the nature of 
Incarnation to articulate a breach in Hegel’s absolute immanent movement within his 
Logic, and to reassert the truth of a logic of the external synthesis of discrete 
metaphysical particularities. Whilst acknowledging that viewed sub specie aeterni 
there can be no contradiction, Kierkegaard argues that only God can be a true 
Hegelian Hegel’s system emerges from a concrete existence but is a system that 
cannot articulate real existence as immanence. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
what makes the notion of immanent mediation attractive and the term synthesis 
problematic for Hegel, makes the concept of synthesis attractive and the category of 
immanent mediation problematic for Kierkegaard’s existing subject. Kierkegaard 
ultimately seeks to abolish Hegelian immanent mediation and reinstate external 
synthesis, a positive third term that creates the synthetic coincidence of opposites. 
Metaphysical oppositions are synthesised through the existing subject’s free self- 
conscious activity, a synthesis of reality and ideality. From Kierkegaard’s perspective 
the polarities of finitude and infinitude represented by reality and ideality are 
ultimately opposites for the existing subject that can only be bridged through an act of 
synthesis, through the struggles o f the system.
It can be seen that Kierkegaard’s Pear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript represent a fundamental assault upon Hegel’s primary presupposition of the 
need for reconciliation. They represent a challenge to the entire impetus of Hegelian 
philosophy. Such a skeptical challenge to Hegel’s immanent speculative closure of 
metaphysics, a challenge that aims to effect an interruption, arguably continues to 
delineate much of the territory of subsequent post/anti-Hegelian philosophy.
' "  Trendelenburg’s critique of Hegel’s Science o f  lj>gic was particularly influential on Kierkegaard’s 
thinking here. Sec F. A. Trendelenburg, ‘Extract from The Utgica! Question in Hegel 's System' in R. 
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(it) The Hegelian Response to Kierkegaard
Hegel would clearly reject many of Kierkegaard’s criticisms, judging them 
fundamentally misguided. For Hegel Kierkegaard’s contention that speculative 
dialectical reconciliation dissolves difference in identity represents a serious failure to 
comprehend the genuine nature of the speculative identity within difference where 
oppositions become co-implicated and demonstrated to be essentially mutually 
constitutive. Kierkegaard interprets Hegelian speculative idealism as an identity 
philosophy in which difference, multiplicity, and plurality are merely apparent, 
ideated and finally unreal. However, even Hegel rejects this conception of abstract 
non-differentiation; the type of early Schellingean idealism he rejects represents such 
an identity philosophy. With a type of speculative idealism distinguished from the 
Schellingean identity variant, Hegel demonstrates that the relation of identity and 
difference does not result in the absorption of difference in identity or the dissolution 
of identity in difference. Hegel would reject the Kierkegaardian characterisation of 
Speculative idealism as resulting in a ‘levelling’ of the contradictions of actual 
existence and the tensions of finite individuality. For Hegel it is only through 
speculative idealism that one is able to fully penetrate the very nature of actuality and 
to comprehend it. The speculative dialectic whereby particularity and universality are 
progressively reconciled does not dissipate genuine individuality; but demonstrates 
that it can only arise within an internally differentiated totality through an immanent 
internal relation. Thus Hegel would be able to proffer a wholly immanent critique of 
the type of external skeptical position that Kierkegaard adopts.
From Hegel’s perspective the opposition definitive of Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
genuine individuality would leave that individual unsustainably fragmented. Such 
fragmentation is, for Hegel, the very characteristic most associated with spiritlessness 
I-ike the Unhappy consciousness Kierkegaardian individuality is dogmatically mired 
in abstraction and the differentiations he insists upon cannot be rationally sustained 
The Kierkegaardian self is set against the other, the subject against the object, finitude 
against infinitude, reality against ideality, actuality against possibility, freedom 
against necessity, individuality against universality, self against society, time against 
eternity, and man against God. The result o f insisting upon such persistent opposition 
is the negation of the essential qualities of genuine concrete individuality:
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‘Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only an agonizing over this 
existence and activity, for therein it is conscious only of its own nothingness.’145
Awareness of one’s inessentiality leads to a desperate self-negation through which the 
temporal finite subject seeks to regain its essentiality through reconciliation with 
divinity. Such faith, however, is doomed to failure. The types o f reified oppositions 
that underlie and presuppose it make reconciliation impossible and self-alienation 
inevitable Subject and object, self and other, existence and essence, man and God, 
remain estranged:
‘There is on the one hand, a going out from my finitude to a Higher; on the other 
hand, 1 am determined as the negative of this Higher The latter remains an Other, 
which cannot be determined by me, insofar as determination is to have an objective 
meaning. What is present is only this going out on my part, this aiming to teach what 
is remote; 1 remain on this side, and have a yearning after a beyond.’146
This desperate and restless yearning leads to the individual’s attempt to establish an 
absolute relation with an alien God, fiirther and further beyond the human community, 
until the self is utterly isolated, alienated and estranged. For Hegel such self­
maintenance of individuality in strict opposition to otherness does not realise genuine 
individuality in the way a thinker like Kierkegaard insists it does For Hegel, given 
that Spirit is essentially intersubjective, the refusal of sociality is essentially the very 
negation of concrete individuality. Kierkegaardian type faith, for Hegel, represents 
nothing more than a revival of Jewish positivity in which a servile subject is 
completely obedient to an omnipotent Lord and Master Hegel had, in his Early 
Theological Writings, explored this aspect of Judaism, and had characterised it there 
as ‘the spirit of self-maintenance in strict opposition to everything -  the product of his 
thought raised to the unity dominant over nature which he regarded as infinite and 
hostile ’147 Such an insistence upon the absolute qualitative difference between the 
divine and the human misconstrues both the nature of the infinite and eternal God and
OW.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, #209, p. 127
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the finite temporal individual. Hegel would argue that Kierkegaard’s ‘Knight of Faith’ 
is essentially estranged, ‘a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to men alike’148. 
With Abraham, the ‘Knight of Faith’ is condemned to suffer the homesickness bom of 
perpetual exile and desperate yearning for the beyond
Kierkegaard would clearly respond by arguing that Hegel’s insistence upon the 
coincidence of opposites would leave them perpetually fragmented, and that it 
ultimately represents a failure to truly grasp the dialectical paradox created and 
sustained by the synthetic activity of Spirit. Since Hegel’s reconciliatory vision 
remains blind to genuine paradox, he mistakenly identifies what Kierkegaard argues is 
the concretely realised individual with the Unhappy consciousness, i.e. merely a 
penultimate stage towards realised spirit. Kierkegaard’s ‘Knight of Faith’ is not 
estranged from real existence but reborn to finite experience, ‘faith begins precisely 
where thinking leaves ofF.149 Faith is an absurdly paradoxical act o f the individual, 
simultaneously resigning and reappropriating, negating and affirming the created 
order:
‘A paradoxical and humble courage is required to grasp the whole o f the temporal by 
virtue of the absurd, and this is the courage of faith.’150
Hegel, however, would maintain that his conception of concrete individuality is 
actually implicit within and immanent to this opposition, i.e. Kierkegaardian 
individuality Thus, Hegel would insist upon the fact that this notion of individuality 
necessarily and immanently negates itself in its very attempt to instantiate itself; it 
thus passes over into its opposite, i.e Hegelian concrete Spirit. For Kierkegaard the 
individual’s identity is established through a self-relation independent of relation to 
alterity Relations among individuals are conceived as being external to antecedent 
constituted identity and as such remain accidental to determinate being Thus 
Kierkegaard regards identity and difference as logically indifferent and denies that the 
individual’s identity arises through internal logical relation to alterity, rather 
individuality is a function of its opposition to alterity. Hegel, however, is able to
14M ... .Ibid
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demonstrate that the effort of the Kierkegaardian individual to establish its self- 
identity through a radical self-affirmation of its freedom and self-subsistence will 
ultimately immanently negate itself. In this immanent negation the irreducible 
structures of the internal relation between self and other become disclosed as being 
the very ground for Kierkegaard’s radical self-affirmation. Thus:
‘Self-subsistence pushed to the point of the one as a being-for-self is abstract, formal, 
and destroys itself. It is the supreme, most stubborn error, which takes itself for the 
highest truth, manifesting in more concrete forms as abstract freedom, pure ego and, 
further, as Evil. It is that freedom which so misapprehends itself as to place its essence 
in this abstraction, and flatters itself that in thus being with itself it possesses itself in 
its purity. More specifically this self-subsistence is the error of regarding as negative 
that which is its own essence, and of adopting a negative attitude towards it. Thus it is 
the negative attitude towards itself which in seeking to possess its own being destroys 
it, and this its act is only the manifestation of the futility of this act.’131
Hegel, in the Science o f Logic, repeatedly demonstrates the essential and necessary 
co-implication of categorical opposites. For Hegel the truth of the individual can 
never be as a merely hypostatised, reified and abstract individual in the way 
Kierkegaard maintains As we have seen, Kierkegaard attempts to articulate an 
absolute irreducible ‘differentiation’ of the self from the other, which in turn generates 
the irreducibility of external synthesis in philosophy. However, as we will see, Hegel 
shows how concrete individuality can only emerge, and be sustained, by virtue of the 
internal logical relation between self and other. We will thus proceed by examining 
Hegel’s account of this necessary internal relatedness between ‘something’ and 
‘other’ in the Science of htgic. We will argue that his account persuasively 
demonstrates Kierkegaard’s failure to engage with the whole matter of internal 
relation, together with his failure to understand that the notion of an irreducible 
‘differentiation’ of the self from the other was already recognised and treated by 
Hegel within the Science o f Ixtgic's treatment of ‘something’ and ‘other’. Indeed, 
Hegel’s immanent account of these categories will conclusively demonstrate that such 
an ‘absolute’ external differentiation logically implies an internal relation. By
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concentrating upon the details of Hegel’s account of the categories o f ‘something’ and 
‘other’ in the Science of Jxtgic we will be able to show precisely how Hegel discloses 
the essentially other-related structure of being and thus highlight implicit weaknesses 
within Kierkegaard’s abstraction of the individual from immanent and internal 
relation
It is important to emphasise, before we begin our analysis o f Hegel, the immanently 
self-determining nature of the Science o f Logic whereby new categories develop 
strictly immanently from prior developed categories, as such the content of new 
categories is entirely determined by an understanding of how prior categories alone 
operate within the transformation and transition of concepts. Thus when abstracting 
singular categories for analysis from such an immanently self-determining 
developmental process, there are a number of risks involved that we will attempt to 
avoid by recognising the necessity o f providing details regarding their immanent 
development.
Hegel’s initial description of the categories ‘something’ and ‘other’ occurs within his 
account of ‘Determinate Being’1” . Here the category o f ‘determinate being’, or 
‘there-being or being which is there’ (Dasein), is present to thought as a simple 
immediate unity o f ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’. ‘Determinate being’ is not the same as 
pure ‘being’, i.e. the category by which the Science of Logic begins its immanent 
development1” . ‘Being’ had transformed itself, through the moments of ‘Nothing’ 
and ‘Becoming’, into this bare form of determinacy. Here in Determinate Being, 
despite the determinateness remaining indefinite and therefore vague in its reference, 
‘there-being’ (Dasein) is more specific than ‘being’ and represents a real 
development. Hegel argues that the ‘emphasis’ of dialectical questioning or thinking 
must now fall upon clarifying the precise nature of how being comes to determine 
itself in more concrete terms.
Initially Hegel claims that this bare form of determinateness has the form of 
immediacy: ‘the simple oneness of being and nothing’154. Crucially he states that in
m Hegel, Science oflA>glc, pp. 109-136
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immediacy determinateness is only for our reflection, and is ‘not yet posited as such 
in its own se ir155. In order that this occur ‘a number of determinations, distinct 
relations of its moments, make their appearance in it’136 Dialectical questioning must 
endeavour to uncover and clarify the way in which the determinateness of being is 
posited immanently within being, or how ‘being’ determines itself as ‘a being’ itself.
In the transition to immediate determinate being the relation to ‘being’ is one of an 
immediate unity of ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ where ‘no differentiation of this unity is 
posited’137 Such a simple immediate form of determinateness is categorised by Hegel 
as ‘quality’. However, ‘quality’ here has the characteristic of the one-sided application 
of determinateness to ‘being’, but determinateness can equally be posited in the 
determination of ‘nothing’, which is equally a moment in the immediate unity of 
determinate being. When this happens determinateness is posited as ‘differentiated, 
reflected determinateness, no longer as immediate or in the form of being’1311. Thus, 
‘nothing’ as a determinate element o f determinateness is equally something reflected, 
(i.e. 'for us in our reflection’139, as Hegel writes) as in ‘quality’, but now as 
‘negation’. ‘Quality’ when it is taken in the distinct one-sided element of ‘being’ is 
‘reality’; but it is burdened with a negative aspect, which becomes negation in 
general, which is likewise a ‘quality’. Hegel’s point here is to demonstrate that when 
determinate being has the ‘quality’ o f ‘reality’, thereby having as its sole emphasis the 
positive aspect of ‘being’, the true nature of its determinateness, i.e. involving an 
element o f ‘negation’ is effaced.
In ‘quality’ as determination there is, and inescapably so, a distinction between reality 
and negation. However, Hegel demonstrates that such a distinction having arisen is 
subsequently self-sublating, so ‘reality’ itself comes to necessarily contain negation as 
a moment The necessity that ‘reality’ must contain negation as a moment emerges 
from the recognition that ‘reality’ is a determinate being and not an indeterminate 
‘being’ Similarly, negation is determinate being in that it is ‘affirmatively present.
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belonging to the sphere of determinate being’160. For Hegel the sublation of these 
distinct aspects represents more than a mere repetition of the stages so far traversed in 
the thinking of the immanent development of determinate being. The distinction is not 
a wavering movement to be traversed ad infinitum, but ‘¿s’; that is, the distinction 
emerges as the very way being now determines itself.
‘What is, therefore, in fact present is determinate being in general, distinction in it, 
and sublation of this distinction; determined being, not as devoid o f distinction as at 
first, but as again equal to itself through sublation of the distinction, the simple 
oneness of determinate being resulting from this sublation’161.
Hegel characterises this movement of sublation of the distinction between ‘reality’ 
and ‘negation’ as ‘being’s own determinateness’ rather than a determination through 
external reflection.162 Through this initial form of ^//'-determination being is a 
determinate being, or, as Hegel categorises it, it is ‘something’. Hegel describes this 
‘something’ as the first negation of negation, as the first wholly internal relation 
immanent to ‘being’. Through this first negation of negation, the first internal form of 
relatedness, being determines itself immanently to become a determinate being, a 
‘something’. However, as the first internal relation it remains, Hegel maintains, ‘a 
very superficial determination’, and ‘only the beginning of the subject [Subjekt] - 
being-within-selP163. From this still as yet indeterminate notion o f self-determination 
‘being’ goes on to develop ‘first, as a being-for-self and so on until ‘in the Notion it 
first attains the concrete intensity of the subject’164 For Hegel what lies at the basis of 
such development in the self-determination of being is ‘the negative unity with 
itself16’ which emerges here in protean form, and now becomes the object for 
thought
Thus through ‘being’s’ own self-mediation of the moments of ‘reality’ and ‘negation’ 
a negative unity emerges as being’s own self-determinateness becomes increasingly
concrete Such a negative unity is present as self-mediated in the first protean form of
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self-determination, ie. ‘being’ as ‘something’. However, it is determined as a simple 
unity, a simple form o f self-mediation. Hegel shows that ‘being’ as ‘something’ is 
determined initially as a ‘simple’ unity, and collapses into becoming the ‘simple’ 
oneness that is ‘being’. He characterises the process of thinking this movement of 
becoming the ‘simple oneness’ o f ‘being’ as being fundamentally different from the 
initial immediate determinateness of determinate being since it no longer has merely 
the thought of mere ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ as its constituent moments. In this new 
thought ‘being’ is a determinate being, and its second moment, negation, is equally a 
determinate being but one determined as a negative of the ‘something’ rather than just 
the negative of ‘reality’; it is, Hegel argues, an ‘other’166. The ‘becoming’ of the 
determinate being here is seen to be a matter of transition between moments which are 
themselves ‘somethings’ but initially determined as ‘something’ and ‘other’ within a 
process o f ‘alteration’. This process of alteration is not posited at first as a process of 
self-mediation between the two constituent moments of ‘alteration’; rather each 
‘something’ is sustained through maintaining the self-relation o f the ‘something’ and 
its negative moment in ‘alteration’ (which is simply posited as equally qualitative but 
negatively so). Thus the negative moment is simply characterised initially as an 
‘other’ in general.
Thus in this initial emergence of the categories of ‘something’ and ‘other’ both are 
equally determinations o f ‘something’. Each therefore, Hegel argues, is equally
‘other’:
‘If of two things we call one A, and the other H, then in the first instance B is 
determined as the other. But A is just as much the other of B. Both are, in the same
way, others.’167
Here the ‘other’ initially functions symmetrically or reciprocally as a matter of 
reflection, or external determination. Hegel, as he had argued in the dialectic of 
‘Sense Certainty’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit, argues that it is the designation 
‘this’ which operates externally to distinguish ‘something’ from ‘other’. So it 
becomes a matter of ‘this’ and not ‘that’. But this means of distinction is merely a
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‘subjective designating’ whereby the determinateness ‘falls into this external pointing 
out’168 The distinction is not yet determined by ‘being’ itself, from out of itself 
immanently. Through the designation ‘this’ ‘we mean to express something 
completely determined’, but, as he had already argued in ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘speech, 
as a work of the understanding, gives expression only to universals’169. Curiously 
Hegel argues that the only exception to this is the proper ‘name’ of the singular 
particular thing, but argues that since the proper ‘name’ is absolutely singular it is 
‘meaningless’, or ‘merely posited and arbitrary’170. It is interesting to note that as we 
have already outlined, both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard attempt to sustain the ‘Other’ 
as absolutely singular and unique and to effectively have, what Hegel claims here, the 
status of a proper name. For Kierkegaard such an ‘Other’ actually signifies but 
without rational content or meaning, and he would deny that there is anything ‘merely 
posited or arbitrary’ regarding such an understanding of the absolutely singular 
‘Other’.
In this process of determination through subjective external designation of the ‘other’ 
by ‘something’, ‘otherness’ ‘appears’ as a determination wholly alien to the 
determinate ‘something’, or as ‘outside the one determinate being’171. The ‘other’ is 
thus ‘determined’ as the ‘wholly other’. However, as Hegel has already shown, every 
determinate being determines itself inescapably as ‘other’ whereby ‘there is no 
determinate being which is determined only as such, which is not outside a 
determinate being and therefore...not itself an other’177 The something/other 
distinction is unsustainable since ‘there is so far no distinction between them’17’ 
However, he now argues that such a collapse of distinctions is itself (like the 
distinction through subjective designation before it) a matter of external reflection. 
I'he self-sameness of ‘something’ and ‘other’ initially emerges from the ‘comparing 
of them’174 What such a reflective collapse of the distinction ignores is the extent to 
which an ‘other’ retains a seemingly ineluctable element of ‘otherness’ ‘apart from
ia
iw
no
ni
172
171
174
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid, p i IX 
Ibid 
Ibid 
Ibid
125
the something’17'. This element of ‘otherness’ is not eliminated through an initial 
reflective comparative collapse of the distinction. What thought must do is examine 
this ineluctable element of otherness and clarify what it thus means to be ‘other’ by 
taking it ‘as isolated, as in relation to itself, abstractly as the other’176 Thought must 
ascribe to the ‘other’ a nature of its own.
Hegel, in considering ‘otherness’ in its own self, does not begin by considering its 
relatedness to ‘something’. Rather, the ‘other’ in itself is characterised as the Other of 
itself or ‘that which is external to itself177 He characterises this ‘other’, determined 
by itself as ‘other’, as ‘physical nature, the other of Spirit’178 This ‘other’ is the 
‘other of itself and as such the ‘other’ of the ‘other’ He argues, ‘It is, therefore, that 
which is absolutely dissimilar within itself, that which negates itself, alters itself.’179
However, in this process of negating itself (of ‘altering’ itself) the ‘other’ remains 
identical with itself. What it alters into within this process is the ‘other’ in that this is 
its sole self-determination. Hegel argues that by ‘altering’ ‘it only unites with its own 
self180 In this process of alteration determinate being is reflected into itself through 
the sublation of the ‘otherness’, and determinate being is, in this process, a self­
identical ‘something’. However it is a self-identical ‘something’ from which 
‘otherness’, which is at once necessarily and irreducibly a moment o f  it, is distinct 
from it:
‘It [the ‘other’] is thus posited as reflected into itself with sublation of the otherness, 
as a self-identical something from which, consequently, the otherness, which is at the 
same time a moment of it, is distinct from it.’181
As Hegel writes succinctly in the Encyclopedia Logic, thought has established that 
‘otherness is quality’s own determination, though at first distinct from it’181. Pure
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thought is able to establish that ‘something’ is itself necessarily ‘preserved’ in the 
‘negative of its determinate being’183, the ‘other’ or ‘outside’, and that it is ‘essentially 
one with it and essentially not one with it’184. Pure thought has established the 
necessity of ‘something’s’ internal relatedness to ‘otherness’, i.e. that ‘something’ is 
intrinsically and constitutionally ‘other-related’. Thus pure thought is able to 
demonstrate the essential futility of the attempt to dogmatically maintain a 
hypostatised, abstracted and alien quality of otherness. This ‘other-relatedness’ of 
something, Hegel argues, ‘is at once contained in it and also still separate from it’185, 
and is categorised by the notion of ‘being-for-other’.
‘Something’ necessarily preserves itself in this negative of its determinate being and 
as such is being ‘as self-related in opposition to its relation to other, as self-equal in 
opposition to its inequality. Such a being is being-in-itself.’186 This ‘Being-for-other’ 
and ‘Being-for-itself constitute the two moments of the ‘something’. The truth of the 
two determinations are their relation, as ‘moments of one and the same something.’187 
Hegel concludes that ‘each, therefore, at the same time, also contains within itself its 
other moment which is distinguished from it.’188
‘Being-for-itself necessarily entails ‘Being-for-other’, and since identity is 
fundamentally relational, otherness ceases to be merely other and difference is no 
longer indifferent. Relation-to-Other is simultaneously mediated self-relation through 
which concrete individuality is established and maintained. Abstract external 
difference and exclusive oppositions are abrogated when it is demonstrated that these 
relations are internally and immanently generated, and are shown to be an essential 
element of the speculative unity of Being. As Hegel writes in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit the self is fundamentally ‘the opposite of itself: it is for itself, insofar as it is for 
another, and it is for another, insofar as it is for itself.’189
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(iii) Kierkegaard and Levinas
For Hegel immanent internal relations are ontologically definitive, thus to be is to be 
related Individuality is essentially social, and Spirit fundamentally intersubjective. 
Concrete individuality can only arise in community with other free subjects. Extracted 
from such necessary interrelation the individual becomes dogmatically maintained as 
an abstract, indefinite, alienated unhappy consciousness. Kierkegaard’s stubborn 
skeptical refusal to acknowledge the necessary co-inherence o f self and other leads, 
Hegel would argue, to a failure on his part to recognise the thoroughgoing sociality of 
selfhood and the intersubjectivity of Spirit. When conceived by Hegel the dialectical 
mediation of oppositions reconciles (but does not dissolve) those contraries 
constitutive of concrete finite individuality. Hegel is clearly more sensitive to the 
dangers of dissipating difference in identity and the disintegration of identity in 
difference than Kierkegaard permits. Hegel ultimately recognises that in order to 
articulate an adequate understanding of concrete individuality it is necessary to trace 
(as he clearly does in the Science of l-ogic) a mediated path between the extremes of 
undifferentiated unity and abstract multiplicity.
The essence of Kierkegaard’s failure is in fact analogous to the failure of abstract 
skeptical equipollence that Hegel demonstrates. With the abstract form of skepticism 
there is an insistence upon a heterogeneous element incommensurable with reason. 
However, for Hegel argues this heterogeneous element is ultimately associated with 
the implicit diversity of reason rather than a realm opposed to it. As we saw in our 
earlier discussion, Hegel argues that diverse equipollent heterogeneous moments of 
reason are necessarily wholly within reason; that is, they are necessarily related 
moments of reason. Kierkegaard’s insistence upon absolute heterogeneity between 
self and other is likewise disclosed as being merely one moment of reason abstractly 
and dogmatically posited in opposition to another. For Hegel such an insistence 
signifies merely one dogmatically abstracted moment of reason and cannot be 
otherwise. Kierkegaard’s insistence upon the ‘paradox’ of faith and the absolute 
separation between self and other fails, from a Hegelian perspective, to articulate a 
sustainable notion of an otherwise than reason in opposition to reason. For Hegel 
reason is One, as self-identity and relationality, whereby all the heterogeneous 
moments associated with the type of skepticism analogous to Kierkegaard’s thinking
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are ultimately demonstrated to be moments of self-relation. By strongly insisting upon 
an element of non-relationality between the self and other Kierkegaard seemingly fails 
to articulate a valid opposition to Hegel’s speculative idealism, since for Hegel such 
absolute separation can be clearly demonstrated (and is in his Science of Ixtgic) to 
necessarily involve relationality.
However, Kierkegaard questions this privileging by Hegel of the principle of a self­
reflexive type of skepticism, a type underlying the very structure of the speculative 
dialectic, and as being at all representative of the genuine spirit of ancient Pyrrhonism. 
Self-reflexive skepticism, he claims, fails to doubt radically enough since it cannot 
reject the operative presupposition to doubt everything. This absolute doubt becomes 
itself an absolute and leads to the self-reflexivity associated with thoroughgoing 
skepticism. Clearly for Kierkegaard Hegel’s adoption of thoroughgoing skepticism as 
a principle of immanent speculative dialectic would imply a presupposition of an 
absolute. For Kierkegaard the true Pyrrhonian doubter must come to reject this 
absolute that assumes the form of a type of ‘method’ associated with thoroughgoing 
self-reflexive skepticism, or what Hegel calls ‘self-accomplishing skepticism’:
‘When thought becomes self-reflexive and seeks to think itself, there arises a familiar 
type of skepticism. How may this skepticism be overcome, rooted as it is in thought’s 
refusal to pursue its proper task of thinking other things, and its selfish immersion in 
an attempt to think itself?’190
For Kierkegaard a genuine persistence o f skepticism paradoxically involves a 
skeptical rejection of thorough, self-reflexive and ‘self-accomplishing’ skepticism in 
an effort to discern whether there is a different basis for philosophy than the 
thoroughgoing determinate negation of Hegelianism. For Kierkegaard the radically 
self-accomplishing’ skepticism associated with Hegelian idealism (as Hegel himself 
clearly recognised) represents a /¡ositive stance for the negative However, 
Kierkegaard draws a very different series of implications from this. Unlike Hegel he 
does not recognise ‘self-accomplishing’ skepticism as a means for articulating an 
utterly autonomous and self-determining rationality of the Real, the One, or the All
S Kierkegaard, ('nncluillnfi Scientific t'osiscript, p 2*W
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For Kierkegaard Hegel’s ‘self-accomplishing’ skepticism actually represents the 
nullification of the very spirit of Pyrrhonism and no longer represents a genuinely 
disruptive force Speculative dialectic thus operates like a pregnant pause rather than a 
radical derangement; it functions as a pensive hesitation productive of further 
determinate content rather than a decisive stance against something. As Hegel writes 
in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
‘The road can .. be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of 
despair .it brings about a state of despair about all the so-called natural ideas, 
thoughts, and opinions ..It is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it 
emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result, in that case it is itself a determinate 
nothingness, one which has a content. The skepticism that ends up with the bare 
abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must 
wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too 
into the same empty abyss. But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is 
in truth, namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby arisen, and in the 
negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete 
series of forms comes about o f itself. ’191
For Kierkegaard this type o f self-reflexive and self-accomplishing skepticism in 
thought is not a genuine ‘nothing’ but always a ‘something’, and his thought is 
marked by the attempt to return to a more paradoxical form of doubt or a more 
genuine path of despair. For him the only genuine response to the real derangement 
brought about by skepticism is a subjective act of faith However, he argues that such 
a leap of faith only brings about a further sense of doubt:
‘Doubt is conquered not by the system but by faith, just as it is faith that has brought 
doubt into the world.’192
Kierkegaard’s persistent skepticism represents a paradoxical re[tetition of refutation 
and return that cannot be overcome. The Kierkegaardian skeptic functions as if
|9J G W.F Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, #78-9. pp.49-51
S Kierkegaard. Journals amt Papers, edited and translated by H. A  E. Hong. IV B, p. 13
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pursuing the paradoxical path of the Mobius strip.193 Certainty in the face of doubt can 
only be discerned by an ungrounded, unjustified and unjustifiable ‘leap o f faith’, 
which reason can always doubt. This type of certainty for Kierkegaard is entirely 
subjective rather than objective.
Kierkegaard’s opposition to Hegelianism might best be understood as conjoining 
traditional skeptical themes with a notion of the need for a ‘leap of faith’ in human 
existence. Thus for Kierkegaard the subject’s contact with the Real is not conceived 
as an objective or universal certainty, but as an entirely subjective one. Certainty is 
entirely maintained by an unjustifiable act of subjective faith, or by a decision on the 
part of the subject.194 This has clear parallels with Pyrrhonism As Hegel himself had 
acknowledged, Pyrrhonism accepts the irreducibility of appearances whilst 
acknowledging their lack of philosophical determinateness195 However, the 
Pyrrhonian skeptic recognises that such appearances function as the ground for 
subsequent truth claims and the dogmatism associated with natural consciousness that 
must be skeptically opposed. Radical Pyrrhonian doubt rests upon an understanding of 
the irreducibility of the merely pragmatic quality of appearance, or what might be 
termed (in the context of Kierkegaard) a type of unsustainable and unjustifiable faith 
in appearances. It is the subsequent determinate truth claims of natural consciousness 
as a type of response to the irreducible quality of appearance that provokes Pyrrhonian 
skeptical opposition. One might argue that the essence of Pyrrhonian skepticism could 
be understood as the attempt to protect the indeterminate and unjustifiable ‘faith’ in 
appearances by ensuring that they do not become overdetermined by natural 
consciousness and subsequently reason. Pyrrhonian skepticism evolves and persists as 
a primal force preventing the realm of appearances becoming overdetermined by 
natural consciousness, and maintains a pragmatic attitude Crucially Pyrrhonian 
skeptical opposition to the tendency to overdetermine appearances takes its bearings 
from a rationally indeterminate and pragmatic attitude towards the irreducibility of 
appearance For the Pyrrhonian Skeptic appearances are rationally unjustifiable and
' A one-sided surface formed by joining the ends of a rectangle alter twisting one end through I SO
degrees
Arguably within Kierkegaard's thought Pyrrhonian skepticism becomes transfigured into an early 
form of Existentialism.
As we saw in the first port of this thesis, Hegel acknowledges the pragmatic acceptance of 
appearances within genuine Pyrrhonism. For Hegel such pragmatic acceptance has no genuinely 
philosophical implication. Sec pp.6-7
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remain ungrounded by thought, yet acknowledges that they remain utterly necessary 
for existence. Kierkegaard might be recognised as arguing in an analogous way when 
he claims that we must accept the revelation of the Other or God as irreducible and 
rationally unjustifiable. For Kierkegaard the revelation o f  the Other or God is akin to 
Pyrrhonists pragmatic understanding of everyday appearance, i.e. both are beyond 
being justified or grounded by reason yet are a necessary structural conviction of 
human existence. Thus, just as Pyrrhonism might be understood as the persistent 
attempt to maintain the integrity of a pragmaticism with regard to appearances, 
Kierkegaard might be understood as traversing a parallel path by persistentently 
attempting to protect what he claims to be the irreducible truth of revelation from any 
reductive claims of reason. In this way Kierkegaard’s thought resembles a persistent 
and radical form o f Pyrrhonian skepticism.
For Kierkegaard the paradox of faith and the revelation of God result from their 
having a two-fold nature: they both represent a heterogeneous element that both is and 
is not a moment within reason. The paradoxical heterogeneity of faith can become 
(when it is articulated within a rational discourse) comprehensible as a differentiated 
moment of rationality itself in the way Hegel argues. However, Kierkegaard argues 
that it also expresses a radical heterogeneity exceeding the domesticated form of 
difference associated with speculative reason. As we outlined earlier within our 
Hegelian response to Kierkegaard, it is the immanent demonstration of the internal 
relationality of heterogeneous elements that is ontologically definitive for Hegel. 
From the Hegelian perspective Kierkegaard’s insistence upon this abstracted and 
radical form of heterogeneity opposed to rationality represents nothing more than a 
pre-critical form of dogmatism. Furthermore, from Hegel’s perspective it merely 
represents a type of dogmatic abstraction of an element o f  difference that he is able to 
demonstrate as merely one element within an ontologically definitive relation and 
unified totality. However, we must ask whether this type of Hegelian immanent 
critique merely misses the point of Kierkegaard’s thought.
Clearly Kierkegaard recognises the plasticity and force o f  Hegel’s speculative reason, 
and attempts to identify the type of paradoxical heterogeneity associated with faith 
and the revelation of God with a type of negativity more radical than that at work 
within the Hegelian speculative dialectic (i.e. the determinate negation that allows
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heterogeneous elements to be immanently assembled into a speculative totality). It is 
in the light of this effort that Kierkegaard must be understood as attempting to 
radicalise the notion o f skepticism and its relationship to philosophical reason. For 
Kierkegaard genuine skepticism implies a type of radically indeterminate negativity 
establishing itself as a self-dissembling truth rather than a determinate one. This 
radically self-dissembling structure of genuine skepticism suggests for Kierkegaard a 
process whereby any manifestation and articulation of the negative (as the 
heterogeneous element opposed yet articulated within reason) never becomes 
definitive enough to become wholly determined as a moment within the speculative 
dialectic Thus, for Kierkegaard genuine skepticism is able to manifest a moment of 
real heterogeneity in reason (i.e as a moment in rational discourse) but as if it were 
not really present there. This type of negativity manifests itself as a moment of 
mystery and paradox and as something that necessarily and radically undermines its 
own manifestation and articulation. It is precisely this notion of paradoxical 
heterogeneous negativity that Kierkegaard’s thought attempts to posit as being 
resistant to Hegel’s speculative dialectic. This type of paradoxical heterogeneity 
cannot, Kierkegaard claims, be adequately contained or understood by seeing it as 
merely a determinate form of negation. It cannot legitimately be reduced to the 
domesticated form of negativity that Hegel understood as the principle of diverse and 
determinate difference within the rational circuit of being Kierkegaard’s radically 
indeterminate negation relies upon the fact that it is always already absent at the very 
moment it becomes apparent within reason. Such negativity can, therefore, never be 
ontologically definitive since it persistently brings with it its own radical skepticism 
that dissolves any such tendency. It is precisely this quality of Kierkegaard’s 
radicalised notion of negativity that he opposes to speculative idealism
Despite considerable similarities between this approach and the one developed by 
Levinas towards Hegelianism196, Levinas always attempts to distance his thought 
from Kierkegaard’s throughout all of his work. Before proceeding with our analysis of 
Levinas’s anti-Hegelianism it is important to clearly understand not only Levinas’s
See M. Wcslphal, 'The Transparent Shadow. Kierkegaard and Levinas in Dialogue' in M.J. 
Malustik ¿t M. Wcstphal od. Kierkeyaard in Post/Modemily (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1995) pp.265-281, ‘Lcvinas's Teleological Suspension of the Religious' in Ethics as 
hirst Philosophy, ed A. Pcpcr/ak. pp. 151-160, M. Weston, Kierkeyaard <tr Modem Continental 
Philosophy An Introduction (London: Routlcdgc. 1994) and P. Kemp, 'Another language for the 
Other: from Kierkegaard to I^cvinas' in Philosophy and Social Criticism. Voi. 23. No.6, 1997, pp. 5-28
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continuity with regard to Kierkegaard but also his profound antipathy. Indeed, we 
wish to argue that it is only by understanding both the continuities and discontinuities 
between Kierkegaard and Levinas that one can begin to understand the full force of 
the latter’s anti-Hegelianism. In that endeavour we will proceed with an examination 
of two short essays197 where Levinas clarifies these continuities and discontinuities. 
This brief examination of Levinas’s relationship to Kierkegaard will function as a 
necessary prelude to our more detailed analysis of Levinas’s philosophy in the next 
part of this thesis.
In both of Levinas’s essays on Kierkegaard there is a clear acknowledgement that 
Kierkegaard is responsible for introducing a radical and important new idea to 
European philosophy by way of a novel modality of skepticism. He explains that this 
novel modality of skepticism is ‘the possibility of attaining truth through the ever- 
recurrent inner rending of doubt, which is not only an invitation to verify evidence, 
but part of evidence itself.’198 For Levinas it is the paradoxical persistence and 
recurrence of doubt as ‘part of evidence itself, as an element of belief, that is crucial 
to the force of Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelianism. He argues that in Kierkegaard’s 
thought there is no longer a straightforward opposition of faith and knowledge where 
the uncertainty of faith is be opposed to the certainty of knowledge. Rather, Levinas 
claims that there is an opposition between two distinct modalities of truth, which he 
terms ‘truth triumphant’ and ‘truth persecuted’. Here the notion o f ‘truth triumphant’ 
is explicitly identified with the Hegelian dialectic:
‘The dialectic’s remarkable effort consisted in showing the necessity o f  the 
conversion of that egotism into Being and Truth, and, in so doing, in revealing a 
thinking that lay dormant in the subjectivity o f the subject. At a certain moment the 
tension upon itself relaxes to become consciousness of self, the I grasps itself in a 
totality, under a general law, on the basis o f a truth that triumphs -  that is, that leads to 
discourse.’199
E. Levinas, 'Kierkegaard: Existence and Ethics’ and ‘A Propos of "Kierkegaard vivant"’ in Proper 
Homes, translated by M.B. Smith (London: The Athlonc Press, 19%), pp. 66-79
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134
To this Hegelian triumphant truth Kierkegaard opposes a belief or faith that is 
supposedly ‘authentic’ precisely because of the incomparable singularity of 
subjectivity. This belief or faith is not merely an imperfect knowledge of the truth that 
would be, in itself, ‘triumphant’, or, as Levinas writes, ‘imposing its sway from the 
start upon everyone’s thinking.’200 This belief or faith supposedly translates an 
irreducible existential condition that cannot be contained by any ‘outside’, and 
Levinas argues:
‘Is at the same time needy and indigent, poor with that radical poverty, that 
irremediable poverty, that absolute hunger that is, in the final analysis, what sin is. 
Belief is linked to a truth that suffers ’201
Through this modality of a ‘truth that suffers’ Kierkegaard attempts to describe the 
very manifestation of the divine or the transcendent. The ‘truth that suffers’ thus 
represents a certainty irreducibly co-existing with absolute uncertainty, a truth that 
recognises the irreducibility of the persistent presence of this skepticism and doubt 
within itself. It is precisely the persistent presence of skepticism in the ‘truth that 
suffers’ that acts incessantly to dissemble any tendency for it to become merely a 
determinately negative element of rationality. The ‘truth’ of such negativity is that it 
is indeterminately negative rather than determinately negative. Levinas writes:
‘The contradiction between presence and absence, in which belief maintains itself, 
remains unreconciled -  like an open wound, in a state of endless bleeding. The refusal 
of the synthesis is not in this case an intellectual weakness. It is precisely in keeping 
with this new mode of truth...The idea o f truth that suffers transforms all seeking 
after truth -  all relation to exteriority -  into an inner drama . .The truth that suffers 
does not open man to other men but to God, in solitude.’202
For Levinas the modality o f  a truth that suffers ‘manifests itself as if it did not dare to 
say its name, and thus as always about to leave.’203 This idea o f a transcendence of the 
transcendent residing in such extreme humility, he claims, allows us to glimpse a new
200
201
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modality of truth beyond Hegelian notions of truth, since its presentation is eternally 
equivocal; ‘it is as if it were not there.’204 ‘Persecuted truth’ allows a radical notion of 
transcendence to emerge precisely through the persistence of a type of doubt. Such a 
notion of transcendence, Levinas claims, is beyond the realm of Hegel’s immanent 
speculative dialectic:
‘The idea of persecuted truth allows us, perhaps, to put an end to the game of 
disclosure, in which immanence always wins out over transcendence; for, once being 
has been disclosed, even partially, even in Mystery, it becomes immanent. There is no 
true exteriority in this disclosure. Now, here with Kierkegaard something is 
manifested, yet one may wonder whether there was any manifestation. . . Truth is 
played out on a double register: at the same time the essential has been said, and, if 
you like, nothing has been said. This is the new situation -  a permanent rending, an 
ending that is no ending.,205
This notion of a persecuted truth characterised by the permanent rending of doubt is 
the crucial feature of Kierkegaard’s thought that, we will argue, Levinas retains within 
his own mature work. Levinas acknowledges that from the Hegelian perspective the 
Kierkegaardian notion of persecuted truth is an unwarranted subjective scandal, and 
‘carries with it an irresponsibility, a ferment of disintegration.’206 Notwithstanding 
Levinas’s overall sympathy with this view of Kierkegaard (which we will examine 
next) he nonetheless acknowledges that the Hegelian modality of triumphant truth 
cannot enclose the subversive, recurring, and persistent rending of doubt that 
Kierkegaard elicits as the very structure of extreme subjective belief or faith. Indeed 
the persistent Kierkegaardian opposition between the two modes of truth becomes 
reconfigured by Levinas in his later work as the modalities of the Said and the 
Saying 207 What Levinas comes to term pre-original Saying shares with Kierkegaard’s 
persecuted truth an ability to persistently resist and disrupt triumphant truth. For 
Levinas, pre-original Saying is:
^ Ib id ,p 7 8  
“ ibid 
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‘Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the 
semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to 
the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very 
signifyingness of signification. The original or pre-original saying, what is put forth 
in the foreword, weaves an intrigue of responsibility. It sets forth an order more grave 
than being and antecedent to being. ’ 8
What can be spoken or written about is what can be made present to the listener or the 
reader It is essential to what can be said to be that it can enter in this way into the 
Said, and thus truth becomes essentially conceptual and external and thus shares many 
of the features of what Levinas had associated with the Kierkegaardian notion o f 
triumphant truth. The truth of being in the Said becomes what can be thematised and 
conceptualised as an object within a rational discourse. However, for Levinas the 
notion of antecedent pre-original Saying (i.e. the approach of the Other) can only 
become thematised in the triumphant truth of the Said by a certain abuse of language, 
since Saying indicates the very condition of possibility for such thematisation. In 
order to mitigate such an abuse (or what Levinas terms the necessary betrayal of the 
pre-original Saying in the Said) it is necessary for Levinas to indicate the way in 
which Saying involves a perpetual self-reduction or self-rending as it enters into the 
Said Here Levinas makes explicit (when describing the radical diachrony of pre­
original Saying) the Kierkegaardian necessity of retaining the modality of persistent 
and recurrent radical skepticism. This necessity of remaining with the permanent 
rending of doubt is crucial for remaining ‘with the extreme situation of a diachronic 
thought’209; a diachrony beyond what is for Levinas the ontological synchrony of the 
Said. In order to conceive Saying as beyond the Said of Hegel’s speculative dialectic 
Levinas retains Kierkegaard’s sense of the necessity of the permanent rending of 
doubt (as part of the evidence itself) in order to signify the genuine transcendence of 
the transcendent:
‘To conceive the Otherwise than being requires, perhaps, as much audacity as 
skepticism shows, when it does not hesitate to affirm the impossibility of statement
E Levinas. Autrement qu 'être ou au-delà de I 'essence (The Hague: NijhofT. 1978. 1“ edition 1974) 
in English as Otherwise than Heiny or Heyond Essence, translated by A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. 1998), pp.5-6 
Ibid, p.7
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while venturing to realize this impossibility by the very statement of this 
impossibility. If, after the “innumerable” refutations which logical thought sets 
against it, skepticism has the gall to return (and it always returns as philosophy’s 
legitimate child), it is because in the contradiction which logic sees in it the ‘at the 
same time’ of the contradictories is missing, because a secret diachrony commands 
this ambiguous or enigmatic way o f speaking, and because in general signification 
signifies beyond synchrony, beyond essence.’210
Our more detailed examination of Levinas’s philosophy in the next part of this thesis 
will concentrate upon his development of this ‘Kierkegaardian’ insight regarding the 
‘secret diachrony’ that commands a perpetual skepticism of reason in his own work. 
However, having traced the most important element of continuity between the two 
thinkers we must now trace the most important elements of discontinuity. The 
question we must ask is why, given the very clear sympathy Levinas has with 
Kiekegaard’s thought, he retains a deep antipathy toward him.
One o f the most important reasons for Levinas’s antipathy stems from his belief that 
Kierkegaard is partially responsible for initiating (through rehabilitating an excessive 
form o f subjectivity) an exaggerated and exacerbated subjectivism of existence. 
Levinas claims:
‘In protesting against the absorption of subjectivity by Hegel’s universality, he 
bequeathed to the history of philosophy an exhibitionistic, immodest subjectivity.’211
Levinas asks whether this return to subjectivity that refuses ‘triumphant truth’ merely 
leads to another form of violence, a dangerous violence that emerges precisely at the 
point where Kierkegaard refuses what he conceives to be ‘ethics’. Levinas claims:
‘It is Kierkegaard’s violence that shocks me. The manner of the strong and the 
violent, who fear neither scandal nor destruction, has become, since Kierkegaard and 
before Nietzsche, a manner of philosophy. One philosophises with a hammer. In that 10*
10 Ibid, p.9 Note: Lingis erroneously translates Levinas’s reference to skepticism here as ‘philosophy’s
illeyiiimaie child’; however, the French reads ‘cl il revient toujours en enfant ligitime dc la
Jjihilosophic’. We have amended the translation accordingly.
E. Levinas, Proper Names, p.76
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permanent scandal, in that opposition to everything, I perceive by anticipation the 
echoes of certain cases of verbal violence that claimed to be schools of thought, and 
pure ones at that . .. That harshness of Kierkegaard emerges at the exact moment when 
he ‘transcends ethics’.’212
Indeed Levinas argues that Hegelianism is able to claim a kind of nobility from its 
reaction against the implicit violence of Kierkegaard’s exacerbated subjectivism of 
existence. For Levinas it is important to go beyond what he calls this ‘pathos’ of 
Hegelianism. He asks whether there is a notion of subjectivity that is irreducible to 
Hegelian objective being, yet understood by a different principle of individuation than 
the mere excessive egotism of Kierkegaard. The answer to this question emerges 
when he questions Kierkegaard’s understanding of the notion o f ‘ethics’:
‘Kierkegaard’s entire polemics against speculative philosophy supposes subjectivity 
tensed on itself, existence as the care that a being takes for its own existence, and a 
kind of torment over oneself. The ethical means the general, for Kierkegaard. The 
singularity of the I would be lost, in his view, under a rule valid for all. Generality can 
neither contain nor express the I’s secret.’213
Levinas claims that Kierkegaard has a mistaken understanding of the essence of 
ethics. The truth of ethics, for Levinas, is the consciousness o f one’s responsibility 
towards others that does not function to submerge the I in the general, rather, it 
functions to utterly singularise the I. Thus, responsibility for the Other situates the I as 
a unique individual; i.e. ethical obligation radically instantiates the I. By 
understanding ethics in this way Levinas is able to return to, and reconceive, the story 
of Abraham and Isaac otherwise than Kierkegaard:
‘In his evocation o f Abraham, he describes the encounter with God at the point where 
subjectivity rises to the level of the religious, that is to say, above ethics. But one 
could think the opposite: Abraham’s attentiveness to the voice that led him back to the 
ethical order, in forbidding him to perform a human sacrifice, is the highest point in *21
212 Ibid
21'ibid
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the drama That he obeyed the first voice is astonishing: that he had sufficient distance 
with respect to that obedience to hear the second voice -  that is the essential.’214
By attempting to articulate a principle of subjectivity that resists Hegelianism, i.e. an 
ethical principle of individuation, Levinas attempts to go beyond both ‘speculative 
totalitarianism’ and ‘Kierkegaardian non-philosophy’. By positing the question 
whether the ethical relation must involve the entry into and disappearance within 
generality, Levinas questions Kierkegaard as much as Hegel Levinas argues:
‘If the relation to exteriority cannot form a totality whose parts can be compared and 
generalised, it is not because the I keeps its secret within the system, but because the 
exteriority in which human beings show us their faces shatters the totality...An 
impossibility that does not remain in its negative meaning, but immediately puts the 1 
in question This putting in question signifies the responsibility of the /  for the Other 
Subjectivity is in that responsibility and only irreducible subjectivity can assume a 
responsibility That is what constitutes the ethical.’215
For Levinas the subject cannot evade its responsibility for the Other. The excess of 
subjectivity is not achieved through an exaggerated secret realm of subjective belief 
or faith in the manner Kierkegaard suggests; rather, the existential excess of 
subjectivity is accomplished ‘as a swelling of responsibility’.216 This putting in 
question of the egotistic subject does not destroy the I but represents an essential 
election of irreducible subjectivity. This ethical election of the subject signifies a 
radical form of singular commitment, and rids the subject of its violent imperialism 
and egotism, be it the Hegelian or Kierkegaardian subject. Hence:
‘Life receives meaning from an infinite responsibility, a fundamental Jiacony that 
constitutes the subjectivity of the subject -without that responsibility, completely 
tendered toward the Other, leaving any leisure for a return to self.’217 21
2,1 Ibid, p.77
21' Ibid, p.73 
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It is important to understand how Levinas differs from Kierkegaard here. He attempts 
to traverse a very difficult path beyond the totality of Hegel’s speculative dialectic and 
Kierkegaard’s excessive and exaggerated subjectivism, i.e. the subjectivity that 
contains the excessive, paradoxical and non-rational ‘leap of faith’. This difficult path 
is pursued by retaining certain elements of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, but also by 
maintaining that what ultimately individuates the subject is not a voluntaristic ‘leap of 
faith’ or an act of subjective resistance to the generalities of the Hegelian system. 
Levinas argues that the absolute ethical responsibility for the Other disrupts the very 
grounds for any such voluntaristic subjective resistance, and is a disruption that 
delivers the subject over to a pre-original structure of ethical individuality, investing 
the subject as responsibility for the Other. As we shall see in our analysis of Levinas’s 
Totality and Infinity, it is not the 1 that resists the Hegelian system but the Other:
‘The 1 is conserved then in goodness, without its resistance to system manifesting 
itself as the egoist cry of the subjectivity, still concerned for happiness or salvation, as 
in Kierkegaard To posit being as Desire is to decline at the same time the ontology of 
isolated subjectivity and the ontology o f impersonal reason realising itself in 
history.’21*
We will now proceed with an examination of Levinas’s attempt to traverse this 
difficult path beyond Hegel and Kierkegaard.
E. Levinas. Totality and Infinity, p.303
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PART THREE - LEVINAS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF SKEPTICISM
I Introduction
Emmanuel Levinas’s work persistently revolves around two fundamental issues. The 
first issue concerns the construction of a formal ethics grounded upon a notion of the 
absolute transcendence of the Other and a subject’s immediate responsibility toward 
that Other.1 The other issue consists of his extensive written work and activities as a 
member of the cultural and spiritual life of Judaism.2 Despite the fact that both of 
these issues are often inextricably bound up with each other3, it is clear that for 
Levinas both elements are utterly ‘dominated by the presentiment and the memory of 
the Nazi horror’4 5. His explicitly philosophical work presents a thorough and ongoing 
struggle to articulate a non-ontological understanding of the alterity of the Other 
(Autruif and a notion of the ethical ‘older than’ justice. This struggle involves an
1 For example. Totalité et infini: Essai sur l'extériorité (Livre de Poche; The Hague: Maitinus Nijhoff, 
1971, first edition 1961) in English as Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by A. 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) and Autrement qu 'être ou au-delà de I 'essence 
(The Wüouc: Nijhoff, 1978, 1“ edition 1974) in English as Otherwise than Heing or Beyond Essence, 
translated by A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998)
: In the text ‘ Signature' Levinas gives a concentrated overview of his life and works. There he writes: 
'Direction of the century-old École Normale Israélite Orientale, preparing teachers of French for the 
schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle du Bassin Méditerranéen. Daily communication with Dr 
Henri Ncrson, frequent visits to M ('louchant, the prestigious -  and merciless -  teacher of exegesis and 
of Talmud Annual conferences, since 1957. on Talmudic texts at Colloquys of the Jewish Intellectuals 
of France.’ ('Signature', translated by M.E. Petrisko. edited by A. Pcpcr/.ak in Research in 
Phenomenology, Vol.8 ( 1978) pp. 175-189)
Levinas published numerous texts associated with Judaism, including Difficile liberté: Essais sur le 
judaïsme (Editions Albin Michel, S. A  - Paris 1963 & 1976) in English as Difficult Ereedom: Essays on 
Judaism, translated by S. Hand (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), A L heure des nations (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit. 1988) in English as In the Time o f Natitms, translated by M.B. Smith (London: The 
Athlone Press. 1994), L'au-delà du Verset: lectures et discours talmudiques (Paris. Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1982) in English as Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and lectures, translated by G.D. 
Mole (London: The Athlone Press, 1994) and Nine Talmudic Readings, translated by A. Aronowicz 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1994)
' Levinas often insisted upon the separation of these two elements of his work, indeed in an interview 
from 1986 he claimed, possibly not altogether seriously: ‘I separate very clearly these two types of 
work. I even have two publishers; the one publishes my confessional texts, the other my texts which arc 
called purely philosophical. I keep the two orders separate.’ (‘Interview with François Poirié’ in Is It 
Righteous To Be? - Interviews with Emmanuel txvinas. edited by J. Robbins (Stanford. California: 
Stanford UP. 2<X) 1 ), p.62) The relationship between the two elements o f Lcvinas's work is complex 
and would be a subject for an entire thesis in its own right. However, it will not be an issue that we will 
seriously address within the confines of this thesis.
5 E Levinas, ‘Signature’, p. 177
' Sec A. Lingis's footnote in Totality and Infinity: ‘With the author's permission, we are translating 
"autrui” (the personal Other, the you) by “Other", and "autre” by "other". In doing so. we regrettably 
sacrifice the possibility of reproducing the author's use of capital or small letters with both these terms 
in the French text’, pp.24-5
We will follow Lingis's translation in our own discussion of Levinas.
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ongoing dialogue with the greatest philosophers of the ontological tradition, and the 
two thinkers that Levinas struggles most consistently with are Hegel and Heidegger 
In many ways Levinas’s struggle with Hegel and Heidegger represents a fundamental 
and radical continuity present throughout all o f his work, from De ¡’Evasion in 19356 
through to De Dieu Qui Vient Á l'ldée (Of God Who Comes to Mind) in 19847 *. 
Indeed, one might even go so far as arguing that his entire philosophical work 
represents a persistent attempt to resist the distinct ontologies articulated by these 
thinkers * What is beyond question, however, is that the radically supra-ontological 
and its ethical significance are constant themes throughout Levinas’s philosophical 
work Indeed, as Robert Bemasconi has written, the ethical significance of the 
absolute alterity of the Other has become ‘virtually synonymous with the proper name 
“Levinas’” .9
Levinas’s approach to the whole question of ethics is fundamentally different from 
approaches that begin with either the universality of the moral law (i.e. Kant) or the 
notion of utility (i.e Bentham or Mill). His approach consists in maintaining that the 
genuine relation to the Other is initially without reference to either universality or 
utility. For Levinas such a relation is a condition, but not the foundation, o f justice. 
This ‘relation’ to the Other is conceived as ‘unique’ and absolutely other, and for 
Levinas it is the primary significance of the meaningful. The relation to the Other as 
incomparable, emptied of all ‘social role’, naked and destitute, immediately imposes 
itself upon my responsibility. The nudity of the Other is a call to me, an appeal as an 
absolute imperative. This is what Levinas calls the ‘face’:
E. Levinas. De /, 'Evasion (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1982)
E. Levinas. De Dieu qui vient d I'idee (Librairic Philosophiquc J. Vrin) in English as O f God Who 
Comes to Mind, translated by B. Bergo (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998)
Lcvinas's persistent resistance to Heidegger is immensely complex and beyond the remit of this 
thesis. Our account of Levinas will privilege the way in which it specifically represents a formidable 
resistance, or refusal, of Hegelian totality and speculative idealism. Indeed our focus will be upon what 
we will argue is Lcvinas's reconfiguration and insistence upon a form of skepticism internal to genuine 
philosophy but otherwise than Hegel.
‘ R. Bemasconi. 'The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien’ in J. Blocchl (cd ), ¡he
h'ace o f the Other ct The Trace o f God: Essays on the Philosophy o f Emmanuel levinas (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000), p.62
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‘Infinity presents itse lf  a s  a face in the ethical resistance that paralyses m y pow ers and 
from the depths o f  defenceless eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and 
destitution.’10
The face-to-face relation  is conceived by Levinas as being prior to  all structures 
whatsoever, w hether they  are understood as the categories o f  Greek philosophy, K ant, 
Hegel or Husserl, and is conceived as prior to  all structures o f  the H eideggerian 
notion o f  being-w ith ."  It is a  relation prior to  all system , sym m etry, correlation, w ill, 
freedom, and the opposition  o f  activity and passivity; ‘the face is present in its refusal 
to be contained. . .it canno t be com prehended, that is, encom passed’12 It is, as John 
Llewelyn characterises it, ‘an un-condition w hich is pre-original and prior to  the in ler- 
esse-m ent’,li
This pre-original un-condition  o f  subjective interiority is w hat Levinas calls th e  
‘separation’ o f  the p sych e . W ithin the tem poral topology o f  interior life (the psyche) 
an extraction from  iden tity  w ith being has a lw ays a lrea d y  happened That extraction  
occurs as a disturbance or interruption o f  the originary order o f  presence o r  
consciousness; therefo re  it represents a loss o f  the im m ediate coincidence o f  o n ese lf  
with oneself w ithout which, Levinas claim s, the transcendence o f  the m eaningful 
would not be produced. Through this notion o f  separation Levinas is able to  allude to  
a paradoxical past o f  subjectivity as a necessary condition o r presupposition o f  its 
constitutive activity. H e argues that the transcendental pow er o f  subjective 
constitution is itse lf  conditioned by a prio r presupposition that, itse lf a lready  
constituted, only afterw ards turns ou t to  be constituting. T hus the very act o f  
constitution em erges as alw ays a lrea d y  conditioned by an originary mediation at th e  
core o f subjectivity, o f  ipseity
" E. I-cvinas. Totality and Infinity, pp. 199-200
'' M. Heidegger, 'Bcing-in-the-World as Bcing-Wilh and Being a Self: The "They”’ in Sein und '/.eit 
(Max Nicmcycr Verlag. Tubingen, 1927); published in English as Being and Time, translated by J. 
Macquarric A  E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell. 1962) and Being and Time, translated by J. Slambaugh 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 107-122 
(J E Levinas. Ibid, p.194
J. Llewelyn. Appositions o f Jacques Derrida 11 Emmanuel I Ivinas (Bloomington A  Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2002), p.l
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The paradoxical temporality through which this originary subjectivity bursts open and 
emerges as already constituted, i.e in a movement whereby it precedes itself, is the 
structure and advent of what is for Levinas genuine ethical subjectivity. By affecting 
the very structure of being the irreducible and irrecuperable temporality of separation 
has always already overflowed those structures. This is why Levinas defines it as ‘an­
archic’, without beginning, always already past, and always refractory to the present 
of representation. At the very core of oneself there is a primordial exposure to the 
Other whose time cannot coincide with the present of consciousness. Levinas will, in 
his later writings, speak o f  this as a radical diachrony14, which he contrasts with the 
notion of negativity at play in dialectics. The notion of diachrony signifies a 
disturbance or interruption of the logical linearity of ontological sense and evokes the 
notion of what might be termed hetero-affectivity; i.e. the irrecusable bond between 
affectivity and transcendence that constitutes the concrete fabric of subjectivity. The 
paradox of a non-synchronisable diachrony (hetero-affectivity) signifies an 
irrecusable anteriority o f  ‘obligation’ anachronously prior to any voluntary 
commitments. Levinas’s pursuit of this absolute disquiet that disrupts the very 
certitudes of ontological sense is undertaken within his philosophical work as a 
specific variation of Phenomenological practice, and it is to this Phenomenological 
practice which we must now turn before proceeding any further with outlining the 
detail of Levinas’s relationship to Hegelian dialectics and idealism. 1
11 H. Levinas: ‘Time is essence and monstration of essence... In its tcmporali/ation... in the recuperating 
tcmporali/ation. without time lost, without time to lose, and where the being of substance comes to 
puss there must be signalled a lapse of time that docs not return, a diachrony refractory to all 
synchronization, a transcending diachrony. ’ Otherwise Than tteing or Beyond Essence p.9
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il  - Levinas &  Phenom enology
There is a clear recognition in all of Levinas’s philosophical work that Husserlian 
Phenomenology represents the method for doing philosophy. Indeed in an interview 
from 1984 he claims that Phenomenology ‘is a manner of thinking concretely. There 
is in this manner a rigor, but also an appeal to listen acutely for what is implicit.’15 
This practice o f acuity and rigor is developed by Levinas through a sustained critical 
dialogue with Husserlian Phenomenology16 together with the recognition that 
Phenomenology holds the key to articulating an effective and formidable resistance to 
Philosophical Idealism, particularly the Hegelian variant. Indeed a striking feature 
throughout all of his writings on Husserl is the degree to which he argues for the 
genuine radicalism of Phenomenological practice by contrasting it to Idealism. Thus 
in an essay on Husserl’s Phenomenology published in 1960 we find an important 
statement concerning Hegelian Idealism that provides a profound insight into 
Levinas’s overall anti-idealist orientation:
‘A new idealism, bom of Hegel, conquered... the thought and even the sensibility of 
the West. It affirmed the entry of the absolute into the becoming of concrete events. 
Events would no longer dissimulate but would manifest the Absolute; they would 
consummate its designs.. Ever since then, the intelligibility of the world is read in the 
imprint left on it by the work of mortals, in the perspectives opened up by cities and 
empires. We acquired the conviction that we cannot encounter -  or think -  anything 
within the real in the wild state. Everything is formed, transformed, or reflected by 
man -  even nature, sky and forest. The elementary forces touch us only through 
civilization, a language, a literature, an industry, or an art. Thus what is human is not
E. Levinas, ‘Interview with Salomon Malka' in Is It Righteous To Be? -  Interviews with Emmanuel 
Levinas, edited by J. Robbins (Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2001), p.93
16 In addition to undertaking this critical engagement with Husserlian Phenomenology throughout his 
major philosophical works such as Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence, 
Levinas also wrote an early study of Husscrlian Phenomenology entitled Theorie de / 'intuition dans la 
phenomenologie de Husserl, in English as The Theory o f Intuition In Husserl’s Phenomenology, 
translated by A. Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern U.P. 1973) and several papers dedicated to the 
understanding and development of Husscrlian Phenomenology which were collected and published as 
Discovering Existence with Husserl, translated and edited by R. A. Cohen & M.B. Smith (Evanston. 
Illinois. Northwestern University Press, 1998)
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only the eye that perceives the image of the world, but also the light that illuminates
h.’n
Husserlian Phenomenology is able to offer a potential resistance to Hegelian Idealism 
by contributing a ‘naïveté which attested to a new experience of being’,18 and contains 
resources that allow a radical ethical signification to be indicated. For Levinas:
‘In a phenomenology where the activity of totalising and totalitarian representation is 
already exceeded in its own intention, where representation already finds itself placed 
within horizons that it somehow had not willed, but with which it cannot dispense, an 
ethical Sinngebung  becomes possible, that is, a S in n g eb u n g  essentially respectful of 
the Other.’19
Husserlian Phenomenology with its methodological cornerstones of intentionality and 
reduction (epoché) claims to disclose a ‘givenness’ or the ‘appearing’ of all that 
‘appears’, i.e. beings and objects. It claims that such appearing arises at the initiative 
of the phenomena, ‘through their own clarity’20, without any concern for categories 
that reason may impose upon them. Phenomena thus disclose themselves o rig in a lly , 
that is, without presupposition as lived sensation and embedded life experience 
(erlebnis). Phenomenologically understood, phenomena are an appearance which 
appear in  th eir ow n a ppearing , as eidos, which ‘gleams from their eternal essence 
with more brilliance than can be borrowed from a reference to the past’.21 Thus for 
phenomena to appear the appearance does not need to be traced back to a  p rio ri 
conditions, associated with the forms and categories of reason, but to the luminosity 
of the appearing of that appearance
Levinas claims that the historical focus of the Phenomenological practice developed 
by Husserl shifted to the cognitive or intentional object, including the subjective acts 
that constitute or determine it and its secondary correlation with a thing. In developed
11 E. Levinas. •The Permanent and the Human in Husserl' (1960) in Discovering Existence with 
Husserl, translated and edited by R.A.Cohen & M.B. Smith (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), p. 130 
Ibid, p.133
9 E. Levinas, 'The Ruin of Representation' in Discovering Existence with Husserl, p. 121
20 Ibid
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Husserlian Phenomenological practice the world that exists for the subject turns out to 
be equivalent to the world that gets its being from the subject to such an extent that 
eventually the correlation of object and 1, noema and noesis, replaces the originary 
correlation of appearing and appearance. From the perspectives opened up by the 
Phenomenological reduction (epoche) advocated by Husserl, the being of each and 
every being becomes comprehensible to the philosopher in its appearing as an object 
of the intentionally constitutive acts of consciousness. The implication of such a move 
is that consciousness bears the limit of all that appears, hence, what is not discovered 
in the reduction as an object intended by consciousness has no being, i.e. is less than 
nothing Consciousness becomes equated with thinking or assuming that everything 
‘appears’, since everything that befalls it is according to it. Levinas claims that such a 
phenomenological practice consists ‘in perceiving a rigorous correlation between the 
object’s structures and the processes of the thought that intends it or has self-evidence 
of it’.22 For Levinas such practice grants the notion of intentionality the ‘allure of an 
idealizing identification’.23 It is clear from all of Levinas’s post-war writings on 
Husserl that the development of Phenomenological practice in this direction is 
governed by totalising gestures associated with idealism, and indeed he comes to term 
precisely this type of practice ‘Phenomenological Idealism’. He claims that the 
totalising gestures more associated with idealism can be seen to infect Husserlian 
Phenomenology, and such contamination stems from the fact that Husserl’s 
conception o f intentionality is governed from the outset by the presupposition of 
intending an ideal object:
‘For Husserl, the object, even in the cases where it is sensible and individual, will 
always be what is identified through a multiplicity of intentions. To say that all 
consciousness is consciousness of something is to affirm that across these correlative 
terms of a multiplicity of subjective thoughts, and thus transcending them, an identity 
is maintained and affirmed. The intentional object has an ideal existence in relation to 
the temporal event and spatial position of consciousness.’24
' E. Levinas. ‘Intcntionality and Sensation' in Ibid, p.135
”  Ibid
24 Ibid, pp 136-7
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For Levinas the way Husserlian Phenomenology develops is governed by this 
understanding of the idealising nature of intentionality whereby the real is constituted 
as an ideaI identity. Thus, by understanding Husserl’s treatment of intentionality he 
argues that the specific task of Husserlian Phenomenology becomes comprehensible:
‘Intentional analysis follows from the original idealism of identifying intentionality. 
The work of synthesis, only the result of which fascinates naive and scientific 
thought, must be retrieved. The identity-result is the abstraction that fixes a petrified 
thought that has already forgotten its life and the horizons from which it uprooted 
itself Phenomenology is then the “reactivation” of all these forgotten horizons and 
of the horizon of all these horizons.’55
Contrary to this understanding of Husserl’s Phenomenology Idealism, Levinas posits 
a significant reversal of the notion of centrifugal intentionality that moves from the 
subject or ego to the object. He posits a counter-intentionality that moves back 
towards the ego. Levinas’s unique approach to Phenomenology also replaces the 
existing object with a ‘face’ as the origin of this countcr-intentionality, and which, 
strictly speaking, does not have to exist: ‘We have called face the auto-signifyingness 
par excellence ,i6 Thus, amongst the phenomena on which is exercised the subject’s 
constitutive activity, Levinas distinguishes counter-phenomena -  i.e. the ‘face’. The 
‘face’ is counter-phenomenal since its very ‘appearing’ consists less in giving itself to 
be seen directly than in imposing upon the subject’s gaze the weight o f  an obligation 
or responsibility irreducible to constitutive intentionality. The ‘face’ is not, therefore, 
one particular spectacle among others; rather, it bursts into that field of visibility 
accessible and originating from the subject’s activity with what is utterly inaccessible 
or invisible as such The ‘face’ is a luminous source, blinding and interrupting the 
subject’s constitutive intentional gaze This reversal of intentionality and 
phenomenality (passing/ram the object that is visible to the face that aims and is thus 
non-visible) radically alters the entire horizon of phenomenological analysis. Indeed, 
for Levinas such a movement discloses the potential within Phenomenology for a 
formidable and effective resistance to philosophical idealism
”  Ibid
E. Levinas, 'Language and Proximity’ in Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by A. Lingis 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 120
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What Levinas’s own Phenomenological approach struggles to show, contrary to 
Husserl, is that the appearing of being is not the ultimate legitimation of the structures 
of subjectivity. In other words, the subject is not, finally, reducible to the field or the 
‘event’27 wherein beings are deployed in their being. Thus, there is more to 
subjectivity than the role it plays as constitutive consciousness. Levinas’s notions of 
counter-intentionality and the ‘face’ demonstrate how the subject reaches an ultimate 
‘beyond’ or ‘hither’ side of the subject’s constitutive role as consciousness in the 
apparition of objective beings. His work attempts to show how the subject of 
Phenomenology includes more than consciousness, and in doing so demonstrate how 
it would open an order of meaning or intelligibility beyond that measured by the 
structures of consciousness. Consequently, ‘phenomena’ that did not appear within 
the intentional constitutive consciousness of Husserlian Phenomenology would 
‘appear’ in Levinas’s reconfiguration of Phenomenology. This ‘something more than’ 
consciousness in subjectivity suggests that the ultimate (or arche) reached by 
Husserlian Phenomenology is already a limitation to meaning, a limitation of a 
broader and vaster order of signification. In this larger order of signification, which is 
the focus of all Levinas’s philosophical work, the field of objectivity, of ontology, and 
truth, no longer measures all the possibilities of appearing (a field determined by the 
constituting intentions of consciousness):
‘That life that bestows meaning may reveal itself otherwise, and presuppose for its 
revelation relations between the Same and the Other that are no longer objectification, 
but society The condition of truth may be sought in ethics. ’**
Despite these reversals of notions so fundamental to Husserlian Phenomenology, 
Levinas does retain a crucial element of the Phenomenological method advocated and 
developed by Husserl. Precisely what he retains is made clear in a conversation from 
1975: 2*
2 To understand what Levinas means by the 'event' of being one would have to return to Heidegger's
notion of Kreignis in Zur Sache ties Denkens, in English as Time and Being, translated by J. Stanbaugh
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972), Identity and Difference - a bilingual edition, translated by J.
Slambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) \ldentitat und Differenz (Pfullingcn: Gunther Ncskc.
1957)| and Beitrdge zur Philosophic (Vom Kreignis), in English as Ctmlrihutlons to Philosophy (From
Knowing), translated by P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington. Indiana: Indiana U.P. 1999)
E. Levinas. 'The Ruin of Representation’ in Discovering Kxistence with Husserl, p.120
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‘What I do is Phenomenology, even if there is no reduction, here, according to the 
rules required by Husserl; even if all of the Husserlian methodology is not 
respected...In proceeding back from what is thought toward the fullness of the 
thought itself, one discovers -  without there being any deductive, dialectical, or other 
implication therein -  dimensions of meaning, each time new. .. In starting from a 
theme or an idea, I move toward the “ways” by which one accedes to it, then the way 
by which one accedes to it is essential to the meaning of the theme itself: this way 
reveals to us a whole landscape of horizons that have been forgotten and together with 
which, what shows itself no longer has the meaning it had when one considered it 
from a stance directly turned toward it. Phenomenology is not about elevating 
phenomena into things in themselves; it is about bringing the things in themselves to 
the horizon of their appearing, that of their phenomenality; phenomenology means to 
make appear the appearing itself behind the quiddity that appears, even if this 
appearing does not encrust its modalities in the meaning that it delivers to the 
gaze . .Out of the thematization of the human, new dimensions are opened that are 
essential to reflected meaning. All those who think in this way and seek these 
dimensions in order to find this meaning are doing phenomenology.’29
Thus it is by retaining Phenomenology’s objective of returning to the ‘concrete’, ‘to 
the things themselves’ on the hither side of the naivete of objectifying thought, that 
Levinas is able to pursue what he terms the paradox of ‘separation’, the temporal 
‘intrigue’ that precedes all reflective reason. In the preface of Totality and Infinity 
Levinas again credits the Phenomenological return to the concrete as revealing these 
‘unsuspected horizons’:
‘Intentional analysis is the search for the concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze 
of the thought that defines them are, nevertheless, unbeknown to this naive thought, 
these horizons endow them with a meaning -  such is the essential teaching of 
Husserl... What counts is the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought by a 
forgotten experience from which it lives.’* 10
' E. Levinas, lie  Dieu qui vient it I 'idee (Librairic Philosophiquc J. Vrin) in English as O f God Who 
Comes to Mind, translated by B. Bcrgo (Stanford, California: Stanford U. Press, 1998), pp. 87-8
10 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.28
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The temporal intrigue that Levinas claims is the necessary presupposition of reflective 
reason is a presupposition that reflective reason cannot itself constitute. His own 
Phenomenological analyses ceaselessly elucidate the original meaning of this 
‘concrete’. From these analyses one does not end up at an absolute unconditioned 
from which meaning emerges, but at a fundamentally impassable conditioning which, 
always presupposed, overdetermines or co-determines all meaning. They signify the 
impossibility of leaving the concrete, of exiting the temporal circle traced out by such 
dimensions, and the impossibility o f providing an account through linear reasoning 
that would lead to the pure present of an atemporal origin. Levinas writes:
‘The conditioning of conscious actuality in potentiality compromises the sovereignty 
of representation much more radically than does the discovery in the life of feeling of 
a specific intentionality, irreducible to theoretical intentionality, and more radically 
than the affirmation of an active engagement in the world prior to contemplation. 
Husserl puts into question the sovereignty of representation with respect to the 
structures of pure logic, the pure forms of the ‘something in general’, in which no 
feeling plays a role and where nothing presents itself to the will; and yet these 
structures and forms reveal their truth only when set back into their horizon’31
Throughout Levinas’s Phenomenological Practice there is an inevitably circular 
movement to the way in which the concrete is deduced through ‘unsuspected 
horizons’ of formal notions and abstract significations that are, at the same time, the 
conditions by which formal notions have their ‘latent birth’ and from which they are 
to detach themselves. Thus there is a passage traced from the concrete to the formal in 
order to return to the concrete. The deformalization of formal notions and abstract 
significations precisely implies a return from the reduction of the given objectivity to 
the horizons of forgotten meaning, by which objectivating thought is nonetheless 
conditioned. For Levinas:
'We are beyond idealism and realism, since being is neither inside nor outside 
thought, but thought itself is outside itself. A second act and second thought are 1
11 E. Levinas, ‘The Ruin of Representation' in Discovering Existence with Husserl, p. 116
1 5 2
necessary in order to consider hidden horizons that are no longer the context of this 
object, but the transcendental givens of its meaning.’32
This circular movement of the Phenomenological method is retained by Levinas. 
Indeed, the movement that attempts to discern ‘unsuspected horizons’ of meaning 
represents, for Levinas, the ‘very task’ of philosophy. This task is conceived as 
exposing, so far as possible, the ‘ethical’ significance of the pre-original (what 
Levinas will later term ‘Saying’). Levinas writes:
‘The signifyingness of an enigma comes from an irreversible, irrecuperable past 
which it has perhaps not left, since it has already been absent from the very terms in 
which it was signalled (“perhaps” is the modality of an enigma, irreducible to the 
modalities of being and certainty33) .. The enigma is the way the Ab-solute, foreign to 
cognition, because it does not lend itself to the contemporaneousnous that constitutes 
the force of time tied in the present, because it imposes a completely different version 
of time This extravagant movement of going beyond being or transcendence toward 
an immemorial antiquity we call the idea o f infinity. The infinite is an unassailable 
alterity, a difference and ab-soiute past with respect to everything that is shown, 
signalled, symbolised, announced, remembered, and thereby ‘contemporised’ with 
him who understands.’34
This primary enigma of ethics exposes itself within a philosophical discourse duty 
bound, for essential reasons, to commence as ontology. The ethical domain of 
signification articulates itself in the pre-originary realm, a realm prior to the orders of 
being and the political, of symmetry and reciprocity, of representation and of the
32 Ibid. p. 120
"  Lcvinas's point here is further clarified by J. Derrida when he discusses Levinas’s use of the word 
probably' in his text for Levinas, “En cc moment mime dans cct ouvrage me voici” in Textespour 
I mmanuel l^vinas Paris: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1980) in English as "At This Very Moment In 
This Work Here I Am", translated by R. Bcrc/.divin in R. Bcmasconi & S. Critchlcy (cds), Re-Reading 
Uvinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) pp. 11-48:
'I cul across my reading to admire this "probably”: it contains nothing empirical or approximate, it 
removes no rigor from the utterance it determines. As ethical responsibility, the essence of language 
doesn't belong lo discourse about the Said, which can only determine certainties... Without that 
|cthical| responsibility there would be no language, but it is never sure that language surrenders itself lo 
the responsibility that makes it possible: it may always betray it, lending to enclose it within the same. 
This liberty of betrayal must be allowed in order for language to be rendered back to its essence, which 
is the ethical. For once, for a unique time, essence is freed for probability, risk, and uncertainty.' p.23 
E. levinas. 'Phenomenon and Enigma' in Collected Philosophical Papers. p.7l
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logos. We will argue that it is precisely in this sense that ethics as first philosophy 
realises a genuinely critical essence intrinsic to knowledge Ethics as first philosophy 
realises a notion o f critical ‘negativity’ radically otherwise than the notion of 
determinate negation. According to Levinas’s ethical transfiguration all philosophy 
(despite originating in being) becomes capable of putting itself profoundly into 
question, and thereby wondering how being itself is to be justified, by virtue of a pre­
originary obligation and responsibility for the Other. We will argue that ethics as first 
philosophy represents nothing less than the persistence o f skepticism in philosophy 
Such persistence represents a sophisticated challenge to the essence of Hegelianism 
by enacting a formidable critical interrogation of being and reason themselves. 
Levinas’s work demonstrates how the call of being to its justification is ultimately 
discovered through a trace of transcendence in immanence. Such a call functions like 
that disruptive yet legitimate child of the philosophical tradition itself, namely 
skepticism
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Ill - Levinas & Hegel
There is clearly an understanding at play in Levinas’ philosophical work of a 
particular trajectory in the history of ontology that culminates in Hegel’s speculative 
idealism.35 As we have attempted to understand it, Hegel’s speculative idealism 
ontology is conceived as a radical form of immanence, i.e. as an autonomously 
evolving and historically developed and instantiated reason It is described by Hegel 
himself as the immanent autonomous movement of self-relating negativity in thought 
and being This immanent speculative dialectic results in an understanding o f being 
itself as a totality of reason, as a whole, the One, or the Absolute. Thus, for Hegel ‘it 
is in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that 
speculative thought consists.’36
Levinas argues that within Hegel’s speculative logic and its notion of multiplicity 
each individual essentially remains what it is in the ensemble formed by the 
multiplicity of terms speculatively identified, i.e. this ‘a ’ is the other of ‘A’ and ‘A’ is 
the other of ‘a ’. He characterises this ontology of the One (which for Hegel is an 
immanent speculative identity of multiplicity) as dangerously totalitarian in a 
philosophical sense rather than a crudely political one:
‘Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State and in the 
non-violence of the totality, without securing itself against the violence from which 
this non-violence lives, and which appears in the tyranny of the State.’37
He understands Hegel’s speculative idealism to move, through the simultaneous 
production and reduction (through negation) of all aspects of alterity to mere moments 
of immanent negative self-relation, towards an understanding of ‘Absolute Being’. 
For Levinas such ontology necessarily functions through an act of reduction and 
effacement of the true significance of the alterity of the Other (or what Levinas will
" E Levinas, Indeed. Levinas once characterised Hegel as 'prohahiy the greatest thinker of all time' 
Difficile liherti: T.sxais sur !e juddtsme (Editions Albin Michel. S.A. - Paris 1963 & 1976) in English 
as Difficult /•rtedom: Two vs on Judaism, translated by S. Hand (London: The Athlonc Press. 1990). 
£238
G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschafl der Toyik (Werke, Thcoric Wcrkausgabc. Bandc 5 & 6. Prank furl 
Suhrluimp Vcrlag, 1970) in English as Science o f Louie, translated by A.V. Miller, foreword by J.N. 
Findlay (Atlantic Highlands. NJ: Humanities Press International. 1989), p.56
E. l-cvinas. Totality and Infinity, p.46
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term in his early work as the ‘infinite’ (I 'in fin i)). All o f Levinas’s efforts with respect 
to Hegel’s ontology consist of an exhortation to philosophise non-specula tively  in an 
effort to articulate the irreducible ethical significance of the subject’s relation to the 
absolutely Other. He asks whether the absolute alterity of the Other (which he argues 
contains a sense o th erw ise  than being) can be properly conceived at all except by 
positing it as a positive modality of the unique and incomparable. His answer consists 
of an incessant effort to exclude and preserve the alterity of the Other from the type of 
speculative identity that constitutes Hegelian immanent ontology, i.e. the identity of 
identity and difference. He persistently exhorts us to reconsider a modality that is 
beyond  and which re s ists  the very ‘logos’ that founds speculative idealism, and to 
refuse its very terminology
The Other, he claims, is not simply an alter-ego, i.e- an appresented analogue of 
myself. He and I are n o t equals and we are n o t relatives, there is an absolute 
asymmetry between us. There is between us (in the Hegelian phrase that Levinas 
crucially attempts to critically reconfigure) an a b so lu te  d ifference. Ultimately Levinas 
asks whether it is this absolute difference of the Other (which in its original difference 
is its being o th erw ise  than being) that forbids its inscription within the terms of a 
speculative identity, but maintains the possibility of what he terms a non-ind ifference  
(in an ethical sense) with regard to the Other. His philosophical work necessarily 
proceeds as an exposition of the ethical significance of radical transcendence, as the 
radically and excessively positive infinity of the Other. When specifically contrasted 
to Hegel’s ontology this positive modality of infinity is, he argues, p rio r  to the alterity 
of self-relating negativity determinately operative within speculative idealism.
In response Hegelians ask whether or not this merely represents a naive re-statement 
of pre-Hegelian transcendental or neo-transcendental philosophical positions and as 
such fails to engage critically with the rigorous demands of an immanent philosophy 
such as Hegel’s How, they ask, can a transcendental or neo-transcendental 
philosophy such as Levinas’s evade the reach of the Hegelian immanent dialectic 
apart from maintaining a dogmatic, unjustified, and presupposed principle like the 
‘Absolute alterity of the Other’ and the ethical claims associated with it? For 
Hegelians Levinas is either maintaining an ‘Absolute difference’ without relation, or a 
type of relation to ‘Absolute difference’ merely dogmatically presupposed and
IS6
asserted rather than grounded immanently on rationally speculative terms Either way, 
for Hegelians, Levinas’s thought is from its very inception terminally condemned as 
uncritical, dogmatic, abstract, one-sided and naive.
A further concern for Hegelians, which we will address, is the understanding and 
characterisation of Hegel’s thought operative within Levinas’s work, i.e. as 
philosophically totalitarian in character and representing the formal reduction of the 
alterity of the Other to the Same, and as a rigid maieutics38 For them such 
characterisations of Hegel’s philosophy are as deeply flawed as his subsequent 
positioning of his own thought as ‘beyond’ Hegel Ultimately his thought, for 
Hegelians, contains a deeply misconstrued understanding of Hegel and for them there 
remains something deeply pathological about Levinas’s dogmatic obsession with the 
Other (perhaps too Jewish) and something idiotic about his reading of Hegel (perhaps 
too Kierkegaardian)
However, we will argue that such questions and concerns are in fact recognised and 
treated successfully by Levinas in his work The extent to which he acknowledges 
these types of Hegelian concerns emerges, for example, when he writes:
‘When faced with the Hegelian saying [le dire], one cannot easily raise one’s voice -  
not only because thought becomes timid, but because language seems lacking There 
is nothing more derisory than ‘putting forward an opinion’ on Hegel -  classing him, 
either in order to reduce him in stature or to glorify him, as a mystic or romantic or 
anti-Semite or atheist we express ourselves in a language that has not established its 
grounding We ask ourselves whether language does not hold another secret to the 
one bought to it by the Greek tradition, and another source of meaning, whether the 
apparent and so-called ‘non-thought’ ‘representations’ of the Bible do not hold more 
possibilities than the philosophy that ‘rationalises’ them, but cannot let them go 
free, whether we should not leave the system, even if we do so by moving 
backwards, through the very door by which Hegel thinks we enter it.’39 *
* Maiculics - a dialogue that endeavours to give birth to knowledge already contained in the 
interlocutors
E. l-cvinas. Difflcull I'reedom. p.238
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Levinas denies that contesting the primacy of autonomy and reason necessarily 
implies irrationalism, dogmatism or mysticism, or the abandonment of the ideal of 
freedom. For him ‘one is not against freedom if one seeks for it a justification’.40 
Rather, he maintains that reason and freedom are themselves radically founded upon 
prior ‘unsuspected’ structures ‘whose first articulations are delineated by the 
metaphysical movement, or respect, or justice.’41 Freedom and reason thus require an 
ethical justification, and that implies a justification coming from beyond freedom and 
reason themselves. For Levinas, the self-legitimating activity of reason and freedom 
within Hegelian philosophy is ethically utterly untenable, and argues that it is the 
approach of the Other who puts into question the naive legitimacy of freedom. For us 
Levinas’s reconfiguration of philosophy towards this ‘other’ justificatory source of 
meaning in fact successfully addresses a number of Hegelian questions in the most 
direct way possible. This is not to deny the considerable challenge of Hegelianism, 
but to maintain that they can be met by understanding how Levinas, without 
dogmatism, proceeds with a remarkable reversal of truth that ultimately rests upon 
freedom outside or beyond the immanent dialectic of determinate negation. Our own 
account of Levinas’s work will focus upon this sense of urgency for reason and 
freedom to be justified heterogeneously. We readily acknowledge that Levinas’s 
insistence upon heterogeneity, transcendence in immanence or metaphysical 
exteriority will nevertheless always appear somewhat incommensurable to Hegelian 
idealism. However, such incommensurability is, to a certain extent, the actual point of 
Levinas’s efforts. Thus Levinas inevitably appears somewhat irrational, unfounded 
and dogmatic from the ultra-autonomous and ultra-rationalist Hegelian perspective. 
We will suggest that his efforts cannot look, from such a perspective, otherwise and as 
such demonstrates an intrinsic inability of Hegelianism to catch sight of genuine 
exteriority. That Hegelianism fails to discern within Levinas’s work anything other 
than a mere pathological form o f transcendental dogmatism perhaps reflects more 
upon the limitations of systematic immanence as a philosophical approach than it does 
upon Levinas’s own work. We will argue that whilst his work is undeniably deeply 
marked by attempts to articulate the radically otherwise than being, the beyond 
reason, the pre-original relation to the Other outside of the rationally constitutive 
powers of the subject (i.e. the always already past of the absolutely Other in the
*’ E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 302 
' Ibid
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subject), it also remains the profound attempt to demonstrate that these utterly 
heterogeneous conditions found and justify reason and freedom themselves We will 
argue that Levinas cannot be reduced to being an irrationalist, mystic or dogmatist 
The ethical relationship is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from 
the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the Other. This 
insistence upon ethics as a radical type of critical inspiration and disturbance, as first 
philosophy, represents neither a naive pre-Hegelian transcendentalism nor a type of 
naive dogmatism associated with empiricism. Rather, we argue, it represents nothing 
less than the profound attempt to demonstrate that the exteriority of the Other is the 
critical principle that founds and justifies all society, reason and freedom:
‘The ethical, beyond vision and certitude, delineates the structure of exteriority as 
such Morality [le morale] is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy.,4J
Our arguments will attempt to show the extent to which Levinas succeeds in 
articulating a ‘displacement’ of Hegel's speculative idealism, and in articulating a 
non-dogmatic notion of transcendence in immanence, where immanence turns out to 
have always already contained more than it can contain. For us his work succeeds in 
disrupting the steady, autonomous and sober immanent constitution o f thought as it 
emerges within Hegel’s ‘presuppositionless’ beginning with an identity of thought 
and being in the Science o f Logic This disruption has ‘always already’ happened, and 
is traced within Levinas’s work as a necessary and radical notion of exteriority or 
alterity that imposes an ethical obligation prior to any presuppositionless beginning in 
absolute autonomy Absolute exteriority, the Other, is that which presupposes an 
absolute obligation prior to the freedom of subjectivity. Thus, all of Levinas's 
philosophical work is orientated by the attempt to articulate this paradoxical notion of 
exteriority, beyond yel within immanence, as that which exceeds or overflows 
immanence from within. Such an overflowing radically throws into question the 
priority of the autonomous and presuppositionless self-determining movement of 
immanence in the most radical way possible, and cannot, we will argue, be 
immediately reinscribed back into immanence in the way earlier post-Hegelians such 
as Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard can
n  Ibid, p 104
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We will argue that Levinas’s responses to the type of Hegelian challenges we have 
outlined consist of a series of fundamental challenges to the very essence of Hegelian 
idealism itself, particularly its understanding of autonomy, rationality and immanence 
Thus, he claims that Hegelians ‘have yet to make understandable how a rational 
animal is possible’43, and his own philosophical work will largely consist of the 
attempt to go beyond Hegel in providing an explanation of the very radical ethical 
founding and explanation of the rational, the social and the autonomous He radically 
challenges the Hegelian explanation of the immanent emergence of the universal 
rational subject, whereby ‘the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject’44 is 
posited by Hegel For Hegel, he claims, the I and the Other function purely as 
emergent, reciprocally related, moments o f the subject; Hegel writes that ‘the living 
Substance is being which is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of 
positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.. .Only this self­
restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself..is the True.’45 The I 
and the Other function, Levinas claims, merely as elements within an ‘ideal 
calculus’4*, who receive from this calculus their genuine being, or their truth. They 
only ever approach one another under the auspices o f ‘ideal necessities which traverse 
them from all sides’;47 the I and the Other play the role of mere moments of becoming 
of truth in the system, rather than as its very origin. Within Hegelian idealism each 
renounces their unicity in not desiring one another in the sense Levinas claims is 
essential to desire, rather they merely desire the consummation of the universal:
‘ The idealist intelligible constitutes a system of coherent ideal relations whose 
presentation before the subject is equivalent to the entry of the subject into this order 
and its absorption into these ideal relations ’4X
Levinas’s radical challenge to the fundamental essence of Hegelian idealism consists 
in the claim that immanent autonomous rationality cannot provide the crucial sense of 
the origin of society and rationality. He argues that both society and rationality
4’ Ibid, p 208
M G.W.R. Hegel. I’henomenoloRV o f Spirit. #17. p. 10
w Ibid. #18. p. 10 
*' E. Levinas. Ibid, p.216 
47 Ibid 
* Ibid
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presuppose a relation whose terms radically absolve themselves from that relation, 
thus ‘separation’. It is in this sense that the true force of Levinas’s claims that 
Hegelian idealism cannot explain the origin of the rational animal become clear. 
Reason, in the Hegelian sense of an autonomous, immanent and impersonal 
legislation, cannot permit ‘us to account for discourse, for it absorbs the plurality of 
the interlocutors. Reason, being unique, cannot speak to another reason.’49 Levinas 
challenges the very cornerstone of Hegelian idealism, its notion of the unique totality 
or reason, by positing a skeptical challenge to that totality. This skeptical challenge 
will attempt to disclose the necessary preconditions of reason, i.e. the fact that 
autonomous reason is itself founded by a relationality always beyond it.
His skeptical opposition to the speculative identity of the I and the Other in Hegelian 
idealism does not merely represent a type of Kierkegaardian protestation of the 
individual who refuses the system and reason. Such a protestation would, from a 
Hegelian perspective, be legitimately accused of arbitrariness and dogmatism, 
whereas Levinas’s opposition is inspired by ‘the affirmation that makes his opposition 
live’.50 This opposition is inspired by the ‘certainty of the surplus which an existence 
separated from and thus desiring the full or immutable being or being in act involves 
by relation to that being, that is the surplus that is produced by the society of infinity, 
an incessant surplus that accomplishes the infinitude of infinity.’51 This protestation 
against Hegelianism does not therefore fall prey to charges of arbitrariness and 
dogmatism; indeed, if it were merely a type of subjective protestation the very 
absurdity and immorality associated with arbitrariness and dogmatism would be 
justified. Rather, the protestation represented by his work proceeds from the 
conviction that the impersonal immanent rational structures of universal being cannot 
serve as the ‘ontological touchstone for a life, a becoming, capable of renewal, of 
Desire, of society’.52 The individual and the personal, he claims, count and act 
independently o f the Hegelian universal, which moulds them, but otherwise than 
Kierkegaardian protestation. The idea of infinity in the Same breaks with the Hegelian 
‘prejudice of maieutics without breaking with rationalism’.53 This is precisely because
49 Ibid, p.207
50 Ibid, p.2I7
5' Ibid
” Ibid
”  Ibid, p.204
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it is the very idea of infinity which conditions non-violence itself, that is, establishes 
ethics:
‘The Other is not for reason a scandal that puts it in dialectical movement, but the first 
teaching A being receiving the ideal of infinity, receiving since it cannot derive it 
from itself, is a being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very existing 
consists in this incessant reception of teaching, in this incessant overflowing of self.’54
Our focus will be on Levinas’s radical understanding o f the very nature of philosophy 
and philosophical thought itself in relation to Hegel’s own. Our particular approach to 
this will consist of a consideration of the way Levinas construes the relationship 
between skepticism and philosophy, i.e. upon his arguments concerning the 
persistence and significance of skepticism within the very movement of philosophical 
thought itself. In doing this we will recall Hegel’s own discussion of the essence of 
genuine skepticism and the role he reserves for the skeptical negativity in his 
speculative idealism, i.e. as the negative-rational moment of dialectic. This moment, 
for Hegel, emerges immanently as a disturbance to all certainties of the understanding 
in order for it to be able to raise itself to the level o f the speculative, i.e. the positive- 
rational. Skepticism is for Levinas, as it was for Hegel, not merely a philosophical 
trend specific to a moment in the history of ideas; rather, it must be understood as an 
internal moment of philosophy itself. The relationship between skepticism and 
philosophy provides a crucial common point of departure for both thinkers, a point of 
‘almost absolute proximity’, and provides an entrance point by which Levinas will 
claim he is able to ‘leave the system, even if we do so by moving backwards, through 
the very door by which Hegel thinks we enter it.’55 Levinas argues for the persistent 
recurrence of skepticism as internal to philosophy (as transcendence in immanence) 
but obviously follows a very different path to that o f Hegel’s speculative idealism. 
Indeed, it is precisely the point by which Levinas initiates an exit from, or resistance 
to, idealism. For Levinas the radical disruption that skepticism represents cannot be 
‘domesticated’ and effectively submerged by immanence in the way Hegel appears to. 
It must remain and be recognised, he argues, as a repetitively disruptive and 
disorientating force coming from within immanence, as otherwise than the mere
162
process of determinate negation. It functions as an appeal of the absolutely Other. 
Precisely because of the necessity of having to use the very structures of reason to 
articulate this beyond reason (the concrete content prior to, and resisting the form in 
which it must, nevertheless, be expressed) the skeptical modality utilised throughout 
all of his work manifests as the emphasis of the ‘perhaps’, ‘maybe’ and the ‘if., .then’. 
Indeed, this modality becomes evident in one of the most explicit and important anti- 
Hegelian passages in Totality and Infinity, a passage that reflects all of his efforts in 
the work and which we will quote here in full:
i f  reason lives in language, if the first rationality gleams forth in the opposition of 
the face to face, if the first intelligible, the first signification, is the infinity of the 
intelligence that presents itself (that is, speaks to me) in the face, if reason is defined 
by signification rather than signification being defined by the impersonal structures of 
reason, if society precedes the apparition of these impersonal structures, if 
universality reigns as the presence of humanity in the eyes that look at me, if, finally, 
we recall that this look appeals to my responsibility and consecrates my freedom as 
responsibility and gift of self -  then the pluralism of society could not disappear in the 
elevation to reason, but would be its condition It is not the impersonal in me that has 
arisen in enjoyment as separated, but whose separation would itself be necessary for 
infinity to be -  for its infinitude is accomplished as the ‘facing’.’56
To outline the nature of the critical dialogue between Hegel and Levinas it is 
necessary to begin with an account of Levinas’s early skeptical positioning of his 
thought vis-à-vis Hegel in his first major philosophical work Totality and Infinity57 
Indeed, the importance of having to persistently position one’s thought in relation to 
Hegel is illuminated by a remark once made by Levinas:
w Ibid, p.20K
”  Levinas had published a number of short philosophical studies, outside of his studies of Husserl and 
Heidegger, including /V  / , 'Evasion (Montpellier: Fala Morgana. 1982), lie I'existence d Text slant 
(Paris: Vrin. 1978, first edition 1947) in English as Kxlxlenct and hxislenls. translated by A. Lingis 
(Martinus Nijhoff The Hague, 1978) and l*  Temps el Tautre (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1979, first 
edition 1947) in English as time and the Other, translated by R.A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duqucsnc 
University Press, 1987)
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‘For a philosopher, to locate his thought with respect to Hegel is as for the weaver to 
install his loom prior to attaching or removing the cloth that will be woven and>38re woven.
'* E. Levinas. 'Une language qui nous est familiar' en Les Cahiers de la Nuit Surveillé, 3 (1984), p.327, 
cited by J. Rolland in his ‘Postscript’ to E. Levinas, God. Death and lime, translated by B. Bcrgo 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2000)
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IV - Levinas’s T o ta lity  A  In fin ity
Written as Levinas’ Doctora! d ’état in the 1950’s and first published in 1961, Totality 
and Infinity9 attempts to retain a ‘positive’ sense of metaphysics. In Totality and 
Infinity Levinas argues that the very essence of metaphysics is the movement towards 
exteriority or the absolutely Other, a movement he terms throughout the work as 
‘Desire’. This metaphysical ‘desire’ thinks being, exteriority, transcendence and the 
absolutely other together, thus, aiming at a being as such or a being in itself. 
Metaphysical ‘desire’ aims at the absolutely Other in its exteriority or transcendence. 
Totality and Infinity represents Levinas’s sustained critique of traditional thought 
regarding the movement of metaphysics; the tradition, he argues, has failed to enact 
the ‘desire’ essential to it. He maintains that the tradition obscures and effaces this 
desire’ in two major ways; the first comes from thinking the absolutely Other in 
negative terms (i.e Hegel) and the second by thinking being as such within the prior 
comprehension of Being (i.e. Heidegger). He argues that only through an ethics of 
sociality can one succeed in accomplishing a ‘positive’ sense of metaphysical desire 
(an accomplishment which does not imply arriving at an end) since it is in such an 
ethics of sociality that a being absolutely other (or exterior) presents itself as such. By 
re-thinking the ethical dimension o f the encounter with the Other Levinas is able to 
redirect metaphysical ‘desire’ back toward the being that presents itself (i.e. what he 
terms the auto-signification of the ‘face’) and purge metaphysics of what the tradition 
has interposed between it and its end. For Levinas this purgation entails as much a 
confrontation with Hegelian negativity as it does with Heideggerian ontology 60
Totality and Infinity consists of a series of detailed attempts to commune with various 
elements of concrete human existence, both at the level of individual experience and 
wider social interaction. Thus, it proceeds by way of concrete phenomenological 
analyses of multiple levels of human experience and aims to articulate, through these 
analyses, an elaborate defence of the notion o f ‘ethics as first philosophy’ (understood 
here as the ‘primordial’ intersubjective relation). The ‘primordial’ site from which
'* E. Levinas. Totaliti el infint: Essai sur l ’extiriorité (Livrc dc Pochc; The Hague. Martinus NijhofT. 
I'171, first edition 1961) in English as Totality amt Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by A. 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duqucsnc University Press, 1969)
Por the purposes of this thesis our engagement with Levinas will necessarily almost completely 
privilege Levinas' critique of Hegelian speculative Idealism, and as such will not attempt to provide 
any kind of reading of Levinas' sustained critique of Heidegger.
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ethics takes its meaning is, he argues, the face-to-face encounter between the subject 
(in the lived, first person sense) and the other who approaches ‘me’, looks at ‘me’, 
and speaks to ‘me’. The face-to-face relation is such an immediate and fragile 
experience that it ultimately eludes definitive thematisation precisely because it is 
necessarily reduced and effaced within such an act of thematisation. In its immediacy, 
fragility and auto-signification, the approach of the face is such a singular event that 
its excessive signification is pre-representational and pre-conceptual. It is 
experienced, Levinas argues, as a luminous force, as an affective quality prior to the 
operations of cognition and understanding. Thus, like Kierkegaard, Levinas also asks 
whether or not there is something in the conscious subject which enables him to step 
outside -  or cause him to be tom from -  his manifold situations and institutions in 
order to enquire how and as what the absolutely other comes to pass. As he argues in 
a short essay published a few years after Totality and Infinity, ‘there must be someone 
who is no longer agglutinated in being, who, at his own risk, responds to the enigma 
and grasps the allusion. Such is the subjectivity, alone, unique, secret, which 
Kierkegaard caught sight of.’61 He situates the production of transcendence in the 
face of the Other. The face is a primordial ethical resistance, ‘the resistance o f what 
has no resistance -  the ethical resistance’62, and is utterly irreducible to a mere 
phenomenon:
‘The nakedness o f the face is not what is presented to me because I disclose it, what 
would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my perceptions, in a 
light exterior to it. The face has turned to me -  and this is its very nudity. It is by itself 
and not by reference to a system... The relation with the face is not an object- 
cognition. The transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this 
world into which it enters, the exiling o f a being, his condition o f being stranger, 
destitute, or proletarian.’63
Thus, there can be no integration of the lived face-to-face relation into a philosophical 
system qua speculative idealism, since there is always some aspect o f the other person 
facing ‘me’ that I can neither predict, enclose or thematise in concepts: *41
41 E. Levinas, ‘Phenomenon and Enigma' (1967) in Collected Philosophical Papers, p.72
41 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 199 
"  Ibid, p.75
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‘The face resists possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the 
sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp This mutation can 
occur only by opening o f a new dimension. For the resistance to the grasp is not 
produced as an insurmountable resistance, like the hardness of the rock against which 
the effort of the hand comes to naught, like the remoteness of a star in the immensity 
of space. The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the 
feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power. The face, still a thing among 
things, breaks through the form that nevertheless delimits it. This means concretely: 
the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a 
power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge,’64
The first part of Totality and Infinity, entitled ‘The Same and the Other’65, outlines 
much of the logic which guides the entire work Here the ‘same’ (le me me) is the term 
he uses to characterise what he argues is the ‘violence’ integral to traditional 
appropriations of metaphysical ‘desire’; for Levinas all such metaphysical thinking, 
insofar as it is the thought of the Same, is constituted by a fundamental violence 
against the Otherness o f the Other Our examination o f Totality and Infinity will 
almost exclusively concentrate upon the arguments contained in this first part, and 
more specifically will address the question of how exactly they relate to Hegelian 
speculative idealism.
In the opening section of Totality and Infinity Levinas sets out the fundamental 
structure of metaphysical desire and infinity of the Other. Echoing Hegel’s 
determination of the Absolute, the Same is not merely substance but subject (the T )  
namely the ‘being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its 
identity throughout all that happens to it . the primordial work of identification The I 
is identical in its very alterations.’66 Following Hegel, Levinas argues that the 
subjective work of identification or recovering self in difference (the work which 
distinguishes the subject which is ‘for itself from the substance which is ‘in itself) is 
the ‘labour of the negative’. Thus negativity is precisely the process by which
Ibid, pp 197-8
' '  E. Levinas. Ibid. pp.33*105 
“  Ibid, p 36
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autonomous subjectivity identifies itself in otherness and confirms what he calls the 
thought of the same. For Hegel it is the way in which spirit is at home with itself and 
is the essence of freedom, ‘being at home with oneself in one’s other, depending upon 
oneself, and being one’s own determinant.’67
Established in and through identification, the Same comprehends otherness, grasping 
it in knowledge and possession. The partial negation (Aufhebung)68 (which is for 
Levinas a ‘violence’) has the effect of denying the independence of beings; they 
become ‘mine’; ‘something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with 
its opposite.’69 The Other in being partially negated is thus preserved; it is preserved 
in its negation, i.e. as the Same. Absolute alterity is reduced to an other that is 
structurally integral to the Same or I. For Levinas such a reduction of alterity is 
necessarily a type of violence against the Other: i.e. the Same is intrinsically violent 
insofar as it necessitates otherness appear only on condition that its alterity be reduced 
to a comprehensible alterity. In Totality and Infinity violence itself is understood as 
the necessity that the Other dissimulate itself in its appearance for the Same. 
Autonomous subjectivity is inherently violent, not because it is constituted by 
excluding otherness but because in its very constitution it includes the Other within it 
while mastering its otherness. For Levinas, there would only be within the Same the 
structural other-relatedness designated by Hegelian phenomenology and logic. This 
type of otherness is one that ‘1’ distinguish from myself and is, as a consequence, an 
otherness speculatively identified as the same as myself. Levinas cites the following 
passage from Hegel:
‘1 distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is 
distinguished from myself is not different [from me], 1, the selfsame being, repel 
myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or as unlike me, is 
immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction for me.’70 *10
61 O.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia logic, #24, p.58
“  Hegel writes: T o  subiate' (Aujhehen) has a twofold meaning, to preserve, to maintain, and. to 
cease, lo pul an end to .. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved. '(Science o f Logic, p. 107) 
and: 'We ought..to recognise here the speculative spirit of language, which transcends the ‘eithcr-or of 
mete understanding ' (The Encyclopaedia logic, #96. add., p. 154 
m G. W.F. Hegel. Science o f  Utgic, p. 107
10 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f  Spirit, #164, p l02 , cited by E. Levinas. Totality and Infinity, 
pp.36-7
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For Hegel, I alter myself immanently by at once negating myself and identifying 
myself in the difference from myself. Negation is understood as the movement 
whereby distinctions are allowed to immanently emerge, and 1 at once recover myself 
in these distinctions. In this way, negativity functions as the negation of negation; by 
negating what is posited as other negativity constitutes the Same or the identity of the 
I. Thus the attempt to think the Other seems integral to the structural constitution of 
the Same and therefore bound to a type of violence against alterity. For Levinas, 
whether the Same as the ‘I’ is fully established by its mundane experience or stands 
apart from it in contemplation, it nonetheless forms a closed circuit with the world 
and stands in relations of continuity with the world. He writes:
‘The way of the I against the ‘other’ of the world consists in sojourning, in identifying 
oneself by existing here at home with oneself. In a world which is from the first other 
the 1 is nonetheless autochthonous. It is the very reversion of this alternation. It finds 
in the world a site and a home. Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself.'1'
In phenomenological terms, experience for the Same is always then the result of a 
variable fit between intention and something which does not refract or deflect that 
intention To the Same and the Other understood in this way Levinas introduces the 
notion of the absolutely Other (which he will also call the infinite and the 
transcendent). This notion of the absolutely Other is beyond the Same; it is neither the 
T  nor the (false) other (falsely) distinguished from this ‘I’: ‘The Other cannot be 
contained by me: he is unthinkable -  he is infinite and recognised as such. This 
recognition is not produced as a thought, but is produced as a morality.’71 2
The Other is identified by Levinas with the notion o f  infinity; the Other, both within 
and without the order of being, thus escapes all measure by my reflection. However, 
given the characterisation of the Same, Levinas immediately poses the question: ‘How 
can the Same, produced as egoism, enter into relationship with an other without 
immediately divesting it o f its alterity?’71
71 E. Levinas, Ibid, p.37
72 Ibid, p.230 
11 Ibid, p.38
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For Levinas any explicit protest against totality on behalf of subjectivity is structurally 
identical to the promotion of the Same within Hegelianism. This was the point argued 
for by our previous discussion of specific elements of Kierkegaard’s anti- 
Hegelianism. Thus, Levinas writes that ‘it is not I who resist the system, as 
Kierkegaard thought; it is the other’.74 For him it is not the thought of subjective 
existence that promises the escape from the totality but the approach of the infinite or 
the Other The absolutely Other (i.e. the transcendent face of the Other) is a being that 
is other by itself without its otherness depending on its being primarily distinguished 
from and by the ‘1’. It is neither straightforwardly or dialectically identical with this 
CF. It represents a radical interruption of the continuous flow o f ‘my’ existence in the 
world without that interruption necessarily being brought about by an ‘empirical’ 
force in the way Feuerbach claims. By no longer depending on any distinction from 
and within the Same, the difference between the I and the absolutely Other cannot be 
sustained as a difference following from an antecedent sameness or commonality. He 
writes that the absolutely Other is: ‘the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with 
oneself. . .Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, 
even if 1 have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my site.’75 The absolutely Other 
is a being that stands beyond every attribute, ‘which would precisely have the effect 
to qualify him, that is, to reduce him to what is common to him and other beings’ 7<> 
Alterity is not attributable to a being fundamentally the same as me The thought of 
the absolutely Other is thus a thought of original difference, i.e. a difference 
preceding, and irreducible to, the integration of the I and its intrinsic other in the 
Same in asserting separation to be original, Levinas stands opposed to a thought for 
which difference (as the distinction between the Same and the Other) signals and 
results from a fall from primordial unity Separation is not a matter of the distinction 
between two finite terms that mutually limit and therefore immanently define the 
finitude of each other. An example that Levinas cites would be the Hegelian 
speculative dialectic of lordship and bondage77 where each limits the other and is at 
the same time integral to defining the identity of the Other; i.e the master is lord only 
when recognised as such by the slave that the lord is not, and vice versa
14 Ibid, p.4()
”  lbid.p.39 
w Ibid, p.74
V See Hegel. Ibid, #I7H-I96. pp I I I - I I 9
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‘Self consciousness. . .must proceed to supersede the other independent being in order 
thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly in so doing it 
proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself. ’7*
For Levinas, if separation is to respect the alterity of the absolutely Other, this Other 
must not arise on the border or limit that distinguishes while at the same time defining 
finite beings. Such separation is the distance in and through which the absolutely 
Other appears. By not being defined by its opposite, the absolutely Other is distinct 
without this distance depending on its relation to another term Unlike other distances 
the distance of the transcendent is not relative to a finite term that it would limit, 
rather, it is constitutive of the transcendent itself. Consequently, it is in keeping with 
these strictures of distance that Levinas wants us to understand the ‘and’ of Totality 
and Infinity, thus the ‘and’ is a non-conjuctive conjunction, i.e. it presents the Same 
with what remains at a distance from it. In admitting a conjunction with what it cannot 
join (since it is given in distance) the Same must renounce its claim to totality. Since 
the absolutely Other remains forever in distance without limiting the Same, Levinas 
writes that ‘this separation is not simply a negation [it] opens upon the idea of 
infinity.’79
With this notion o f Infinity Levinas opposes the Hegelian notion of the Infinite that 
becomes truly infinite by negating the finitude that opposes it. As Hegel writes in the
Science o f Logic.
‘The Infinite ..is, in fact, the process in which it is deposed to being only one of its 
determinations, the opposite of the finite, and so to being itself only one of the finîtes, 
and then raising this its difference from itself into the affirmation of itself and through 
this mediation becoming the true infinite.’*0
™ ibid. #179-1 ho, p . I l l
lq E. Levinas, Ibid, p.105
*' G.W.F. Hegel, Science oflMgic, p. 148
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Hence, Hegel’s genuine infinite is that from which nothing is separate and is posited 
as being the most real since it grasps or comprehends, within its own negation, every 
other:
‘The image of true infinity, bent back into itself, becomes the circle, the line which 
has reached itself, which is closed and wholly present, without beginning and end 
True infinity taken thus generally as determinate being which is posited as affirmative 
in contrast to the abstract negation, is reality in a higher sense than the former reality 
which was simply determinate, for here it has acquired a concrete content. It is not the 
finite which is the real, but the infinite. Thus reality is further determined as essence, 
Notion, Idea, and so on.’81
In an entry written for the Encyclopaedia Universalis in 1968 on the topic o f ‘Infinity’ 
Levinas clearly confirms this understanding of Hegel’s thought:
‘The thought of thought is the infinite. But the surpassing o f the given knowable -  
which Hegel calls negativity -  is a process of determination. Its result is the concept. 
Hegel showed, precisely, that negativity is a determination and that determination is 
not completed with the limit o f  the defined and with exclusion: that it is a totalization 
absorbing the other, or, concretely, the efficacious action o f  Reason in history The 
singularity of consciousness itself is but the labour of the infinite inserting itself into 
the datum The totality is not a piling up nor an addition o f beings: it can only be 
conceived of as absolute thought that, without any other thing being an obstacle to it, 
affirms itself as absolute freedom, i.e. act, efficacious thought qua thought, actual 
freedom. . . In Hegel’s Logic, contrary to the conception of the classical thinkers, the 
finite is not determinable in itself, but only in its passage to the other ..It is the very 
mode according to which the infinite is revealed But it is the fact of revealing itself, 
knowledge, that is the event o f  the Absolute itself’”
In contrast to the genuine infinite of Hegel’s thought, Levinas argues for an 
understanding of infinity as that which precedes and exceeds all comprehension and is
Ibid. p i  49
E. Levinas, ‘Infinity’ in Alter) ti  el Transcendence (Fata Morgana, 1995) in English as Alterity and 
Transcendence, translated by M B. Smith (London: The Alhlonc Press. 1999), pp. 70-1
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excluded from a supposedly limitless totality.83 Indeed, Levinas’s understanding of 
infinity is firmly situated in the religious tradition of the idea of infinity 84 As infinity 
the absolutely Other escapes comprehension not because it is simply lacking from the 
same but because it precedes and overflows it; ‘Infinity overflows the thought that 
thinks it. Its very infinition is produced in this overflowing.’85 Levinas describes the 
preceding, overflowing or exceeding of the Same as an ab-solution of the absolute. In 
other words, this exceptional idea of infinity is conceived as a relation with the 
absolutely Other that does not render the Other as merely internal or relative. It is a 
notion of a relation with the Other that respects the Other’s absolution from every 
relation it enters. Since for Hegel negativity is understood as a structurally 
constitutive element of reason, the absolutely Other or infinite cannot be, Levinas 
claims, fully comprehended by reference to traditional notions of negativity. For 
Levinas, since affirmation and negation (the yes and no) remain negative 
determinations of each other, neither is capable of comprehending the absolutely 
Other or Infinity. Thus it is in the context of the attempt to distinguish the absolutely 
Other from the determinate negation of opposition that Levinas re-introduces a novel 
and radical form of skeptical ‘negativity’. This form of skeptical ‘negativity’ claims 
not to function as a merely internal negative element of the Same, l.e. it claims not to 
function as a principle of ultimate coherence in the manner of Hegel, but as a radical 
delirium
Derrida, in his first text on Levinas, describes this skeptical form of negativity as the 
‘nature of Levinas’s writing...to progress by negations, and by negation against 
negation Its proper route is not that of an “either this , or that”, but of a “neither
><< Indeed, Levinas denies that his position is reducible to Hegel's notion of the bad infinite. In an 
interview published in 199$ he makes precisely this point: ‘Cette constation de ne pas ¿tre quitte 
désigne dans Totalité et infini non pas le grand chilîrc, ou l'infini mauvais de Hegel. Le mauvais infini 
de Hegel, l'ctcctcra. c ’est ce qui conduit toujours plus loin, et dés qu'on est obligé de conduire toujours 
plus loin, on pense déjà l'idée de l'infini. Mais la relation à Autrui n'est pas toujours la même. 
L'ctcétcra de Hegel dilapide l’infini qui est inclus. Chaque pas qui n'est pus terminé n'est pas le même 
pas. et il n'est jamais terminé. C'est dans ce sens précis que je comprends le concept de l'infini son 
rapport à l'autre, et assumer la responsabilité ne signifie pas. par conséquent, de constater la singularité. 
Elle est toujours l'agir (l'action), l’ctrc-coupablc. C'est une culpabilité sans crime.' ('Emmanuel 
Levinas : Visage et violence première (phénoménologie de l'éthique) - Une interview’ in lœ  
Différence comme Non-lndifference T'.thique et Altérité chez h'.mmanuel Levinas -  Sous la direction 
D’Amo Munster (Paris, Éditions Kimé, 1995), p. 138
84 Sec Levinas’s comments at the end of his article on ‘Infinity’ in Altérité el Transcendence (Fata 
Morgana, 1995) in English as Alterity and Transcendence, translated by M B. Smith (London: The 
Athlonc Press. 1999), p.76
85 E. Levinas, Ibid, p.25
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this nor that’” .86 Derrida clearly recognises Levinas’s claim that neither 
straightforwardly affirmative nor negative propositions are able to contain or conceive 
the absolutely Other. Thus Levinas’s philosophical discourse proceeds as a radical 
type of skepticism, containing as it does an excessive abundance of negations in order 
to proceed ‘otherwise than’ the Hegelian speculative dialectic 87 The Levinasian 
neither/nor does not contain or aim to secure an affirmation by its negation (as the 
Hegelian principle of determinate negation does); as such it is an infinitely disruptive 
negation (or a negation ad infinitum) that traces out the persistent recurrence of a 
skeptical interruption. Levinas’s form of critical skepticism represents a disruptive 
interruption coming from the absolutely Other or the infinite, and such a form of 
negation never finally determines that Other or infinite, rather it originates from the 
approach of the Other. Indeed the proximity to the Other represents for Levinas a 
‘relation’ without determinate negativity and is a ‘relation’ that avoids becoming a 
constitutive element within the Same. This ‘relation without relation’ is proposed by 
Levinas as the essence o f ‘discourse’ and ‘dialogue’. Succeeding sections of Totality 
and Infinity expand upon this supra-ontological significance, beneath or below the 
Same’s constitution of the experience of the Other, as one of response to the Other’s 
summons and speech with him.
Discourse and dialogue are ‘prior to the negative or affirmative proposition; it first 
institutes language, where neither the no nor the yes is the first word. The description 
of this relation is the central issue of the present research ,88 For Levinas, the ‘object’ 
that is the ‘face of the other’ is, indeed, the only ‘object’ I ever encounter that 
signifies actively and verbally, and whose signification is both summons and 
interdiction The face presents the performativity that summons an ethical response 
that has priority vis-à-vis the circle o f representation:
86 J. Derrida. ‘Violence and Metaphysics. An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’ in Hriling 
and Difference, translated, with an introduction and additional notes by A. Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978), p.9<)
K Hegel writes: ‘When the dialectic has the negative as its result, then precisely as a result, this 
negative is at the same time the positive, for it contains what it resulted from sublalcd within itself, and 
it cannot be without it. This, however, is the basic determination of.. .the speculative or positively 
rational.' (The Encyclopaedia Dixie. #81. add 2. p . l i l )
“  E. Levinas. Ibid, p.142
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‘The relation between the Same and the Other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted 
as conversation, where the Same, gathered up in its ipseity as an ‘I’, as a particular 
existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself.’89
Faced with the Other, the Same is unavoidably and incessantly in Society with the 
Other The Same cannot rid itself of the Other’s face, neither through comprehension, 
partial negation and assimilation or total negation and murder. The Same respects the 
Other by giving itself to the Other in and through language and discourse For Levinas 
the very essence of language is ethical not only because it announces the inviolability 
of the Other but because language itself is structured as generosity -  it designates 
things for the Other. Language is primordially an act o f generosity that responds to 
the advent of the face by offering my world to him. In offering what is mine to the 
Other, language is not preceded by community or commonality but is the foundation 
upon which the world is put in common:
‘To recognise the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed 
things, but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality.. To 
speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces. Language does not 
refer to the generality of concepts but lays the foundation for a possession in
,9 0common.
The encounter with the Other thus opens the possibility o f approaching the absolutely 
Other without the conditions which constitute the Same. The relation described by 
Levinas brings together the Same and the absolutely Other without constitutive 
speculative and determinate negativity. Since it precedes all questions asked of it, the 
presence of the face arises from itself and it presents itself absolutely. It is not an other 
merely relative to us By expressing itself, the absolutely Other reveals itself, and with 
the notion of expression Levinas is able to describe the way the absolutely Other 
presents itself as Other. This auto-signification of the Other entails the disruption of 
the constitutive structures o f the Same; indeed Levinas claims that the auto- 
signification of the Other (the face) is the very origin o f all signification. In other 
words there would be no signification where the Same had not always already been
““ Ibid p.148 
*’ Ibid, p.76
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interrupted or breached by the presence of the Other. By expressing itself before 
having been disclosed, the expression o f the face bears its own meaning and is the 
very production of meaning:
‘Language is a relation between separated terms. To the one the Other can indeed 
present himself as theme, but his presence is not reabsorbed in his status as a theme 
The word that bears on the Other as a theme seems to contain the Other. But already it 
is said to the Other who, as interlocutor, has quit the theme that encompassed him, 
and upsurges inevitably behind the said.,9'
Ethics, the non-violent approach of the Other, is presupposed and encountered only in 
speech with the Other In language the Other is inviolable because, as the interlocutor, 
he ‘upsurges inevitably behind the said, which pretends to grasp it within the Same ,9i 
In addition to announcing the incomprehensibility of the Other, language is essentially 
an ethical acknowledgement of the incomprehensible presence o f  the Other. Levinas 
will claim later in Totality and Infinity that this acknowledgement is generosity, the 
‘offering which language is.’9’
As we explored earlier in this thesis, for Hegel language also marks the passage from 
the immediate here and now of the thing possessed into the universal Like Hegel, 
Levinas believes that language cannot utter the particular or sensuous thing, what is 
mine and what I mean, and in fact marks the very entry of the thing into the sphere of 
the universal or the general. However, for Levinas, language dispossesses me o f what 
is mine not simply by the act of designating the thing, of uttering it, as Hegel argues, 
but because ‘in designating a thing, I designate it to Autrui T his act of designating 
modifies my relation of enjoyment and possession with things, places things in the 
perspective of Autrui . .The word that designates things attests their apportionment 
between me and the Others.’91 *4 On Levinas’s reading of designation, a thing is 
designated only insofar as it is given to the Other. The act of utterance, designation is
91 Ibid. p. 193
”  Ibid. p.1‘25
M Ibid. p. 174 See J. Llewelyn. ‘Levinas and language' in Appositions o f  Jacques Derrida and 
Emmanuel te  vinas (Bloomington ft Indianapolis: Indiana U P , 2002), pp. I64-I7H and K. Ziarck. 
‘Semantics of Proximity: language and the Other in the Philosophy or Emmanuel Levinas' in 
Research in I’henomenoloyy, Vol. XIX, pp.211-247
94 Ibid, p.209
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not the act of subjectivity ascending to the universal in and through the dialectical 
negation of particularity and otherness; rather, it presupposes the presentation of the 
Other, the upsurge of language in the face, to which every act of designation 
responds. In other words, language, generosity, is essentially a response to the 
presence o f the face in speech. By designating the thing that 1 possess, language gives 
it to the Other, and in doing so it institutes the order of the universal or general where 
things can be shared and held in common. Thus for Levinas language confers 
universality to the particular sensuous thing only insofar as language is essentially the 
gift of what is mine to the Other. On his reading generalisation (the becoming 
universal o f the thing in the world) is not what is entered when language negates what 
is mine, the sensuous thing. Rather things become general in language simply because 
language offers what is mine to the Other, dispossesses me, thereby ‘putting in 
common a world hitherto mine’.95 In this way, Totality and Infinity provides an 
ethical explanation of how language generalises. Language generalises and 
universalises insofar as it puts the world in common; but such putting in common is 
an essentially ethical event (if ethics is understood as the donation of what is mine to 
the Other).
By disclosing the irreducibly ethical essence o f discourse Levinas argues that the 
fundamental essence of ‘idealism is refused’.96 Discourse and language are not, he 
insists, limited to the Hegelian maieutic awakening of thoughts common to beings; ‘it 
does not accelerate the inward maturation of a reason common to all; it teaches and 
introduces the new into a thought. The introduction of the new into a thought, the idea 
of infinity, is the very work of reason’ 97 Since reason commences with discourse the 
subject does not ‘abdicate’ his unicity’, rather it confirms his separation. The passage 
to the rational, as conceived by Totality and Infinity, is not the Hegelian dis- 
individuation (i.e. the negating of the subject’s particularity) precisely because it is 
language, that is, language necessarily understood as a response to the being who in a 
face speaks to the subject and tolerates only a personal response, i.e. an ethical act. 
The passage to the rational is precisely the passage to hyper-ethico individuation for 
Levinas. *91
95 Ibid, p.174 
*  Ibid, p.216
91 Ibid, p.2ISI
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In his first text on Levinas, entitled ‘Violence and Metaphysics’9*, Derrida also 
evokes this solicitation of the infinity of the Other (the otherwise than Being) within 
discourse as the very essence of Levinas’s work. Derrida insists that Levinas ‘does not 
seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather 
the essence o f the ethical relation in general ...an Ethics o f Ethics’99. For Derrida this 
Ethics of Ethics is enacted by Levinas’s work as a radical critical essence (what we 
argue should be recognised as Levinas’s radical reconfiguration of skepticism) 
summoning us ‘to depart from the Greek site’ and towards ‘what is no longer a source 
or a site’100 The non-violent relationship to the infinitely Other is the only way of 
opening the space of transcendence and of liberating metaphysics; for Levinas it 
‘makes us dream of an inconceivable process of dismantling and dispossession’.101 
This ‘opening of opening’ cannot be enclosed within any category or totality and 
cannot be described by any traditional concepts; rather, it represents a destabilising 
negativity beyond the soberness of the Hegelian dialectic. It is an attempt to articulate 
a thinking o f ‘original difference’. However, Derrida’s commentary upon this 
solicitation towards original difference traced by Levinas’s work posits a number of 
powerful concerns associated with the very nature of Levinas’s textuality and its 
relationship to Husserl, Heidegger and Hegel102 Derrida’s concerns are focussed on 
problems seemingly inherent within Levinas’s textuality, given its insistence upon 
opposing ontological thinkers o f the western philosophical tradition. Such problems 
emerge from Levinas’s efforts to think and solicit a non-ontological and pre-original 
un-condition necessarily within an irreducibly ontological language We will proceed 
by examining the concerns that Derrida raises concerning Levinas's articulation of 
‘original difference’ as a genuine critical and ethical force of skepticism opposed to 
Hegelianism His suspicion will be that Levinas is unable to ultimately disentangle
* J. Derrida. 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel levinas' in Wriliny 
and Difference, translated, with an introduction and additional notes by A. Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 1978), pp 79-153 
w Ibid.p i l l  
lon Ibid, p.82 
"" Ibid
">2 We will focus only upon Derrida's concerns regarding lxvinas's opposition to Hegelianism and 
ignore Derrida's many penetrating analyses of Ucvirlus's relationship to Husserl and Heidegger 
Furthermore, wc will focus on only one of those concerns regarding Hegel, identity and difference, at 
the expense of many other Hcgcliun concerns voiced by Derrida. The reasons for this concern the 
relevance to our argument here and the overall limitations concerning space in this thesis. It is our 
conviction that the other Hegelian concerns arc both powerful and suggestive, and would merit an 
exhaustive treatment at some point in the future.
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V - Derrida’s ‘Violence and Metaphysics’
Derrida’s first essay on Levinas, entitled ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, claims that it 
does not posit a sustained and systematic critique of Levinas’s thought, but poses 
‘several questions’ which are ‘the questions put to us by Levinas’103. These questions, 
Derrida claims, are primarily ‘questions of language and the question of language’104, 
and as such ‘already belong to his own interior dialogue’105. The function of Derrida’s 
early commentary on Levinas’s work (a commentary that spans Levinas’s The Theory 
of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology106 to ‘The Trace of the Other’107) is to 
emphasise the need for philosophical vigilance by drawing Levinas’s attention to the 
intrinsic limits of philosophical discourse and recalling the sense in which it is an 
irreducibly Greek conceptuality. Derrida argues that there is an ‘indestructible and 
unforeseeable resource of the Greek logos’, namely its ‘power of envelopment, by 
which he who attempts to repel it would always already be overtaken’108 Despite 
acknowledging Levinas’s awareness of these inevitable difficulties (it would be one 
the questions implicitly ‘put to us’ by Levinas) Derrida does not seem satisfied that 
Levinas’s work is as acutely aware as it should be, particularly when it is concerned 
with displacing Hegel’s speculative idealism. Derrida argues:
‘Let us confess our total deafness to propositions of this type: ‘Being occurs as 
multiple, and as divided into Same and Other. This is its ultimate structure.’ (Totality 
and Infinity). What is the division of being between the Same and the Other? Is it a 
division between the Same and the Other, which does not suppose, at very least, that 
the Same is the Other’s other, and the Other the Same as oneself?’109
Derrida’s deafness to these types of proposition put forward by Levinas is part of a 
strategy concerned with demonstrating Levinas’s actual (and perhaps unsuspected)
Ibid. p.K4 
104 Ibid. p. 109 
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Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, translated by A. Oriannc (Evanston: Northwestern U.P. 1973)
107 E. Levinas. ‘La trace de l'autre' in Tijdschrifl voor THosofle, Sep 1963. in English as 'The Trace of 
the Other', translated by A. Lingis. in Deconstruction in Context, cd. M.C. Taylor (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. I9tt6) pp 345-339 
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proximity to ‘him who stands most accused in the trial conducted by Totality and 
Infinity'"0, namely Hegel. Despite Derrida’s agreement with Levinas for the need to 
go ‘beyond’ Hegel, and the fact that he has an overall sympathy with Levinas’s efforts 
to ‘make the very difficult passage beyond the debate, which is also a complicity, 
between Hegelianism and classical anti-Hegelianism’111, he asserts that ‘as soon as he 
speaks against Hegel, Levinas can only confirm Hegel, has confirmed him already’112 
He attempts at various points throughout his commentary to demonstrate this 
proximity, complicity or vulnerability to Hegel within Levinas’s work by positing a 
series of problems for Levinas’s textuality upon explicitly Hegelian grounds. 
However, he does so only to demonstrate the extreme difficulty of disentangling 
philosophy from Hegel and to indicate, to a certain extent, Levinas’s own failure in 
that regard. He claims that these problems demonstrate that:
‘Levinas is very close to Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment 
when he is apparently opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion. This is a situation 
he must share with all anti-Hegelian thinkers, and whose final significance calls for 
much thought.’113
Derrida argues that Levinas has clearly been caught ‘dreaming the impossible dream’, 
or of walking a path that is forever blocked, a path beyond the questionableness of 
philosophy that leads to what can neither he nor be thought Levinas is dreaming of an 
absolutely wholly Other, as an infinity, an other which is absolutely exterior to, and 
which shatters the bounds of reason In this respect Derrida argues that Levinasian 
ethics represents a kind of continuity with empiricism, i.e. a view of the self-other 
relation as strangely devoid of interpersonal content and even as resembling the 
process by which (on an empiricist account) we acquire knowledge through exposure 
to the stream of incoming sensory data:
‘The true name of this inclination of thought to the Other, o f this resigned acceptance 
of the incoherent incoherence inspired by a truth more profound than the “logic” of 
philosophical discourse, the true name o f this renunciation of the concept, of the a
1,0 Ibid, p.84
111 Ibid, p. 111
112 Ibid,i n  n  - .
prions and transcendental horizons of language, is empiricism. . . It is the dream of a 
purely heterological thought at its source. A pure thought of pure difference. 
Empiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical pretention or modesty. We say 
dream because it must vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens.’" 4
By arguing that Levinas’s thought is akin to empiricism Derrida suggests an affinity 
between Levinas’s ethics o f the Other and Feuerbach’s post-Hegelian empiricism, ‘a 
confrontation of Levinas’s thought with Feuerbach’s anti-Hegelianism would 
necessarily uncover, it seems to us, more profound convergences and affinities.’115 He 
argues that what Levinas calls the positive infinity of the infinitely Other is similar to 
Feuerbach’s notion of sensuous being, ‘unthinkable, impossible, unutterable’, and 
adds, ‘perhaps Levinas calls us toward this ‘unthinkable-impossible-unutterable 
beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos’116. He argues that if this is the case then it is 
not something that one is able either to say or think. Hence:
‘The attempt to achieve an opening toward the beyond of philosophical discourse, by 
means of a philosophical discourse, which can never be shaken off completely, cannot 
possibly succeed within language.’" 7
However, Levinas clearly affirms language by asserting his thought of the Other in 
philosophical discourse. For Derrida there is a suspicion that Levinas repeats a gesture 
intrinsic to all forms of empiricism or absolutely heterological thought (a gesture 
understood well by Hegel himself), namely that it ‘always forgets, at the very least, 
that it employs the words “to be’” "*. For Derrida Levinas’s arguments amount to the 
claim that a non-violent language is a language that does without the verb “to be”, it is 
a language without predication, ‘a language of pure invocation, pure adoration, 
proffering only proper nouns in order to call to the Other from afar. In effect, such a 
language would be purified of all rhetoric. . .purified of every verb.’" 9 Derrida asks 
whether such a language would still deserve its name as a language. Claiming to 
follow the Greeks, he argues that ‘there is no Logos which does not suppose the
1,4 Ibid, p.lSl 
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interlacing of nouns and verbs.’130 Thus, Levinas would seemingly not only claim to 
posit an Ethics without determinate laws but also a language, i.e a saying, without 
phrase However, there cannot be any language, Derrida claims, ‘which does not pass 
through the violence of the concept’131. His attention is entirely focused upon 
Levinas’s articulation of the absolutely wholly other, given the structures, restrictions 
and necessity of conceptuality, ‘the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional 
conceptuality in order to deconstruct it.’133
Part of Derrida’s efforts consist in bringing Levinas’s account o f the ‘absolute Other’ 
into proximity with Hegel’s discussion of Absolute Difference in the Science o f  
Logic His aim is to disclose the unsuspected difficulties and complications within 
Levinas’s articulation, or necessary conceptualisation, of the absolutely wholly Other. 
Derrida’s claim is quite straightforward -  Levinas underestimates the profound 
plasticity and force of the Hegelian dialectic. For him Levinas’s discourse is 
necessarily and inescapably entangled within Hegel’s dialectic of Identity and 
Difference by virtue of the fact that it is a discourse; it cannot be ‘beyond’ or 
‘exterior’ to dialectic since such a dialectic expresses something intrinsic to the very 
nature of discourse.
Hegel in the Science o f Ixtgic demonstrates the development of an internal relation 
between identity and difference. This development occurs in such a way that each 
passes into the other and thus conjoin in a principle Hegel terms ‘Contradiction’. 
Hegel’s immanent logical revision o f identity and difference claims to disclose the 
very structure of ‘identity within difference’ that is for Hegel so definitive of 
authentic Spirit. Hegel begins his demonstration by arguing that the category of 
‘identity’ is immediately a simple self-sameness, which is usually considered as being 
exclusive of difference. Hegel indicates, however, that when such a simple and 
immediate self-relation is considered it becomes apparent that such abstract ‘self- 
identity’ is fundamentally inseparable from absolute difference Such an abstract self­
relation is necessarily mediated by an opposition to and absolute negation of
12,1 Ibid
121 Ibid
122 Ibid, p i l l
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‘difference’, and by affirming itself as an identity it negates itself and becomes its 
‘opposite’ - namely ‘difference’.
‘This identity is... the negation that immediately negates itself, a non-being and 
difference that vanishes in its arising, or a distinguishing by which nothing is 
distinguished, but which immediately collapses within itself. The distinguishing is the 
positing o f non-being as non-being of the other But the non-being of the Other is 
sublation of the other and therewith of the distinguishing itself. Here, then, 
distinguishing is present as self-related negativity, as a non-being that is the non-being 
of itself, a non-being which has its non-being not in another but in its own self. What 
is present, therefore, is self-related, reflected difference, or pure, absolute difference. 
In other words, identity is the reflection-into-itself that is identity only as internal 
repulsion, and is this repulsion and reflection-into-self, repulsion that immediately 
takes itself back into itself Thus it is identity as difference that is identical with 
itself . Identity, therefore, is in Us own self absolute non-identity.’m
Conversely, difference considered as immediate, pure or absolute (what Derrida refers 
to as ‘external difference’) is indistinguishable from identity. Difference defines itself 
immediately by opposing itself to its opposite, identity:
‘Difference is the negativity which reflection has within it, the nothing which is said 
in enunciating identity, the essential moment of identity which, as negativity of itself, 
determines itself and is distinguished from difference.. This difference is difference 
in and/or itself absolute difference, the difference of essence. It is difference in and 
for itself...self related, therefore simple difference , as such, it is the negativity of 
itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself from itself, it is not itself but its other 
But that which is different from difference is identity. Difference is therefore itself 
and identity.’124
Since Hegel has shown that identity is inherently difference, he shows that by relating 
itself to its apparent opposite, difference really relates to itself Thus relation to ‘other’ 
turns out to be ‘self-relation*. In the act of affirming itself, difference likewise negates
m  G.W.F. Hegel. Science o f  l/Ogtc. pp4l2-4l t  
124 Ibid, p.417
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itself and becomes its opposite - ‘identity’. Thus, ‘identity’ (which is in-itself 
difference) and ‘difference’ (which is in-itself identity) conjoin in ‘Contradiction’, 
which Hegel shows is the identity o f ‘identity’ and ‘difference’:
‘Each has an indifferent self-subsistence of its own through the fact that it has within 
itself the relation to its other moment; it is thus the whole, self-contained opposition. 
As this whole, each is mediated with itself by its other and contains it. But further, it 
is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other, thus it is a unity existing on its 
own and it excludes the other from itself. . . This consists in containing within itself its 
opposite determination -  through which alone it is not a relation to something external 
-  but no less immediately in the fact that it is itself, and also excludes from itself the 
determination that is negative to it. It is thus contradiction.’125
Inasmuch as identity and difference necessarily include their opposites within 
themselves, they are, Hegel argues, inherently self-contradictory. Derrida’s claim is 
that by hypostatizing difference as absolute alterity Levinas is at risk o f repeating the 
kind of abstraction that Hegel disparages as opinion or ‘external reflection’ whereby 
‘such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and 
alongside it, difference’126 Levinas thus risks a certain naivety in the face of the 
Hegelian dialectic, and as such risks merely restating what Hegel has already argued, 
i.e. the contradictory result of hypostatising, through a notion o f ‘separation’, absolute 
self-identity and absolute difference. For Derrida ‘Hegel’s critique o f  the concept of 
pure difference is for us here doubtless, the most uncircumventable theme ’127 Derrida 
makes an analogous point regarding Levinas’s reformulation of a non-negative notion 
of infinity. Again Derrida suspects that Levinas rather naively posits a notion of 
positive infinity without being aware of the degree to which he risks merely 
hypostatising infinity and repeating (through abstraction) an element of Hegel’s own 
speculative analysis. Derrida insists upon the impossibility of designating, within 
discourse, a non-negative notion of the infinite (i.e. as Levinas claims with his notion 
of the infinite alterity o f the Other). For Derrida the designation o f the infinite is 2
l2'  Ibid, p.43l
¡“ O.W.F. Hegel. Ibid, p.412
127 J. Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics', footnote 91, p i 20
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necessarily achieved through a negation of the finite; thus infinity cannot be 
conceived as Other except in terms of the //»-finite. He argues:
‘As soon as one attempts to think infinity as a positive plenitude (one pole of 
Levinas’s non-negative transcendence), the other becomes unthinkable, impossible, 
unutterable. Perhaps Levinas calls us toward this unthinkable-impossible-unutterable 
beyond (traditions) Being and Logos. But it must not be possible either to think or 
state this call.’128
Hegel’s notion o f the bad or spurious infinite'29 is of an infinite defined by its 
negative opposition to finitude. Such an infinite is in fact a limited being. For Hegel 
this notion of infinity is spurious simply because it is finite and thought has clearly 
not yet isolated a genuine thought of infinity. Levinas would seem to agree with 
Hegel regarding the spurious nature of this infinite (i .e. that the genuine infinity of the 
alterity of the Other is not to be conceived merely through a negative relation to the 
finitude of the same), but argues that Hegel’s genuine infinity also represents a 
spurious infinite. Yet Derrida suspects that the Hegelian notion of the spurious infinite 
inevitably ‘haunts numerous gestures of denunciation’ in Totality and Infinity. By 
conceiving genuine alterity as essentially non-negative Levinas claims that the Other 
is a genuine positive infinity and that the realm o f the Same is constituted negatively 
as a false-infinity. However, Derrida asks the Hegelian question of how the alterity of 
the Other is to be separated from the ‘negativity’ of false infinity and how absolute 
Sameness is to be conceived in any terms other than infinity. Thus he asks:
‘If, as Levinas says, the Same is a violent totality, this would mean that it is a finite 
totality, and therefore is abstract more other than the other (than an other totality), etc. 
The Same as finite totality would not be the Same, but still the Other. Levinas would 
be speaking of the Other under the rubric o f the Same, and of the Same under the 
rubric of the Other, etc. If the finite totality was the Same, it could not be thought, or
,2* J. Derrida, Ibid, p. 114
'21 A notion that Hegel describes in the Science o f Ijjgic -  The spurious inlinity is in itself the same 
thing as the perennial ought; it is the negation of the finite it is true, but it cannot in truth free itself 
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posed as such, without becoming other than itself (and this is war). If it did not do so, 
it could not enter into war with others (finite totalities), nor could it be violent. 
Henceforth, not being violent, it would not be the same in Levinas’s sense (finite 
totality) Entering into war -  and war there is -  it is conceived, certainly, as the 
Other’s Other, that is, it gains access to the Other as an Other (self) But again, it is no 
longer a totality in Levinas’s sense. In this language, which is the only language of 
western philosophy, can one not repeat Hegelianism, which is only the language 
coming into absolute possession of itself ’1,0
Levinas’s fault with regard to Hegel is not that his ‘ethics’ seeks to effect a breach or 
interruption of the conceptual totality, indeed that effort is precisely his virtue for 
Derrida (‘It is at this level that the thought of Emmanuel Levinas can make us 
tremble’111). The spirit of the effort is something that they undeniably share 
However, his fault resides in neglecting the complexities involved in having to 
necessarily lodge an account of the absolutely Other within traditional conceptuality 
in order to effect a breach of ontology from within discourse. Levinas seriously 
underestimates the power, plasticity and force of the Hegelian dialectic by operating 
with overdetermined hypostatised categories Ultimately he risks a naive anti- 
Hegelianism by failing to recognise the extent to which Hegelianism represents the 
language of philosophy ‘coming into absolute possession of itself. By repeating 
gestures inherent within the Hegelian dialectic Levinas risks becoming enveloped 
back within the immanence of Hegelianism. For Derrida the price of escaping Hegel 
is persistent vigilance when bringing oneself back within philosophical 
conceptualisation to articulate a breach o f ontology. There has to be vigilance in 
effecting this breach so that one avoids the philosophical naivety of hypostatising 
notions of absolute difference and infinity. It is a question of being far more attentive 
than perhaps Levinas is to the way Hegel’s dialectic aligns itself with, and brings to 
completion, the ability of discourse to repair tears, wounds and breaches to its rational 
fabric. For Derrida it is a question of an ongoing effort to affect a breach, an incessant 
and recurrent effort rather than an absolute breach it is in this sense that Derrida
”°J. Derrida. Ibid. p. 119
1,1 Ibid, p 82
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argues for an understanding o f ‘metaphysics’ as ‘economy’, where it is a question of 
‘violence against violence, light against light’.132
Despite Derrida’s suspicions regarding Levinas’s thought he acknowledges that his 
thought perhaps functions as a profound solicitation. He argues:
‘Nothing can so profoundly solicit the Greek logos - philosophy - that this irruption of 
the totally other; and nothing can to such an extent reawaken the logos to its origin as 
to its mortality, its other ’,33
For Derrida the profound solicitation which Levinas’s work performs (which he 
aligns with Judaism) itself solicits a reflection upon ‘the necessity in which this 
experience finds itself, the injunction by which it is ordered to occur as logos, and to 
reawaken the Greek in the autistic syntax of his own dream.’134 Ultimately Derrida’s 
Hegelian ‘critique’ indicates the extent of Levinas’s failure in this regard, and does 
not constitute Derrida’s adherence to Hegelianism. On the contrary Derrida merely 
believes himself to be attentive to the overwhelming ‘power’ of Hegelianism in the 
face of opposition, decision and assertion within philosophical discourse. In this sense 
his study should perhaps be read as a ‘supplement’ or ‘corrective’ to Levinas’s 
thought, or as an effort to be more Levinasian than Levinas. He indicates a certain 
necessity to remain self-consciously Hegelian; thus in order to pass ‘beyond’ Hegel it 
becomes necessary to inhabit Hegelianism, to discover what resists the Hegelian 
dialectic from within the dialectic and to ‘lodge’ oneself within ‘traditional 
conceptuality in order to deconstruct it.’135 Quite simply in order to posit a fracture in 
the Hegelian system it is never enough to simply criticise or oppose Hegel Rather, 
eschewing such strategy of direct opposition, Derrida advocates an indirect strategy 
that seeks to indicate the extent to which Hegel’s own interpretation can be 
reinterpreted against him, i.e. that the bellicosity of his own discourse, under the guise 
of an ‘irenics’, can itself be turned against him.
Ibid. p. 117 
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We will proceed by considering Levinas’s implicit response to the Hegelian concerns 
raised by Derrida in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’. This response, we will argue, 
consists largely of an invocation of a persistent and recurrent movement of skepticism 
in the face of philosophy.1,6
1 v> The claim that I evinas invokes the movement of skepticism as a specific response to some of the 
central concerns aniculalcd by Derrida in ‘Violence and Metaphysics' is also made by R. Bcrnasconi in 
his puper on Levinas and Skepticism. He argues -  ‘Levinas introduced the discussion of skepticism and 
its refutation... to address certain problems posed by his own exposition of the infinite. These problems 
were explored most thoroughly by Derrida in his 1964 essay ‘Violence and Metaphysics’... Whatever 
Derrida intended and however Levinas himself understood ‘Violence and Metaphysics', it was 
generally construed as a forceful critique and, as such, in need of some kind of answer. A case can be 
made on internal grounds that Derrida's essay played an important port in leading to |a | reformulation.* 
(R Bcmasconi. ‘Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy’, in R. Bcmasconi & S. Crilchlcy (cds ), He- 
Heating /.m m «  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1991) p. 153
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VI - Levinas and Skepticism
There are a number of places in Levinas’s later work where he appears to concede 
that the language of Totality and Infinity was perhaps too ontological, and that it 
tended to ontologically overdetermine the traces of enigma that signify ‘otherwise 
than being’. However, in his defence Levinas argues that its language was never 
totally definitive. He claims that the reliance upon an overly ontologically determined 
language emerged from a desire to ‘not be psychological’ 137 He did not want to be 
seen as merely characterising the psychological topology of an ‘unhappy 
consciousness’, but to outline that which is ‘more ontological than ontology, an 
emphasis of ontology’ l3S He argues that the very discourse of Totality and Infinity 
was ‘already a search for what 1 call “the beyond being”, the tearing of this equality to 
self which is always being.. .whatever the attempts to separate it from the present’.139 
Indeed, in an interview conducted in 1986, Levinas replies directly to a question 
concerning Derrida’s ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ by saying:
‘Derrida has reproached me for my critique of Hegelianism by saying that in order to 
criticise Hegel, one begins to speak Hegel’s language That is the basis o f his critique. 
To which 1 respond that for me, on the contrary, the Greek language is a language 
which does not imprint itself in what it says, and consequently that there is always the 
possibility of unsaying that to which you were obliged to have recourse in order to 
show something.’140
Indeed, Levinas had argued for such a view of language in the preface to Totality and 
Infinity. There he had argued that the work of the preface is essentially reflective of 
the essence of language, whereby language is ‘continually undoing its phrase by the 
foreword or the exegesis’141. He was o f course arguing against Hegel’s view that a 
preface to a philosophical work is superfluous. Thus Hegel writes:
1 E. Levinas, O f God Who Comes to Mind, p.82 
'*  Ibid, pp.87-8 
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14,1 R. Bcmasconi & D. Wood cds., The /Provocation o f  levinas 
New York: Routlcdgc, 1988), p.179 
141 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.JO
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‘Whatever might appropriately be said about philosophy in a preface... [cannot] be 
accepted as the way in which to expound philosophical truth.’142
What a preface indicates in Totality and Infinity and in Hegel is the very way 
language is necessitated to interrupt itself, how it must tear itself away from the fabric 
of immanence and address another. It unsays its said in an attempt to ‘restate without 
ceremonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable ceremony in which 
the said delights’.143 For Levinas this otherwise said is not superfluous; the attempt to 
stand outside of the philosophical text (i.e. the immanent development of 
presuppositionless science) and the maintenance of such an interruption, testifies to 
the essence of language as a Saying in the Said. The interruptive quality of Saying in 
the Said is not a dogmatic clutching or grasping onto naively pre-critical assumptions 
or a dogmatic refusal o f immanence; rather, it represents an ethical obligation to what 
Levinas terms the ‘gleam’ of exteriority or the ‘height’ of the other who stands 
forever ‘outside’, or ‘apart from’, the interlocutory relationship. He argues that this 
transcendence is within immanence insofar as it is the ‘other’ to whom immanence is 
ultimately to be addressed; an other necessarily standing outside of that immanence. 
Levinas’s philosophy is the attempt to thematise that unthematisable pre-original 
relation in order to articulate or express its unthematisability and irreducibility to 
immanence. Levinas appears to concede that the ‘ceremonial’ that constitutes his 
main thesis, i.e. the attempt to thematise the unthematisable, will have failed in its 
own terms and needs itself to be always unsaid, or interrupted. However, he argues, 
by failing it will again have testified to the truth of transcendence within immanence. 
Referring explicitly to this notion in relation to Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence, Levinas writes:
‘Saying must be accompanied immediately by an unsaying, and the unsaying must 
again be unsaid in its manner, and there is no stopping, there are no definitive 
formulations. It is for this reason that in [Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence]...1 call my conclusion ‘Otherwise Said” .144
143 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, Preface, p.
1,1 E. Levinas. Ibid, p.30
144 E. Levinas, O f (tod Who Comes to Mind, p.88
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Indeed, in addition to the claims made in the preface we also discover Levinas 
arguing that conclusions are never actually definitive ironically in the section of 
Totality and Infinity entitled ‘Conclusions’. Here he “concludes” that ‘philosophy is 
never a wisdom, for the interlocutor whom it has just encompassed has already 
escaped it.’145 We will argue that Levinas’s later work represents a profound 
continuity with this “conclusion” reached by Totality and Infinity regarding the 
‘beyond being’ that escapes philosophy. This continuity is transfigured by an 
increased level of hyperbole in the complex series of re-emphases of the ‘otherwise 
than being’. Such re-emphases, we would argue, aim precisely to uncover the 
‘possibility of unsaying’ any discourse that is nonetheless necessarily fleshed out in 
ontological discourse. These re-emphases emerge from Levinas’s growing awareness 
(arguably as a result of Derrida’s commentary on his work) of the care needed in 
order to signify from within ontological discourse the significance of the ‘otherwise 
than being’; a significance that does not immediately become inscribed back into the 
fabric of an immanent ontology. There is an ardent realisation that he must struggle 
more carefully to signify a non-reductive element o f exteriority from within the 
necessarily reductive discourse of ontology. His later work is significantly marked by 
such a struggle and indicates a deeper and more significant engagement with 
Hegelianism than had been the case in his earlier work. In this later work there is an 
extraordinary ongoing effort to solicit within discourse itself the significance of what 
Levinas terms the ‘cellular irritability’ of the Other in the Same. There is in the later 
work a marked shift into a radically harsh and, some might argue146, cruel rhetoricical 
formulations of subjectivity itself.
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence and the work that followed147, Levinas 
attempts to articulate the very meaning of ethics itself as the privileged site (or non­
site) of delirium in all culture and discourse14*. He argues that this delirium signifies a 
meaning prior to the very distinction of sense or non-sense; indeed, it founds them. 
The pre-original delirium of ethics emerges, he claims, from an understanding of the
145 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.295
146 This is a position persuasively argued by R. Brassier in ‘Levinas: Cruelty Beyond Being’ 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Warwick. 1996)
147 Particularly God, Death and Time and O f God Who Comes to M ind
l'M This emphasis of the delirium associated with the ethical is highlighted by T.C. Wall in Radical 
Passivity I*vinas, Blanchol A Agamhen (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1999)
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truly radical nature of ‘obligation’ towards another; this obligation towards another is 
radically uncontainable and unrepresentable, and is outside all movements in the 
economy of thought. In Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence such an obligation 
has the radical structure of what he terms ‘Substitution’. As infinitely responsible for 
the other, I am unconditionally “for-the-other”, I am the other’s substitute and hostage 
not because of any choice or desire on my part, but because of an election prior to my 
birth into being. This election, he argues, and not freedom or autarchy, gives 
humanity its ultimate meaning or signification. He writes:
‘The ipseity, in the passivity without arche characteristic of identity, is a hostage. The 
word I means here I am [me void], meaning for everything and for everyone.. the 
other in the same is my substitution for the other through responsibility, for which, I 
am summoned as someone irreplaceable. 1 exist through the other and for the other, 
but without this being alienation. I am inspired.’149
The structure of substitution, the ‘one-for-the-other’, articulates the pre-originary 
transcendence of the ‘always already’ in its purest form. According to Levinas the 
absolute identity of the unique ‘I’ consumes itself in the extreme contraction of its 
singularisation and thus passes outside itself toward absolute exteriority. In this way 
what Levinas terms the all-embracing essence of being is interrupted by irrecuperable 
excess; thus, being transcends itself. In other words, being transcends itself precisely 
because of the infinite scission of the substituted self that recurs both within and 
without identity. As a consequence, the absolutely other is the other in being and is 
that which allows being to transcend itself.
‘In the exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the 
oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able to 
resign, and thus as incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and to give. It is thus 
one and unique, in passivity from the start, having nothing at its disposal that would 
enable it to not yield to the provocation. It is one, reduced to itself and as it were 
contracted, expelled into itself outside of being.’190
1 49 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Hevond Essence, p. 114 
Ibid, p.105
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Levinas emphatically denies that the ‘beyond being’ is to be understood as simply 
‘outside’ being in some naively spatial sense. On the contrary, the absolute exteriority 
of the ‘otherwise than being’ is simultaneously an absolute ‘interiority’ constitutive of 
the immanence of being itself. However, it constitutes ‘otherwise’ than the way in 
which Hegel describes it, i.e. as a necessarily constitutive element within, and of, 
immanent ontology. There is a notion of ‘impossibility of possibility’ that functions 
almost as a signature of the Other in Levinas’s later work; the Other is both an 
impossibility «/being and an impossibility in being. Through substitution, understood 
as the irrevocable over-individuation of the one assigned through the other, the excess 
of identity knits and unknits the seam of essence; being has always already 
interrupted itself:
‘What we are here calling oneself, or the other in the same, where inspiration arouses 
respiration, the very pneuma of the psyche, precedes this empirical order, which is a 
part of being, of the universe, of the state, and is already conditioned in a system. 
Here we are trying to express the unconditonality of a subject, which does not have 
the status of a principle. This unconditionality confers meaning on being itself, and 
welcomes its gravity. It is as resting on a self, supporting the whole of being, that 
being is assembled into a unity of the universe and essence is assembled into an event. 
The self is a sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for 
everything.’151
The over-individuation of the absolute, whereby the subject bears the weight of 
responsibility for the whole universe, expresses an infinite scission of identity as 
indivisibility beyond being (Levinas calls it ‘unity without identity’ but it could 
equally be called ‘identity without unity’). This scission of the absolute, or division of 
the indivisible, represents the in-scission of an identity differing more radically than 
any possible intelligible difference in being; an in-scission of the One beyond being 
which simultaneously constitutes and deconstitutes being. For us Levinas’s theory of 
‘substitution’ represents a radical and fundamental challenge to Hegel by explicitly 
proposing a novel definition of the absolute. Substitution is the absolute as a relation
151 Ibid, p. 116
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of relation and non-relation, rather than the identity of identity and difference so 
characteristic of Hegelian dialectical ontology.
What one must recognise is that such an ethics of obligation signified by the being- 
for-the-other structure of substitution is inexorably ‘betrayed’ by positive notions of 
morality. Laws and ethical maxims would inherently seek to constrain this delirium of 
being-for-other through the wisdom and justice of rationality or the ‘Said’. What 
Levinas’s work aims to solicit is that which is radically ‘outside’ such wisdom of 
rationality; it attempts, through a reduction (epoche) of the Said in which morality, 
laws and politics are articulated, to discover a relation to the ‘other’ older than self­
relation (which Levinas characterises as ‘egology’) and the relation to objects in the 
world. Levinas argues that ‘the ethical situation o f responsibility is not 
comprehensible on the basis of ethics.’152
Also, it is important to recognise that the ‘relation’ which Levinas describes does not 
involve two terms, the self and the other, ‘it is... a relationship, but one where there is 
no disjunction between the terms held in relationship’.153 For Hegel the type of 
relation involving the self and the other emerges purely immanently (ultimately as 
symmetrically dissymmetrical) as a moment of self-relation in the self-determining 
dialectical development o f absolute concrete subjectivity.154 In contrast the relation 
Levinas seeks to discover is ‘older’ than the self, and is thus a relation not conceived 
in terms of self-determination. The anteriority of the other which conditions the 
relation Levinas attempts to discover has the characteristics of absolute dissymmetry 
and a goodness without measure. This anteriority operates to destructure the self as a 
‘relation’ with a ‘never present’ other. As immemorial this anterior relation can only 
he betrayed, i.e. it can actually only be conceived in terms of a relation between two 
terms on the same ground. However, such a betrayal is an absolutely necessary 
conception, and one which functions to express (yet never fully contain) the radical 
truth of the relation. Thus, any ‘relation’ to another, however it is expressed, remains 
paradoxically faithful to the Levinasian ethical position. This is a point Derrida 
emphasises in a recent work on Levinas:
1,2 Ibid, p.120 
155 Ibid, p. 108
1M Recall our earlier discussion of Hegel's arguments concerning precisely this point in the Science o f  
tragic.
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‘Hospitality is not simply some region of ethics, let alone... the name of a problem in 
law or politics: it is ethnicity itself, the whole and the principle of ethics. And if 
hospitality does not let itself be circumscribed or derived, if it originarily conveys the 
whole of intentional experience, then it would have no contrary: the phenomena of 
allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even war itself would still exhibit everything that 
Levinas explicitly attributes to or allies with hospitality.’155
Levinas offers no concrete critique of existing ethics, morals or political maxims to 
which we must or ought accord. Rather, all of Levinas’s thought gravitates toward an 
obsessive ‘relation without relation’ that refracts all actual relations; which holds each 
‘relation’ to that immemorial relation without relation, and which each necessary 
relation cannot fail but to betray. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence this 
ethics is understood and articulated as essentially ambiguous. What ‘binds’ me to the 
other person must be understood, Levinas claims, as the immemorial non-relation to 
the Other, the ‘nothing’ or no-relation that I, myself, am. Thus, outside of any 
particular defined relation to the other, there is always a prior exposure in the self to 
the ‘no relation at all’, which Levinas characterises as a restless obsession with the 
Other.156 This relation without relation functions to fundamentally orientate me as 
absolutely obligated to the Other, but also escapes me. The notion of radical 
diachrony (diachrony without synchrony) allows us to discern, Levinas claims, a 
significance in anteriority that defines the very meaning of the ethical. This diachrony 
eludes the temporal continuum, synchrony or immanence of consciousness and is 
what he terms the trace of the other in me, a trace that is older than me. Indeed, I am 
nothing but its echo. As its echo I find myself always already ordered, orientated and 
obligated. ‘The ego is in itself like a sound that would resound in its own echo, the 
node of a wave which is not once again consciousness.’157
155 J. Derrida, Adieu d Emmanuel l^vinas (Editions Galil6c. 1997) in English as Adieu to Emmanuel 
Levinas, translated by P-A. Brault & M. Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1999), 
p. 50
Levinas writes: ‘Obsession traverses consciousness countercurrent wise, is inscribed in 
consciousness as something foreign, a disequillibrium, a delirium. It undoes thematisation. and escapes 
any principle, origin, will, or which are put forth in every ray of consciousness. This movement 
is, in the original sense of the term, an-archical. Thus obsession can nowise be taken as a hypertrophy 
of consciousness... Obsession is a persecution... it designates the form in which the ego is affected. a 
form which is a defecting from consciousness.' (Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 101)
1,7 E. Levinas. Ibid, p.130
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No concrete rational morality can contain this ‘otherwise’ than me; indeed, its radical 
priority functions to throw all such morality into doubt. Ethics is for Levinas a 
command that cannot be recalled, and that is forgotten prior to any distinction 
between the activity o f ‘memory’ and ‘forgetting’.158 It is this radical forgetting which 
transports me outside of all egoity. it, Levinas argues, ‘denucleates’ the ego, stripping 
it bare and exposing it to absolute exteriority. I am commanded out of an immemorial 
time when I am not yet ‘present’, ‘prior to the for-itself. ..older than the time of 
consciousness’ 159 It is, he claims, the anonymity and diachrony of the Other that is so 
commanding, imperious, confounding, and perplexing. Here no-thing obligates me, 
and I am unable to distance myself from such an obligation -  for 1 am it. In other 
words, it is ‘I’ who instantiate absolute obligation. In radical passivity 1 am ordered, I 
am obligated, thus in short I am Aulrui:
‘The event. . . is not grasping of self in consciousness It is an assignation to answer 
without evasions, which assign the self to be a self. Prior to the play of being, before 
the present, older than the time of consciousness that is accessible in memory, in its 
‘deep yore, never remote enough’, the oneself is exposed as a hypostasis, of which the 
being it is as an entity is but a mask. It bears its name as a borrowed name, a 
pseudonym, a pro-noun. In itself, the oneself is the one or the unique separated from 
being.’160
For Levinas then I am only insofar as 1 am always already Other, only insofar as 1 am 
identified/substituted for this Other, this no-one other than I. The Other obsesses me 
because I am that Other, who is no other than myself; ‘In the form of responsibility, 
the psyche in the soul is the other in me, a malady of identity, both accused and self, 
the same for the other, the same by the other.’161 Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, marks the 
very event of the self, and represents the very constitution o f subjectivity. The self 
(always already involved with the Other) comes to me from an ‘outside’ that is all the 
more exterior in that it precedes any inferiority Radically outside, prior to any inside,
'*  See E. Casey, ‘Levinas on Memory and the Trace' in The Collegium I’haenomenologicum: The 
First 10 Years, ed. J. Sallis, G. Moncra & J .Taminiaux (Boston : Kluwcr Academic Publishers. I98K) 
,w E. Levinas, Ibid. pp. 106-7 
Ibid, p. 106 
1,1 Ibid, p.69
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this identification, this trauma, is just as radically forgotten. Yet it is me: in me but 
beyond me. I thus incarnate that which calls me to myself. The self is responsibility 
incarnate. All of the ego’s power of self-determination, mediation and immanent self­
relation, are shadowed by this anterior unpower, characterised by Levinas in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence as the signifying o f an originary Saying. For 
him it is I who incarnate this Saying:
‘My responsibility for the other is the for of the relationship, the very signifyingness 
of signification, which signifies in saying before showing itself in the said. The one- 
for-the-other is the very signifyingness o f signification!’162
‘Saying’ (le dire) is Levinas’s difficult expression of that which is beyond or 
otherwise than the ‘Said’ (le dit) or thematic discourse. However, insofar as both 
terms are necessarily thematically inscribed, it is clear that they operate as no more 
than a model. The term ‘Saying’, thus, is no more than a ‘way of speaking’, a 
substitution for the ethical signification that Levinas cannot articulate without at once 
reducing it to a thematic ‘Said’. The ‘reduction’ of the Said to the Saying is, we would 
claim, again a type of model designed both to show that the Saying has an ethical 
sense that is separate from the Said, but also that this Said is always presented by a 
Saying. The Saying is my exposure -  corporeal, sensible -  to the Other, my inability 
to refuse the Other’s approach. It is the performative stating, proposing, or expressive 
position o f myself facing the other. On the other hand, the Said is a statement, an 
assertion or a constative proposition (of the form ‘S is P’), about which truth or falsity 
in discourse can be ascertained.
In what might be called the ‘sincerity’ of the Saying163, the subject expresses its 
originary responsibility as Me Void, (Here I Am). But it is unthematisable and is that 
which resists the movement into (and envelopment by) universality. It is then the very 
subjectivity of the subject (i.e. its being absolutely subject to the Other) which
Ibid, p. 100
IM P. Davies in his paper ‘Sincerity and the End of Theodicy: Throe Remarks on Levinas and Kant' 
(unpublished paper, 1998), aligns Saying with sincerity, thus being sincere is not simply one type of 
linguistic behaviour amongst others. He writes: ‘“Sincerity" is, perhaps. Lcvinas's last word on what he 
calls the Saying of the Said, the Saying of all the -  tie jure and de facto -  systematisablc, thcorisablc 
and dcscribablc Saids. It permits us to speak of the sincerity of the always unsaid ‘yes' or 'hello' 
presupposed in everything that is said.’ 198
prevents the unique elected subject’s transition into absolute other-relatedness, i.e. its 
move into universality, sociality, culture, politics and ethics proper, is thus always 
marked by radical excess. Such radical excess is a more radical form of other- 
relatedness, and is one which cannot be adequately or definitively thematised or 
expressed by the sincerity o f the Said. Thus, Levinas writes:
‘This dedication to the other, is a sincerity, and this sincerity is Saying. . .The Saying 
is therefore not a communication of something Said . . . When the Saying has meaning 
only through the Said, the Saying is covered over and absorbed by the Said. To the 
Saying without a Said an opening is necessary that does not cease to open, and that 
declares itself as such. The Saying is that declaration. It is necessary that the Saying 
be a Saying of the Saying itself, a Saying that goes without thematisation, but that 
exposes itself ever more. This is a Saying turning back on itself as though it were a 
matter of exposing the exposure, rather than standing there as in an act of
>164exposing.
The question then becomes one of how Levinas can, in the Said, convey a genuine 
sense of this Saying or sincerity. How is the Saying, my exposure to the Other, to be 
Said, or given a philosophical exposition without utterly betraying this Saying? How 
does one write the pre-original interruption of the ‘otherwise than being’ in the 
language of being without this simply becoming a being otherwise? In other words 
how does one avoid merely repeating, as Derrida had argued, Hegel? Levinas’s 
answer seems to be, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, that the ethical 
necessarily signifies ambiguously. Because Saying is prior to its origination or 
showing forth in the light of the Said, and because the Saidness of discourse is part of 
a movement related to the constitutive operations of a consciousness organising the 
world in relation to itself, the Said is necessarily ‘unfaithful’ to Saying. Ethical 
signifyingness remains an-archical. Yet, pre-original Saying does move into language. 
Indeed, such a movement appears to be essential to Levinas’s account of it rather than 
a lack of coherence or vigilance on Levinas’s part. Pre-original Saying requires the 
language of the Said, but the moment Saying moves into a Said, the moment it 
becomes thematised, it is betrayed, usurped and sullied His task is to posit a type of
IM E. Levinas, Dteu, la mart et le temps (Paris: Grassct. 1993) in English as (¡oil, Death and Time, 
translated by B. Bergo (Standford: Standford U P. 2<X)0). p. 191
199
strategy to somehow undo or unsay the Said of his discourse. Thus anything he can 
say about Saying is already part of the ‘intrigue’ between the Saying and the Said that 
the reduction is designed to dislocate. It seems that he can only attempt to unsay by 
rehabilitating this very intrigue. Having said that that which is beyond essence is 
necessarily beyond thematic discourse, Levinas attempts to slide in between the 
Saying and the Said. An ‘opening’ is posited as an invisible ‘fissure’ in the seam of 
time, a fissure which is at once a crucial factor in what Levinas terms the 
amphibology of being165 and the theoretical space wherein infinity signifies. For 
Levinas it is a matter of finding a strategy that can indicate ‘the incompressible 
nonsimultaneity of the Said and the Saying, the dislocation of their correlation.’166 As 
F. Ciaramelli writes in an essay on Levinas:
‘The transcendence in play here cannot be described as in any way definitive. It is a 
transcendence whose movement is always frustrated by the medium in which it is set 
and on which it depends, namely, language. Perpetually in the moment of betrayal, 
the movement is always ‘to be made’... At this point we can begin to see a fracture 
open up in time: that which, however ambiguously, resists conceptualisation is not 
itself contemporary with this resistance. In other words, the transcendence of 
conceptualisation is marked by diachrony.’167
The solicitation of being to responsibility represents an anachronism within the core 
of being itself. However, Levinas cannot actually argue for the sense of this radical 
diachrony except through terms of synchrony. There is seemingly no vocabulary 
available to him that would say diachrony in any other way than that in which it is 
said. By struggling to say the unsayable, Levinas can only proceed indirectly; the
165 Amphibology refers to Heidegger's notion of ontological difference. In a section of Otherwise than 
Being or Beyond faience entitled ‘The Amphibology of Being and Entities' Levinas writes: ‘In the 
said, the essence that resounds is on the verge of becoming a noun. In the copula is scintillates or 
sparkles an ambiguousness between the essence and the nominali/.cd relation. The said as a verb is 
essence or tcmporali/ation. Or, more exactly, the logos enters into the amphibology in which being and 
entities can be understood and identified, in which a noun can resound as a verb and a verb of an 
apophansis can be nominalized... Logos is the ambiguousness of being and entities, the primordial 
amphibology.', pp.41-2
166 E. Levinas,'Tout Autrement' in /. 'arc. No.54 (1973) in English as 'Wholly Otherwise’, translated 
by S. Critchley in R. Bcmasconi & S. Critchley (cds.) Re-Reading /.evinas (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), p.5
167 F. Ciaramelli. ‘Lcvinas's Ethical Discourse Between Individuation and Universality' in R. 
Bcrnasconi & S. Crilchley (cds), Re-Reading l-evinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991)
p.96
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chief tool of rhetorical indirection he employs in his later work is the suggestiveness 
of paradox, as an iridescence of exteriority. However, an important question remains. 
How is it that that which simultaneously ravels and unravels the fabric of being still 
possesses a sense of absolute unravelling or what he terms the ‘truth of truths’? If the 
sense of absolute unravelling is lost we are left with mere indecision. It would remain 
an unravelling suspended between sense and non-sense, where the unilaterality of 
ethical ‘sense’ would revert immediately into ontological non-‘sense’. However, it is 
his account of the incision of the absolute, as a pre-originary interruption of essence, 
which makes it entirely legitimate to interpret the incision as providing a radical 
‘sense’ to ambiguous undecidability. This incision of the One beyond being is a 
‘transcendence within immanence’, and is an unexcisable inscission of the absolute. 
This betrayal of ethical Saying by the inevitable ontological discourse in which it is 
said is necessitated by the recurrence o f substitution as a pre-originary interruption of 
the ontological resumption of ethical interruption. This is an interruption that renders 
the ontological betrayal of the ethical possible, hut always betrays its own betrayal in 
advance. In the attempt to elucidate this further Levinas, at this point in Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence, introduces the figure of the movement of skepticism 
and its refutation.
Allusions to the alternation of skepticism and its refutation are found throughout 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence'6*, but it receives its most detailed 
consideration toward the end of the book in a section entitled ‘Skepticism and 
Reason’.169 For Levinas the importance of the skeptic’s viewpoint lies in the 
contestation of the very possibility of truth. It is clear for him that neither philosophy 
nor truth are able to find their ultimate justification immanently within themselves, 
indeed the claim that they can represents nothing more than the ‘presumptions of
The movement of skepticism is evoked from the very beginning of Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence. Thus he writes in the opening pages: ‘Skepticism, at the dawn of philosophy, set forth and 
betrayed the diachrony of this very conveying and betraying. To conceive the otherwise than being 
requires, perhaps, as much audacity as skepticism shows, when it does not hesitate to affirm the 
impossibility of statement while venturing to realize this impossibility by the very statement of this 
impossibility. If, after the innumerable ‘irrefutable' refutations which logical thought sets against it, 
skepticism has the gall to return (and it always returns as philosophy’s legitimate child |el il revienl 
toujours en enfant ligitime de la philosophic: Lingis erroneously translates légltime as 'illegitimate')), 
it is because in the contradiction which logic sees in it the ‘at the same time’ of the contradictories is 
missing because a secret diachrony commands this ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking and 
because in general signification signifies beyond synchrony, beyond essence.', p.7 
E. Levinas. Ibid, pp. 165-71
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philosophers, presumptions of idealists!’170 He asks whether or not the beginning of 
philosophy is preceded by something that cannot be synchronised into immanence, ‘if 
an anarchy is not more ancient than the beginning and freedom.,m  I f  that were the 
case then the apparently immanent order of the Said, to which philosophy and truth 
belong, would always refer to what he terms the transcendence of Saying, (as the 
exposure of oneself to the Other). The recurrent rebirth of skepticism, despite its 
inevitable refutation, is seemingly utilised by Levinas as a model to depict the way the 
Said is interrupted, and its priority as a self-grounding and self-determining totality 
put into question by the diachrony of the Saying. For Levinas the true significance of 
Saying always exceeds its thematic statement in the Said, which, in turn, always bears 
irreducible traces of Saying
Levinas’s discussion of skepticism in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 
emerges directly from the question of the risk that his discourse runs by attempting to 
articulate a ‘difference’, the risk being that it is ultimately reducible to a moment of 
immanent speculative dialectics. Hence we should acknowledge the way he is directly 
engaging with a number of the ‘questions’ posed by Derrida in ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics’, (most notably the ones we have outlined here). For Levinas the 
recurring rebirth of skepticism in the face of its own logical refutation provides a 
means for understanding how the priority of immanence is to be challenged by a 
notion of transcendence which ultimately remains irreducible to the immanence of 
speculative dialectical ontology. It also provides a means for understanding how 
Levinas is able to attempt to articulate (or thematise) within his discourse (i.e. within 
a Said) a radically non-thematisable notion of transcendence. It indicates a profound 
sense of the radically non-speculative aspect of transcendence that he attempts to 
signify within his work, the Saying in the Said. Indeed, we would argue that it 
indicates a radical transcendence ultimately irreducible to a naive uncritical form of 
dogmatic presupposition inferior to the rigours of immanence. Thus it is precisely 
here that powerful insights are to be gained with regards to the genuine configuration 
and relationship to Hegel’s thought in Levinas’s work. His discussion of the 
movement of skepticism and its refutation impinges upon all of the most important
170 Ibid, p.122 
Ibid. p. 165
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questions regarding the very status of Levinas’s ‘transcendental’ ethics with respect to 
Hegel’s immanent speculative ontology.
Robert Bemasconi argues in his own work on Levinas’s account of skepticism in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Being172, that Levinas is not himself adhering to or 
adapting a skeptical position; rather, his focus is upon skepticism, its refutation and its 
return despite that refutation, as a ‘model' :
‘It is important to recognise that Levinas is giving skepticism and its refutation the 
status of a metaphor or ‘model’. He is not himself adopting a skeptical position. He 
gives no indication of having made a detailed study of the history o f skepticism. Nor 
does he attempt to situate historically the argument about skepticism to which he 
refers, except to locate it at the dawn of philosophy.’173
Our own view of Levinas’s evocation of skepticism departs from Bemasconi’s 
account by arguing that Levinas should be recognised as attempting to radicalise the 
relationship between skepticism and philosophy, and as articulating the significance 
of the very essence of critical equipollence associated with skepticism. In doing this 
Levinas should be recognised as radicalising Hegel’s own reformulation of the 12
112 See R. Bcrnasconi. 'Skepticism and the Face of Philosophy" in R. Bemasconi & S. Critchley (cds). 
Re-Reading Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) pp.149-161. Bemasconi does not 
discuss Levinas's account in relation to Hegel’s thought; the focus of Bemasconi's work is the 
relationship between Derrida and Levinas. See also J. de Grcef, 'Skepticism and Reason' in R.A. 
Cohen cd. Face to Face with ¡¿vinos (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1986), pp. 159- 
179, which also focuses upon Derrida and Levinas. There are discussions of Levinas and skepticism in 
P. Atterton. 'Levinas’s Skeptical Critique of Metaphysics and Anti-Humanism' in Philosophy Today, 
Winter 1997, pp.491-506 and A.T. Peper/.ak. Beyond: The Philosophy o f Emmanuel ¡¿vinos 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1997), pp. 148-153. Also Jean Greisch in his article 
'The Face and Reading: Immediacy and Mediation’, translated by S. Critchlcy in Re-Reading ¡¿vinas. 
writes: 'We should recall... what place Hegel reserves for the moment of skepticism on the threshold of 
his logic. It occupies, for Hegel, a very specific moment in the economy of logico-real comprehension: 
it is the negative-rational moment of dia-lcctic which, in the first place, comes to disturb all the 
certainties of the understanding in order to be able to raise itself to the level of the speculative, that is to 
say, the positive-rational. In Levinas, as in Hegel, skepticism is not a philosophical trend relevant to the 
history of ideas; it is an internal moment of philosophical comprehension itself. But the Lcvinasian 
rehabilitation of skepticism follows very different paths from those of the Hegelian dialectic', p.78. Our 
account of Levinas and skepticism will be guided by Greisch's insight that it contrasts directly with 
Hegel's account of skepticism.
1 1 R. Bemasconi. Ibid. p. 150 Indeed. Bemasconi claims to indicate an instance in Levinas where he 
makes this point very clearly:‘The refutation of skepticism, which we have evoked as a model. |my 
cmphasis| also operates at the heart of a rationality proper to the knowledge of being, proper to 
ontology whose regime is already established. ’ E. Levinas. O f God Who Comes to Mind, p. 178
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relationship between skepticism and philosophy 174 Both Hegel and Levinas do more 
than merely evoke skepticism’s relationship to philosophy as a model; rather, they 
must be recognised as thinking the degree to which skeptical equipollence functions 
internally as a negative/critical force within philosophy/ontology. We began this 
thesis by demonstrating how Hegel radicalises the whole question of the relationship 
between skepticism and philosophy as part of a response to a post-Kantian 
problematic. We will argue that Levinas in his later work reconsiders Hegel’s claim 
that skepticism (when understood as an abstract challenge to reason) is refuted 
Hegel’s demonstration of the refutation of skepticism functions to reveal that its 
critical and negative force is in fact a determinate force immanent to reason Levinas 
rethinks the whole question of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy by 
implicitly adopting Hegel’s own approach, but arguing that it persists and recurs, 
despite refuting itself, simply because it is radically immanent to philosophy without 
philosophy being able to contain it. The radical immanence of skepticism represents a 
transcendence in immanence operating as a delirious critical and negative force within 
the very fabric o f philosophy/ontology For Levinas the persistent recurrence of 
skeptical equipollence (despite refutation) represents and signifies a persistent 
interruptive force, rather than the domesticated form of determinate negation Hegel 
arguably reduces the essence of skepticism to
Levinas’s account concentrates upon the fact (a fact itself the focus of attention in 
Hegel’s own studies of skepticism) that skepticism is ultimately self-defeating or self- 
negating as soon as its own arguments are turned against it. At the beginning of 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Levinas alludes to a moment when 
skepticism does not falter in affirming ‘the impossibility of statement while venturing 
to realise this impossibility by the very statement of this impossibility.’17’ By 
concentrating upon this paradoxical movement he addresses the very essence of 
absolute skepticism that Hegel had associated with genuine ancient skepticism 176 
What seemingly impresses both thinkers is that skepticism (despite losing the 
argument on its own grounds) returns unabashed, as if somehow deaf to the objections 
that its position is self-refuting or self-negating. For Hegel that deafness ultimately
This reformulation was the subject of the first port of our thesis.
) E Levinas, Otherwise than Heiny or lieyond Essence, p.7 
’ Recall out discussion in ftirt One.
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implies the adoption of a dogmatic form of subjective assuredness in skeptical claims, 
which in turn represents the beginning of the degeneration of skepticism away from a 
genuinely negative critical perspective. Its deafness, in absolute negativity, to the 
essential positivity at its heart means that skepticism simply fails to recognise the 
essentially determining negativity in the very content it considers. It fails to consider 
the essentially self-negating aspect of the content upon which it brings its 
methodology of skeptical equipollence to bear, and considers itself to be a merely 
external negation. However, by bringing its negation to bear upon its own negation 
(i.e. in self-reflective skepticism) it is able to discern a notion of immanent self­
negation that necessarily results in the transition to an elevated philosophical 
perspective, namely speculative dialectic or determinate negation itself. Subjective 
skepticism, whilst it might have the merit of displaying the beginnings of the 
independent freedom of self-consciousness through its adoption of an essentially 
negative perspective towards all being, has all the philosophical gravitas one 
associates with squabbling children, each merely repetitively contradicting the 
other177 For Hegel the truth of skepticism (a truth wholly internal to skepticism) 
resides in the very notion of a ‘self-accomplishing skepticism’ that he articulates 
within the Phenomenology of Spirit. Its truth is thus the determinate negation at the 
very heart of immanent rationality.
Levinas, whilst also being concerned with the persistent recurrence of skepticism, 
attempts to uncover a forgotten meaning within the very alternation of recurrence and 
refutation. He argues that this alternation signifies the truth that the correlation of the 
Saying and the Said represents a diachrony of that which cannot be conjoined. This 
forgotten meaning (which he terms a ‘secret diachrony’) ultimately signifies a 
powerful resistance to Hegel’s arguments concerning the inevitable slide into 
subjectivism that the recurrence o f  skepticism represents. Levinas is concerned with 
articulating what it is that makes the seemingly impossible recurrence of absolute 
skepticism possible and legitimate outside of any consideration o f subjective 
dogmatism. This concern is closely aligned with the question of how Levinas is able 
to indicate a notion of radical alterity without being open to charges of naive
117 See Hegel's remark in the Phenomenology o f Spirit that the recurrent form of skepticism is ‘like the 
squabbling of self-willed children, one of whom says A if the other says B, and in turn says B if the 
other says A, and who by continually contradicting themselves buy for themselves the pleasure of 
continually contradicting one another’, #205, p. 126
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pathological dogmatism or subjectivism from Hegelians. For Levinas the genuine 
significance of the recurrence o f the movement of skepticism indicates not the refusal 
by subjectivism of the truth of skepticism’s immanent determinate self-negation, as 
Hegel insists from a speculative perspective. Rather, for Levinas the alteration of 
skepticism and its refutation, when considered as a persistent movement, necessarily 
signifies a ‘secret diachrony’ refractory to the immanence of consciousness and 
reason. It signifies a diachrony able to repeatedly evade the fabric o f the synchrony of 
immanence, despite the seeming ease with which such a notion is reduced to 
speculative dialectics. It is not a question of merely evading synchrony through the 
contingent whim of subjective wilfulness. As we have demonstrated, Levinas argues 
that it is not I who selfishly resist or contest the System, but the Other. Thus the 
inherent contradiction associated with the refutation and subsequent recurrence of 
skepticism fundamentally evades ‘the “at the same time” of contradictories’178, a 
coinciding that Hegel invokes when discussing skepticism’s attempt to articulate a 
challenge to the totality of reason. The alternation associated with the refutation and 
recurrence of skepticism ultimately indicates, for Levinas, two distinct times, the 
diachronic and the synchronic. By understanding the critical essence of skepticism as 
a radically diachronic disjunction coming from the Other, its persistent recurrence is 
removed from the realm of mere dogmatic and wilful subjectivism. It represents a 
disjunction no longer recoverable, as Hegel argues, by the immanence of the 
synchrony of reason and consciousness, the whole, or the One. Levinas articulates the 
persistence of this radically diachronic disjunction as a question:
‘How in consciousness can there be an undergoing or a passion whose active source 
does not, in any way, occur in consciousness? This exteriority has to be emphasised. 
It is not objective or spatial, recuperable in immanence and thus falling under the 
orders of -  and in the order of -  consciousness; it is obsessional, non-thematisable 
and... anarchic.’179
This radical diachrony of Saying (whereby Saying escapes the total re-envelopment 
within the Said of presence or immanence) provides the basis for an attempt to 
articulate the significance of the recurrence of skepticism. Thus the persistent
118 E. Levinas, Ibid, p.7
119 Ibid, p.102
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recurrence of the critical essence of skepticism provides Levinas with a potent 
instance of an excessive signification that signifies the incessant movement beyond 
totalising synchrony and the immanence of the Said. Skepticism itself is characterised 
as being both a form of immanence (i.e. as a Said) and a force beyond immanence 
(i.e its critical essence as Saying). Thus it necessarily enters a realm reducible to 
immanence by being articulated as a philosophical viewpoint contesting all truth and 
philosophy, and once it is within that realm it is demonstrated, as Hegel argues, to be 
a fundamentally ««//"-negating viewpoint:
‘The truth of skepticism is put on the same level as the truths whose interruption and 
failure its discourse states, as though the negation of the possibility of the true were 
ranked in the order restored by this negation, as though every difference were 
incontestably reabsorbed into the same order.’1*0
However, he argues that skepticism is able to signify radically otherwise than being 
precisely because of its recurrent and persistent skeptical questioning of the order of 
rationality and truth, i.e. ‘to contest the possibility of truth is precisely to contest this 
uniqueness of order and level’:
‘Skeptical discourse, which states the rupture, failure, impotence or impossibility of 
disclosure, would be self-contradictory if the saying and the said were only 
correlative, if the signifyingness of proximity and the signification known and said 
could enter into a common order, if the saying reached a full contemporaneousness 
with the said, if the saying entered into essence without betraying the diachrony of 
proximity, if the saying could remain saying by showing itself to be knowledge, that 
is, if thematization entered into the theme in the form of memory. ’181
The gesture of recurrence signifies the truth of that which never enters into a wholly 
synchronous theme, i.e. the ‘truth of truths’ that remains beyond or outside This 
signification is produced precisely by its persistent movement of recurrence; it is a 
signification produced ‘out of time’, out of essence and beyond being. For Levinas it 
is not produced by mere subjective dogmatism but rather as a radical form of
Ibid, p.168 
1,1 Ibid
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questioning, inscribed pre-originally as a critical essence in Being, by the Other. Thus 
skepticism occurs ‘in two times without entering into either of them, as an endless 
critique, or skepticism, which in a spiralling movement makes possible the boldness 
of philosophy, destroying the conjunction into which its Saying and its Said 
continually enter.’182 The very difference between the Saying and the Said relates 
directly to the persistent recurrence of skepticism and its refutation, but not in such a 
way that skepticism becomes paradigmatic of Saying and its refutation merely the 
Said. It is clear that what skepticism actually states in its Said, i.e. in its philosophical 
contestation of rationality and truth, through an equipollent proposition, cannot itself 
avoid becoming a philosophical proposition. However, by virtue of its ‘refusal’ to 
abide by its inevitable self-refutation, the critical essence of skepticism seemingly 
demonstrates a disdain for the very philosophical logos it necessarily employs. It 
seemingly demonstrates that it is not prepared, by becoming lodged within the 
immanence of philosophical reason, to submit to the movement o f immanence itself. 
Rather, it attempts to remain as a persistent contestation of the truth of that 
immanence by its persistent recurrence. As we know this persistent alternation 
between the recurrence of skepticism and its refutation has, for Hegel, no other 
philosophical significance apart from indicating the very beginning of the concrete 
realisation of the absolute freedom of self-consciousness, i.e. a dogmatic abstract form 
of subjectivity. Skepticism is unable, from his perspective, to launch an authentic 
challenge to speculative philosophy. However, for Levinas the alternation has a much 
greater significance than that accorded to it by Hegel, and represents more than a 
contingent and wilful disdain for the philosophical logos. For Levinas it ultimately 
represents the way in which the subject is ultimately and radically orientated by a 
‘secret diachrony’. He argues:
‘The skeptical saying undone by philosophy in fact recalls the breakup of 
synchronizable, that is, the recallable, time. Then, the trace of saying, which has never 
been present, obliges me; the responsibility for the other, never assumed, binds me; a 
command never heard is obeyed. The trace does not belong to the assembling of 
essence. Philosophy underestimates the extent of the negation in this ‘not appearing’, 
which exceeds the logical scope of negation and affirmation. It is the trace of a
1,2 Ibid, p.44
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relationship with illeity that no unity of apperception grasps, ordering me to 
responsibility.’183
Levinas argues that skepticism exhibits an acute sensitivity to the difference between 
the Saying and the Said, and argues that it is as if skepticism ‘were sensitive to the 
difference between my exposure without reserve to the other, which is Saying, and the 
exposition or statement of the Said in its equilibrium and justice.’184 Such an 
argument is based upon recognising the ultimate inability of skepticism to apply its 
absolute denial of truth to its own claims in any concrete and determinate way. It is as 
if the Saying (the very sincerity of the critical essence of skepticism) does not occur 
‘at the same time’ as its inevitable articulation as a philosophical Said. In this way 
skepticism is able to signify a tendency utterly divorced from that trajectory of 
Western philosophy culminating, for Levinas, in Hegel’s idealism.185 However, it is 
not only skepticism that is sensitive to the interval between the Saying and the Said. 
Indeed, when Levinas writes that ‘language is already skepticism’186 he means that all 
language resides in this difference between Saying and the Said. This has profound 
implications for the assessment of the nature of philosophy and philosophical 
discourse; ‘philosophical speaking... remains as a Saying, a proximity and a 
responsibility.’187 In other words, philosophy itself cannot legitimately be reduced 
ultimately to pure immanence, qua Hegel, and cannot be reduced to the immanence of 
the synchrony of the Said even if, as Hegel shows, this is where it situates itself (i.e. 
as radically and immanently self-determining). The genuine truth of all philosophy for 
Levinas is this movement o f radical diachrony within synchrony, transcendence in 
immanence:
‘The truth of truths lies in the Said, in the Unsaid, and in the Otherwise said -  return, 
resumption, reduction: the history of philosophy or its preliminary.’188
Ibid p.168 
Ibid
1,5 For example. Levinas writes: ‘The works of Hegel, into which all the currents of the Western spirit 
have come to flow, and in which all its levels arc manifested, is at once a philosophy o f  absolute 
knowledge and of the satisfied man. The psyche of theoretical knowledge constitutes a thought that 
thinks to its measure and, in its adequation to what is thinkable, equals itself and shall be conscious of 
itself. It is the Same that finds itself anew in the Other.’ (O f God Who Comes to Mind, p. 170)
86 H. Levinas. Otherwise than Being or Hevond Essence, p. 170 
Ibid, p.168
*" E. Levinas, 'Wholly Otherwise', p.6
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Skepticism and its recurrence is itself witness to reasons that reason Joes not know. 
The question that all of Levinas’s work addresses is whether or not transcendence has 
a meaning. Levinas wants to suggest that even immanent philosophical reason is able 
to hear those reasons that signify beyond the ontological forms that philosophical 
reflection reveals to  it. Thus he argues that it is transcendence in immanence that will 
allow a philosophy to emerge that recognises that ‘Truth is in several times’:
‘The meaning that philosophy lets us see with the aid of these forms frees itself from 
the theoretical forms which help it to see and express itself as if these forms were not 
precisely encrusted in that which they allow to be seen and said. In an inevitable 
alternation, thinking comes and goes between these two possibilities.’189
For Levinas skepticism is not just a denial or rejection of the possibility of 
knowledge; it represents an affirmation transcending the realm of the immanence of 
the Said at the same time as sustaining it. Thus when Levinas writes that Saying is 
‘both an affirmation and a retraction of the Said’, it is pre-eminently true of the 
Saying of skepticism. The truth of skepticism is thus placed upon the same level as 
the very truths its own discourse seeks to disrupt. It is as if the very negation of the 
possibility of the true is itself ranked within the very order restored by this negation: it 
is ‘as though every difference were incontestably reabsorbed into the same order. But 
to contest the possibility of truth is precisely to contest this uniqueness of order and 
level.’190 Consequently the differentiation signified by skepticism is not ultimately 
recoverable through immanent rationality. Levinas argues for a radically diachronous 
difference between the Saying and the Said which immanent philosophical discourse 
fails to mark explicitly enough. By drawing upon the notion of the recurrence of 
skepticism he is able to signify the degree to which it must refer to an irrecuperable 
excess as the very ground for its recurrence outside the reductive immanence of 
philosophical discourse. Philosophy becomes radically reconfigured within his 
thought as a discourse able to uncover and articulate the recurrent movement of 
transcendence in immanence. Indeed, he re-inscribes the very task of philosophy as a 
necessary traversal of this alternation between the diachronic interruption of the
Ibid, p. 180 
Ibid. p.168
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Other, and as a necessary reduction of that diachrony back into the very fabric of the 
synchrony of the Same as the inevitable consequence of such an articulation.
We will proceed by examining Derrida’s second major text on Levinas, a paper 
entitled ‘At This Very Moment In This Work Here I Am’191. We will argue that this 
paper represents Derrida’s significant reappraisal of Levinas’s efforts to respond to 
the challenges outlined in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ by adopting a strategy of 
persistent and recurrent skeptical opposition.
191 J. Derrida, “En cc moment même dans cet ouvrage me voici” in Textes pour Emmanuel Ixvinas 
Paris Editions Jcan-Michcl Place, 1980) in English as “At This Very Moment In This Work Here 1 
Am”, translated by R. Bcrc/.divin in R. Bemasconi & S. Critchley (eds), Re-Reading Ixvinas 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1991) pp.l 1-48
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VII - Derrida’s ‘At This Very Moment In This Work Here I Am’
In the second text that Derrida wrote on Levinas he explicitly marks out the radically 
diachronous difference between Saying and the Said evoked by Levinas in Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence. He specifically addresses the question of how Levinas 
indicates the diachrony solicited by the ‘mode’ of skepticism and its refutation, 
together with the question of how to genuinely respond to the demands of his work.
Derrida immediately observes that the risk of comprehension by the intelligibility of 
the Same necessarily contaminates the very ‘possibility’ of incomprehensible and 
unintelligible Saying; but recognises that it is a contamination which is 
simultaneously constitutive of the possibility of its uncontaminated occurrence:
‘To make us (without making us) receive otherwise, and receive otherwise the 
otherwise, he has been unable to do otherwise than negotiate with the risk: in the same 
language, the language of the Same, one may always ill receive what is thus otherwise 
said. Even before that fault, the risk contaminates its very proposition.’192
Indeed, Derrida argues that the question of how Levinas is able to signify the wholly 
other within the economy of reductive language must in fact be reversed in the light 
of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The real issue becomes one of whether 
or not the language of the Same is itself unbound and thus open to the wholly other. 
For Derrida:
‘It is less a matter of exceeding that language than of treating it otherwise with its own 
possibilities. Treating it otherwise, in other words to calculate the transaction, 
negotiate the compromise that would leave the non-negotiable intact, and to do this in 
such a way as to make the fault, which consists in inscribing the wholly other within 
the empire of the same, alter the same enough to absolve itself from itself.’193
The risk run by Levinas’s work is its attempt to negotiate a thematisation of that 
which uniquely forbids thematisation. Derrida argues that by understanding Levinas’s
192 i  Derrida, Ibid. P.12
Ibid, p. 17
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notion of the recurrence of the One as an identity without unity (as substitution) we 
can begin to understand the recurring serial structure in which the perpetual 
alternation of Saying and Said are inextricably woven together. Within this perpetual 
interweaving ‘another language comes to disturb the first one’194, and ‘haunts’ the 
first one. The first moment of interweaving belongs, Derrida suggests, to dialectics, 
i.e by interweaving the trace as a negative into a systematised totality of discourse. 
The second moment of interweaving, he argues, makes the first possible by 
functioning to make it possible it represents a diachronic moment which infinitely 
overflows the synchronous order. The examples that Derrida gives close attention to 
are those interweaved moments where Levinas draws attention to a certain present via 
the inscription of “at this moment” or “at this very moment” in Otherwise than Being 
or Beyond Essence. We must briefly examine Derrida’s analyses in order to recognise 
how it further illuminates the way in which Levinas’s later work no longer risks 
merely repeating Hegelianism but enacts a powerful displacement o f it.
Derrida focuses his attention on those instances in Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence where Levinas is most concerned with articulating the procedure for 
negotiating the non-negotiable (i.e. the Saying of the Saying in the Said) and its 
inevitable and necessary betrayal. Derrida argues that this act of negotiation is 
elaborated within a complex process of serial repetition that functions, through the 
indication of a ‘lapsus’, to disrupt or interrupt immanence. We will argue that the 
process of serial interruption described by Derrida is identical to the recurrent 
movement of skepticism and refutation evoked by Levinas. Both serial repetition and 
the movement of skepticism attempt to indicate a pre-original dislocation within a 
movement of apparent conjunction; in other words, to indicate the disjunction of two 
distinct times. Derrida attempts to identify two such distinct moments of ‘presence’ 
within the fabric of Levinas’s text, the first of which he cites as follows:
‘Every contestation and interruption of this power of discourse is at once related and 
invested by discourse. It thus recommences as soon as one interrupts it...This 
discourse will affirm itself to be coherent and one. In relating the interruption o f 
discourse or my being ravished into discourse I connect its thread ... Are we not at this
l(M J. Derrida. Ibid. p. IK
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very moment [my italics J.D.J in the process of barring the issue that our whole essay 
attempts, and of encircling our position from all sides? The exceptional words by 
which the trace of the past and the extravagance of the approach are said -  One, God 
-  become terms, reenter into the vocabulary, and are put at the disposition of 
philologists, instead of confounding philosophical language Their very explosions are 
recounted.. Thus the ladder-proof equivocation that language weaves signifies.’195
For Derrida this inscription of “at this very moment” essentially constitutes a citation 
of the enveloping power of immanent textuality, a text ‘resuming without end all its 
tears within itse lf196 (i.e. what Levinas characterises as the Said). However Derrida 
argues that the same “at this very moment”, occurring as it does two pages later, 
signifies radically otherwise. Here it signifies that “at this very moment” an 
interruptive fracture has always already occurred; which is, for Levinas, certain at the 
very moment that immanence pretends, as Derrida writes, to ‘reappropriate for itself 
the tear within the continuum o f its texture’. Levinas writes:
‘The intervals are not recuperated. Does not the discourse that suppresses the 
interruptions o f discourse by relating them maintain the discontinuity under the knots 
with which the thread is tied again? The interruptions of the discourse found again 
and recounted in the immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied 
again, the trace of a diachrony that does not enter into the present, that refuses 
simultaneity. And I still interrupt the ultimate discourse in which all the discourses are 
stated, in saying it to one that listens to it, and who is situated outside the said that the 
discourse says, outside all it includes. That is true of the discussion I am elaborating 
at this very moment [my italics J.D.]. This reference to an interlocutor permanently 
breaks through the text that the discourse claims to weave in thematising and 
enveloping all things. In totalising being, discourse qua discourse thus belies the very 
claim to totalize.’197
Derrida acknowledges that both inscriptions of “at this very moment” are of course 
the same remark or expression; however, from one moment to the next moment they
E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 169, cited by J. Derrida, Ibid, p. 21 
J. Derrida. Ibid, p.22
E. Levinas. Ibid, p.170, cited by J. Derrida. Ibid, pp.21-2
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are no longer the same. Thus they contrast radically with Hegel’s remarks in his 
account o f  ‘Sense-Certainty’ concerning the differentiation of the ‘Now’. Here the 
immediate ‘Now’ is no longer the same because of the time that will have passed. To 
recall Hegel’s own words on the same matter:
‘Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not... as a negative in 
general. This self-preserving Now is, therefore, not immediate but mediated; for it is 
determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now through the fact that something 
else is not... it is still just as simply Now as before, and in this simplicity is 
indifferent to what happens to it.’198
For Derrida both of the occurrences within Levinas’s text are inscribed within two 
radically different gestures, and this explicitly recalls the ‘two times’ solicited by 
Levinas in the discussion of the recurrent movement of skepticism and its refutation. 
The first present moment is itself determined by the present of a thematisation, in 
precisely the same way Hegel thematises the present ‘Now’ in his account of sense- 
certainty. As for Hegel it is a moment whose ‘presentation. . . pretends to encompass 
within itself the Relation which yet exceeds it, pretends to exceed it, precede it, and 
overflow it.’199 Hence, the first moment returns to the Same or to the immanent 
dialectic. However, the second inscription o f the present moment is no longer and 
never has been a present ‘same’ in the manner of the first moment. This second 
present moment suggests the critical essence of skepticism that Levinas evokes. To 
recall, for Levinas the recurrence of skepticism is rendered possible by a radical 
critical essence irreducible to immanence. Writing of the second inscription of 
presence Derrida writes:
‘Its ‘same’ is (will have been) dislocated by the very same thing which will have 
(probably, perhaps) been its ‘essence’, namely the Relation. It is in itself anachronic, 
in itself disparate, it no longer closes in upon itself. It is not what it is, in that strange 
and only probable essence, except by allowing itself beforehand to be opened up and 
deported by the Relation which makes it possible. The Relation will have made it
'*  G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f Spirit, #96. p.60 
J. Derrida, Ibid, p.21
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possible -  and, by the same stroke, impossible as presence, sameness, and assured
,200essence.
In this second ‘moment’ Levinas is attempting to make explicit the fact that he is 
pursuing the paradoxical themalisation of the radically unthematisable relation of 
substitution that does not permit further envelopment within the fabric of the same. 
Despite there being, between the two ‘moments’ (the “now” of recoverable 
thematisation and the “now” of paradoxical diachrony), a chronological, logical, 
rhetorical and ontological interval (just as there was with the alternation associated 
with the movement of skepticism and its refutation) it is nevertheless, Derrida claims, 
the ‘same moment, written and read in its difference. . . One belonging to dialectic and 
the other different from and deferring from the first, infinitely and in advance 
overflowing it. The second moment has an infinite advance on the first. And yet it is 
the same.’20 01
It is the persistent traversal between the two moments that comes to constitute what 
Levinas calls ‘transcendence in immanence’. Derrida characterises this movement 
with a notion he terms ‘sé nature’. This notion is understood as a process of 
repetition202, without which Levinas would be unable to offer the probable essence of 
language as a relation to the Other, or what he terms the hors série 203 The hors série 
represents the fact that the series comprises not only the ‘threads’ or the paths that 
interweave the mesh of language, but the interruption of the threads or paths. Saying 
persistently interrupts the very weaving of linguistic threads only to be simultaneously 
rewoven back into the tom mesh. Yet this reweaving is not, Derrida claims, a simple 
relinking of tom thread; thus a new knot is not only to be woven from threads but 
from the very interruption of threads. The hors série does not therefore weave threads 
but the interruptions or the intervals of hiatus between them. The hors série is, strictly
200 Ibid, p.24
201 Ibid
2,12 The notion of ‘siriature' introduced here by Derrida here has clear resonance with Lcvinas's own 
discussion of the recurrence of skepticism despite its refutation. Both skepticism and 'siriature'
suggest the notion of repetition in order to signify an ‘absolute’ beyond immanence, i.e. a means to 
signify pre-original transcendence despite immanence. Derrida writes: 'Obligation binds and unbinds. 
He will have obligated: bound and unbound, bound in unbinding “together”, in the “same” scriasurc 
(siriature) in the same dia-synchrony, in a serial at once, the “many times” that will have taken place 
only once. He will have bound/unbound an obligation that obligates', p.30 
” Sec E. Levinas, Ibid, p. 170, ‘The approach, or saying is a relationship with what is not understood 
in the together, the out-of-thc-serics (hors sirie)'.
speaking, without a single knot simply because it links a multiplicity of interruptions 
without threads. These serial interruptions are what Derrida terms sérialure, which he 
characterises by a notion of ‘de-slricluralion absolue’, which indicates the absence of 
the destination of the trace and impossibility of return. This ‘absolute de- 
stricturation’, the impossibility of stricture, has to be, Derrida claims, mediated 
through the stricture of language. The reason for this, he claims, is that ‘in order that 
two annulments or two excesses not be equivalent, within indetermination, the ab­
solving erasure must not be absolutely absolute. 1 must therefore make each atom of 
an utterance appear faulty and absolved’.204 It must be negotiated in terms of stricture 
and series. However, such a contamination is not wholly ‘negative’ since it does not 
detract from the trace but constitutes the very process of tracing. For Derrida the 
necessity of negotiating the trace makes one interruption, one trace, insufficient for 
guarding the alterity of the other. There must be a persistent process of sérialure. 
Thus Sérialure characterises an ongoing interweaving of the trace of the Other which 
lets the trace abandon its trace, absolve itself from it and remain other. Sérialure is 
therefore not only an interweaving or an interlacing (entrelacer) but also what Derrida 
terms an en-tracing (entracer); sérialure is the very performing of what Derrida calls 
‘renlr(el)acemenl’. This represents his understanding o f Levinas’s notion o f ‘letting- 
the-trace’, a process whereby the Other announces itself on its own basis rather than 
on the basis of being. This letting-of-the-trace implies abandonment, a leaving of the 
trace, which does not insist upon a sign, but effaces itself only to let-the-trace of a 
trace of the Other. Thus letting-the-trace o f the Other performs otherwise than letting- 
be. Indeed it marks, for Levinas, a meaning beyond being.
Derrida argues that the repetitive inscription whereby Saying is betrayed in the Said 
manages to un-say the Said, and betray its betrayal of ethical Saying. By inscribing 
that betrayal of ethical Saying, writing is able to articulate the serial structure of 
sérialure whereby the an-archic betrayal o f betrayal is effaced and the wholly Other 
liberated. Through the power of iteration writing is able to efface traces of Saying’s 
effacement in the Said and thus reinscribe Saying as the trace of the un-sayable within 
the Said. The present of iterative inscription allows an unpresentable notion to exceed 
the present of its representative inscription in scriptural iteration because the power of
204 J Derrida. Ibid, p.35
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iteration peculiar to writing always serially exceeds the presence of the present in 
which it presents itself. So when Levinas seeks to tell, “at this very moment”, of that 
which exceeds all telling he inevitably betrays it. However, what exceeds all telling is 
the Saying of this telling itself, i.e. the evocation of the One to whom it is addressed. 
Yet it can only ever be partially and unsuccessfully betrayed because it remains 
addressed by Saying even in the Saying of the Said in which it is betrayed The 
coherence of the “at this very moment” as a present of the Said encompassing the 
ethical interruption o f the present, is itself realised through the in-coherence of 
another “at this very moment”. This is a moment of Saying offered to the Other that 
interrupts the encompassing present in which it is incorporated without 
comprehension (even as it renders its own inclusion within that present possible). For 
Derrida the ontological present itself is constituted and deconstituted across an 
immeasurable interval of a lapse which separates the presence of the Same as present 
from itself in order to bind it into the unity of the present.
Levinas recognises that ethical signification can only be paradoxically counterpoised 
to the significance he intends to convey; thus every word he writes is necessarily a 
self-interruption Such failure may be sufficiently interrupted (an interruption of 
interruption) by Saying which ‘resounds’ or is heard otherwise within the thematic 
denotative constraints of language. Thus it would be a grave error to interpret 
Levinas’s procedures of disengaging ethics from immanent ontology through the 
careful and emphatic use of the concepts of ontological discourse as conclusively 
succeeding, or as stating with certainty the modality of transcendence It should be 
clear that that kind of success (a success arguably demanded by Hegelians) would be 
an automatic defeat of Levinas’s thought. Such a demand would simply function to 
reduce the transcendence of the ethical back into immanence, rather than as signifying 
an irrecuperable transcendence in immanence (As we outlined earlier, such a failure 
was one of the central concerns of Derrida’s early commentary.) However his texts 
are only able to ‘successfully’ signify a pre-original obligation toward the Other by 
means of a profound enigma or epiphany, i.e. as an undoing of every undoing, as an 
interruption of every thematic investiture, and as a failure in terms of what 
Hegelianism would measure as a success. His work must function as a deliberate 
auto-interruption akin to the persistent recurrence of the critical essence of skepticism 
if it is to avoid falling prey to the type of Hegelian concerns articulated by Derrida’s
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early article, and the charges of naivety, dogmatism and abstraction made by 
Hegelians. The ultimate effectiveness o f his work lies beyond anything he is actually 
able to definitively demonstrate, and our response as readers cannot be the result of a 
type of persuasion garnered through arguments organised around the priority of the 
logos. Levinas cannot make us respond ethically on this level precisely because his 
work functions to trouble and disrupt the very connection between persuasion and 
veracity. Indeed the disruption of good conscience is, for Levinas, ethics. Only within 
the order of being does rectification, truth, falsity and certainty obtain a meaningful 
purchase. Levinas’s task is to demonstrate that the involutions of being qua being 
neither exhaust nor exercise a monopoly over ‘sense’. Indeed, as he argues in his 
essay ‘God and Philosophy’:
‘We must ask if beyond the intelligibility and rationalism of identity, consciousness, 
the present, and being -  beyond the intelligibility of immanence -  the signifyingness, 
rationality, and rationalism of transcendence are not understood. Over and beyond 
being, does not a meaning whose priority, translated into ontological language would 
have to be called antecedent to being, not show itself ’205
With the understanding we have developed of the way Levinas evokes an affective 
quality that allows for a persistently recurrent movement of skepticism (a movement 
analogous to the recurrent and disruptive articulation of the ethical) we are able to 
understand the way in which he attempts to displace the priority o f  Hegelian 
immanent ontology. The way in which he solicits a sense of the wholly other in his 
later work is intrinsically bound up with the critical essence that permits its legitimate 
recurrence despite its refutation in rational and ontological discourse. It is necessary 
to conclude our thesis by proceeding with a detailed and rigorous examination of a 
specific example of the type of displacement of Hegel’s thought that Levinas’s work 
actually permits. This more detailed textual engagement with Hegel occurs in the 
context of Levinas’s lectures on Death and Time, to which we must now turn our 
attention.
E. Levinas. God and Philosophy' in Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by A. Lingis (The 
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Vili - Death in Hegel -  A Scandal
Between November 1975 and May 1976 Levinas presented a lecture course under the 
title La Mori el le Temps (Death and Time).W6 The overall theme o f these lectures is 
the negativity of death, and their fundamental contention is that there has been an 
insufficient thinking of the nothingness proper to death by the philosophical tradition. 
Indeed, he claims that ‘In death ...we arrive at something that European philosophy 
has not thought.’207 Throughout the lectures Levinas provides a series of powerful 
insights into how the thought of Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger, Bloch and Fink 
fare with regard to the attempt to think what he argues is a nothingness proper to 
death For Levinas the authentic negativity of death is a negativity that exceeds 
thought and which represents an enigma. Crucially it is a form o f negativity that 
differs radically from the spirituality of German Idealism, particularly Hegelianism, 
where the nothingness or negativity of death is the condition of the life of the Spirit. 
As Jacques Rolland writes in an essay on Levinas’s lectures:
‘It is a negativity to be grasped -  or suffered -  in the ineffectiveness that it induces, in 
what Blanchot would call its neutrality. A negativity , that Levinas does not avoid, 
and before which he does not turn away...but of which he only asks whether 
nothingness is sufficient to h.,M*
In the lectures Levinas does not deny the nothingness of death, rather he argues that it 
is the task of the philosopher to search for and analyse the quality proper to this 
nothingness. For Levinas it is a crucial task to think that nothingness with which, for 
an entire philosophical tradition, death is confounded or reduced. As Jacques Rolland 
writes, ‘thinking about death must cross over the nothingness or, as Hegel would say, 2
2“’ These lectures were published together with his 1975/6 lectures entitled 'Dieu et I 'onto-théo-logie' 
(God and Ontotheology) as Dieu, la mort et le temps (Paris: Grasset, 1993) in English as God, Death 
and Time, translated by B. Bcrgo (Slandford: Standford U P. 2000)
201 Ibid, p.70
2I* J. Rolland, 'Death in its Negativity', translated by B. Bcrgo in Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal, Vol. 2<>No.2-Vol. 21 No.l. 1998: l^vlnas s Contribution to Contemporary Philosophy, cds. 
B. Bcrgo & D. Perpich. p.463. Sec also J. Holland's postscript to these lectures De l'autre homme -  Le 
temps, la mort cl le Dieu’, pp.263-279 (‘On the Other Man: Time, Death and God’, pp.225-239).
Further insights into these lectures are contained inT. Chanter's paper ’Traumatic Response - 
Lcvinas's Legacy' in Philosophy Today. 1997 Supplement, pp. 19-27 and J. Derrida’s Adieu à 
Emmanuel le  vinos (Editions Galilée, ¡997) in English as Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, translated P- 
A. Brault & M. Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1999)
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must “look it in the face”’.209 By crossing over this notion of nothingness Levinas is 
able to posit what he claims is nothingness proper to death. This is a notion he argues 
has defied the philosophical tradition:
‘In death, as pure nothingness, as foundationless -  which we feel more dramatically, 
with the acuteness of that nothingness that is greater in death than in the idea of the 
nothingness of being (in the there is [i ly a], which wounds less than disappearance 
does) -  we arrive at something that European philosophy has not thought. We 
understand corruption, transformation, dissolution. We understand that shapes or 
forms pass into and out of being, while something subsists. Death contrasts with all 
that; it is inconceivable, refractory to thought, and yet unexceptionable and 
undeniable. It is not a phenomenon; hardly thematizable, unthinkable -  the irrational 
begins there. Even in anxiety, even through anxiety, death remains unthought. To 
have experienced anxiety does not allow one to think it. Nothingness has defied 
Western thought.’210
By seeking a non-ontological meaning in death he attempts to uncover the radical 
alterity of death, its refusal of the categories of being and the precise way it presents 
us with excess'.
‘Death indicates a meaning that surprises -  as if annihilation could introduce us to a 
meaning that is not limited to nothingness.’2"
Levinas attempts to disclose how death is radically disquieting by arguing that there is 
in death a surplus of meaning that is uncontainable. The ‘Is it possible that he is 
dead?’ represents a question beyond the remit of rational ontology; it represents, he 
claims, a fundamentally ethical question. His approach essentially consists of thinking 
the nothingness proper to death through an analysis of the significance of the death of 
the Other. He argues that the death of the Other represents a scandal as if it were a 
question of murder, and approaches the question of the death of the Other as my
Ibid, p.467
2,0 E. Levinas. (md. Death and 'time, p.70 
,n Ibid, p.13
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taking on the responsibility o f  being a survivor. In an interview given in 1987 Levinas 
claims:
‘I think that to approach the face of the other is to worry directly about his death, and 
this means to regard him straightaway as mortal, finite. The directness of death is the 
face of the other because the face is being looked on by death. It is like the origin of 
the straight line. One can neither prove the origin, nor define it. It is directness in 
itself, the directness of death. And his death, your death, is immediately present to me, 
even though I do everything possible in order to forget it. What nonetheless remains 
behind the scenes is the ethical, an original being delivered over to the other -  
love.’212
By invoking the tradition that is unable to sustain the thought of nothingness proper to 
death Levinas introduces his detailed engagement with the thought of Hegel. Thus his 
discussion of Hegel is prefaced by a brief discussion o f Aristotle; he argues that 
Aristotle’s thought represents a refusal to think nothingness in itself. For Aristotle it is 
always a matter of the way in which being becomes another being; becoming is a 
movement and for Levinas this renders it impossible to think the negativity proper to 
death Aristotle’s notion o f ‘metabolè’ may seem, he argues, to admit the turning of 
being into nothingness, and it may appear to admit the separation of nothingness from 
being. However, corruption in his analysis is always thought as closely related to 
generation. Although Aristotle distinguishes corruption and generation from 
alteration, Levinas argues that ‘metabole preserves the style of alteration, where being 
subsists in nothingness in such a way that nothingness is not thought as a pure 
nothing’.213 For Levinas, the notion of nothingness thought here is ‘nothingness as 
dissolution, annihilation as decomposition in which something subsists even if the 
forms of things pass away’214:
‘For him, it is impossible to think annihilation with the acuteness with which it 
announces itself in anxiety. For Aristotle, where becoming is movement, it is 
impossible to think the change that is death. The metahole is the turning of being into
212 E. Levinas, Is It R iyhteoux T o  Re? Interviews with Em m anuel levinas, edited by J. Robbins 
(Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2001), pp. 134-5
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nothingness, and Aristotle seems in this sense to acknowledge the possibility of 
thinking being and nothingness separately. But in his analyses, corruption, or the 
passage to nothingness, is always thought of in connection with generation. . . Thus 
nothingness appears, in Aristotle, as a moment of essence, as the negativity proper to 
being, whose essence is finite. Not-yet-to-be or no-longer-to-be will be negative for 
Aristotle’215
Levinas’s thinking of the nothingness of death is a thought of nothingness ‘pregnant 
with nothing at all [n’est gros de neri]. . .ax\ absolutely indeterminate nothingness that 
alludes to no being’.216 Thus the fundamental nothingness proper to death cannot be 
legitimately conveyed by the notion of annihilation, non-being or nothingness; rather, 
it is a certain experience for the survivor of what he terms the ‘without-response’. The 
nothingness proper to death is conveyed by the sense of the death of someone, and the 
having-been of someone is carried not by the one dying but by the survivor. Levinas 
argues:
‘We should think of all the murder there is in death; every death is a murder, is 
premature, and there is the responsibility of the survivor. Aristotle does not think 
nothingness in this way. For him, that does not “demolish” the world; the world• ,2 1 7remains.
In these lectures he argues that the nothingness proper to death is absolutely 
inseparable from my relation to the Other, and that ‘my relation with death is. made 
up o f the emotional and intellectual repercussions of the knowledge of the death of 
others’218:
‘The death of the Other who dies affects me in my very identity as a responsible “me” 
[/no/]; it affects me in my nonsubstantial identity, which is not the simple coherence 
of various acts of identification, but is made up of an ineffable responsibility. My 
being affected by the death of the Other is precisely that, my relation with his death. It 21
21 ’ Ibid, pp.69-70 
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is, in my relation, my deference to someone who no longer responds, already a 
culpability -  the culpability of the survivor.’219
In these lectures Levinas argues that the nothingness proper to death is conveyed by 
my responsibility for the death of the Other, and that ‘the death of the Other affects 
me more than my own’.220 The death of the Other has the effect of putting me in 
question and poses the question of my response as a survivor. The question of my 
responsibility for others includes my responsibility for the death of the Other as a 
survivor. This responsibility is elevated above my anxiety before my own death, and 
another question arises behind the question of being, a profound question irreducible 
to its terms, a question regarding whether the very humanity o f man is defined by that 
which man ‘is’. Levinas writes:
‘We are asking whether the humanity of man is defined only by that which man is, or 
whether in the face that asks for me a meaning other, and older, than the ontological 
one is in the process of becoming meaningful and awakening us to another thought 
than that of knowledge ’2il
Levinas asks whether a thinking o f the nothingness proper to death can in fact be 
discerned in certain moments of Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit, moments where 
the nothingness of death is thought apart from a process or thought of ‘becoming’ or 
Aristotelian metahole. Is there in Hegel a thinking of the nothingness proper to death 
as an end to all ‘becoming’? Levinas claims that in the opening pages of Hegel’s 
analysis of ‘Spirit’ in the Phenomenology o f Spirit121 we indeed arrive at an authentic 
thinking of death, and it is to these arguments that we will now turn.
(i) Levinas's Reading of Hegel's ‘Phenomenology'
The entire effort of Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit might perhaps be read as a 
meditation upon the ‘negativity’ of death, but a very specific notion of death. Hegel 
argues that what is limited to a natural life (what he terms Dasein) is not able to
219 Ibid, p. 12
22,1 Ibid, p. 105
221 E. Levinas, O f  G o d  Who Comes to Mind, p.167
222 O.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology o f  Spirit, #438-476, pp.263-289
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transcend itself immanently. An other must, he argues, push it beyond itself. This 
being pushed or tom from its position is its death. Dasein is only what it is and its 
concept, Hegel argues, is entirely outside it. Thus Dasein belongs to nature The 
negation of Dasein, on account of its finitude must necessarily come about as a 
negation alien to it, a negation it does not include for itself. However, this is not the 
case with consciousness. Consciousness, he claims, is for itself its own concept, which 
is to say that it is for its own self the negation of its limited forms, or, of its own 
death. Thus, whereas in nature death is an external negation, consciousness or spirit 
carries death within itself and posits a positive meaning to it. The meditation on death 
in the Phenomenology o f Spirit is a meditation on the notion of death carried by 
consciousness that (far from being exclusively negative or an end point in an abstract 
nothingness) is an Aufhebung -  an ascent or a becoming.
The death of natural Dasein is merely the abstract negation of a term, which is only 
what it is. However for consciousness death is a necessary moment by means of 
which it survives itself and rises to a new form. Death is therefore only the beginning 
of a new life of consciousness, and in this manner consciousness (being for its self its 
own concept) incessantly transcends itself; the death of what is held as its truth is the 
appearance of a new truth. Thus Hegel writes:
‘The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth 
only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something 
positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that it is 
nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away and pass on to something 
else, on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and 
tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it 
into being.
For Hegel the anguish that possesses human consciousness drives it before itself until 
it is no longer an abstract human consciousness, but reaches absolute knowledge. This 
absolute knowledge is at once a circle o f  knowledge of the object and self-knowledge.
2”  G.W.F. Hegel, Ibid #32, p.19
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For Levinas, however, there exists a thinking of the nothingness proper to death in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit which approaches an adequate thinking of ‘the whole 
scandal that is this end, which is expressed in the affective register . and which shall 
be stated here in moral terms (responsibility for the death of another, the scandal of 
every new death)’.214 If there is a thinking of the nothingness proper to death in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit, it is precisely because of the ethical significance it attains 
there. Levinas argues:
‘We must search not for a positive thought for death but rather for a responsibility 
according to the measure or the beyond-measure of death. We must search for a 
response that is not a response but responsibility, that is not of the same measure as a 
world but belongs to the beyond-measure of the infinite.’115
The specific moment of the Phenomenology o f Spirit Levinas analyses in the lectures 
is the moment of Immediate Ethical Substance that emerges from the transition to 
Spirit from Reason. This transition describes the point at which the individual 
transcends its own particularity in which it had seemed terminally enclosed towards 
the self understood as universal self. In reason the individual self-consciousness takes 
itself to know what is immediately just and good, and proclaims edicts that must be 
immediately valid, such as ‘Everyone must tell the truth’ or ‘Love your neighbour as 
yourself. However Hegel demonstrates how these edicts actually prove to be 
inadequate with regard to the necessity that they express. Thus the necessity undoes 
itself through manifesting a degree o f contingency that derives from the individuality 
of the consciousness that formulated them. Whilst we must tell the truth, doing so 
depends upon one knowing what truth is, and that knowledge depends upon specific 
circumstances and individual conviction. Hegel argues that to understand the 
commandment ‘Love your neighbour as yourself properly must mean to understand 
it as ‘Love your neighbour intelligently’ -  ‘Unintelligent love will perhaps do him 
more harm than hatred’. However, as Hegel argues:
‘Intelligent, substantial beneficence is, however, in its richest and most important 
form the intelligent universal action o f the State -  an action compared with which the
224
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action of a single individual, as an individual, is so insignificant that it is hardly worth 
talking about.’216
These immediate commandments lose their immediateness and are shown to be as 
arbitrary as the individual consciousness that formulates them. For Hegel the 
contingency of merely particular content is transcended by substance qua universality 
and necessity. However when the individual claims to legislate, his commandments 
appear as if  from a particular self-consciousness and remain merely arbitrary orders -  
the orders of a master. In substance these orders are not only orders but exist and are 
valid in themselves. They are in-themselves, but the commandment by a specific 
consciousness gives them a persisting arbitrary character that in no way corresponds 
to their ‘absolute’ nature
Hegel then shows that the specific self who has thought through universality and 
necessity still has one final recourse. Rather than legislating immediately it can 
examine the laws themselves. The content is given, and now consciousness becomes 
the mere unit of measure that tests that content in order to ascertain its absolute 
validity. Thus we are brought to an implicit engagement with Kant, who had 
proclaimed the rule that expresses nothing but the general condition in which any 
maxim can be established as an absolute universal law. For Hegel this manner of 
testing o f an already existing content can proclaim nothing but tautologies. Indeed he 
claims that the scrutiny of laws may already be the beginning of the immorality of an 
individual consciousness:
‘If 1 inquire after their origin and confine them to the point whence they arose, then 1 
have transcended them; for now it is I who am the universal, and they are the 
conditioned and limited. If they are supposed to be validated by my insight, then I 
have already denied their unshakeable, intrinsic being, and regard them as something 
which, for me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true. Ethical disposition consists 
just in sticking steadfastly to what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move 
or shake it, or derive it.’26 27
226 G.W.F. Hegel, Ibid, #425, p.255
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Thus far individual consciousness has appeared in its negative behaviour towards 
ethical substance and substance has thus far appeared only in the form of the 
particular individual’s will and knowledge. It exists only as the ‘must-be’ of a 
commandment that lacks actual reality, or as the knowledge of a formal universality. 
Laws are not the arbitrary commandments of specific individual consciousness, and 
are not grounded in the will of a specific individual. Rather, they are valid in 
themselves. Thus Hegel argues:
‘The law is equally an eternal law which is grounded not in the will of a particular 
individual, but is valid in and for itself, it is the absolute pure will of all which has the 
form of immediate being. . . it is not a commandment, which only ought to be: it is and 
is valid; it is the universal T  of the category, the T  which is immediately a reality, 
and the world is only this reality. But since the existent law is valid unconditionally, 
the obedience o f  self-consciousness is not the serving of a master whose commands 
were arbitrary, and in which it would not recognise itself. On the contrary, laws are 
the thoughts o f its own absolute consciousness, thoughts which are immediately its 
own ..Ethical self-consciousness is immediately one with essential being through the 
universality of its self.’,J8
Consciousness has suppressed itself as a specific consciousness and has effected the 
mediation by which laws lose their arbitrary nature. It is only because such mediation 
is accomplished that consciousness again becomes the self-consciousness o f ethical 
substance The essence is self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is the 
consciousness o f  essence We have reached the notion of Spirit, insofar as Spirit is the 
concrete substance, i.e. reason posited as being. Spirit is a ‘we’ and is history -  it 
realises itself only through a historical development because each of its moments, in 
making itself essence, must realise itself as an original world, and because its being is 
not at all distinct from the action through which it poses itself. Spirit is knowledge of 
itself in its history -  it is ultimately a return to itself through, and by means of, that 
history -  a return such that nothing alien subsists in and for Spirit and such that Spirit 
knows itself as what it is and is what it knows itself to be.
2”  Ibid. #436, pp.260-1
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At first Spirit exists immediately (it is there as an immediate historical given, i.e. as 
the existence of a people) as a community aware of itself as living within a concrete 
totality. The world now is reason rendered real and self-consciousness is not 
counterposed to it. Rather self-consciousness recognises itself in the world 
immediately. To say, as Hegel does, that Spirit exists immediately is to show that it is 
still nature -  that morality is custom, and that the self immediately knows the laws of 
its action. Hegel insists, contra Kant, that such immediateness is a necessary condition 
of moral action. He claims that no decision is possible without a certain presence of 
what must be done -  an existential ‘this’ or givenness, or what Hegel comes to term 
‘Divine Law’. This is a term explicitly derived from Hegel’s introduction of 
Sophocles’ Antigone and, more specifically, Antigone’s appeal to ‘the unwritten and 
infallible law of the gods’ .229 As he argued earlier, the merely legislative activity of a 
formal consciousness does not culminate in action, and an examination of laws is 
already a slide toward immorality. In the Immediate Ethical Substance Divine Law is 
given and immutable and must simply be accepted, whereas the Human Law that 
emerges parallel to it must be constructed and intelligible, it is a proper object of 
rational deliberation. However, the two realms remain in a complex reciprocal 
relationship with each other, as Hegel writes:
‘Human Law proceeds in its living process from the divine, the law valid on earth 
from that of the nether world, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from 
immediacy -  and equally returns whence it came. The power of the nether world, on 
the other hand, has its actual existence on earth, through consciousness, it becomes 
existence and activity.’210
For Hegel this is ultimately a movement in consciousness characterised by a 
consciousness which grasps its being only in contrast to an other, and sets itself off 
against a background of unconsciousness. Divine Law is marked as much by its 
hiddenness as it is by its givenness; and the effort within the Immediate Ethical Order 
to clarify it through the institutions of government is to be recognised as a natural 
imperative that is present within Divine Law itself. Thus:
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‘The commands of government have a universal, public meaning open to the light of 
day; the will o f the other law, however, is locked up in the darkness of the nether 
regions.’231
Both realms here are expressed primarily through the notion of immediate natural 
necessity where male consciousness assigns itself to the realm of the Human Law, 
whilst female consciousness remains devoted to the older, primary, Divine Law (as 
Hegel writes, ‘the self-consciousness confronting the substance assigns to itself 
according to its nature one of these powers’232). Hegel argues that each power 
complements the other, though essentially each is the other for the other. Human Law 
expresses the actual action or ‘deed’ of self-consciousness, whilst Divine Law has the 
form of immediate substance, or the substance posed only in the element of being. 
Thus it is the Family that is the very substance of ethical life as pure and simple 
immediateness, i.e. as nature. He writes:
‘This moment which expresses the ethical sphere in this element of immediacy or 
[simple] being, or which is an immediate consciousness of itself, both as essence and 
as this particular self, in an ‘other’, i.e. as a natural ethical community -  this is the 
Family The Family, as the unconscious, still inner Notion [of the ethical order], 
stands opposed to its actual, self-conscious existence; as the element of the nation’s 
actual existence, it stands opposed to the nation itself; as the immediate being of the 
ethical order, it stands over against that order which shapes and maintains itself by 
working for the universal, the Penates stand opposed to the universal spirit.’233
Levinas begins his own analysis by briefly outlining the essential characteristics of 
Hegel’s notion of Immediate Ethical Spirit, before proceeding with a discussion of 
what he recognises as a significant notion of death there. He begins with an outline of 
Hegel’s claim that the life of the whole, the overall interaction of Divine and Human 
Law is characterised by a double movement of expansion and contraction. Hegel 
argues that specific individuals existing at the level of Immediate Ethical Spirit are
Ibid. #466, p.280 Ibid, #445. p.266 Ibid. #450. p.268
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able to become aware o f their being-for-self because of the power of what he terms 
‘the simple self of the entire ethical substance’234, i.e. the State. This power flows 
within the individual by virtue of belonging to an immediate ethical order. He writes:
‘This simple power does indeed allow the Family to expand into its constituent 
members, and to give to each part an enduring being and a being-for-self o f its
own.’235
However, this expansion ultimately threatens to culminate in negating the simple 
individuality of social spirit, i.e. the State, that is its condition of possibility. Hegel 
shows how this expansion that threatens to negate the State and the unified ethical 
realm of human law is itself negated:
‘Spirit is at the same time the power of the whole, which brings these parts together 
again into a negative unity, giving them the feeling of their lack of independence, and 
keeping them aware that they have their life only in the whole.’236
This negation of negation occurs through the imposition of a state of war. In its 
negative action the government or state acts to essentially restrict particular systems, 
i.e Families, which are in the process of splitting off from the whole. Hegel writes:
‘In order not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby breaking up 
the whole and letting the [communal] spirit evaporate, government has from time to 
time to shake them to their core by war.’237
In the absence of war individuals return, through enjoyment, acquisition of wealth, 
etc., to a state of pure and simple immediate nature. War is needed by governments to 
resist the centrifugal movement that is the individualisation into separate isolated 
Family units under the direction of the feminine, or what Hegel terms that principle of 
‘specificity’. As the negation of that negation war brings about a return of the
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awareness of their ultimate dependency on the human law. Levinas gives an account 
of this moment in his lectures:
‘Individuals can become aware of their being for self within the State, because the 
awareness the State has of itself is a force from which everyone benefits, since 
everyone has been recognised by this law. Nonetheless, being recognised in this way, 
the units inside the State, that is, the families, can in this atmosphere of security 
separate themselves from the Whole; that is, they can become abstract. It is war that 
will back those individuals detached from the Whole. Without war, individuals would 
return to the state of pure and simple nature, to the immediate, to the absolutely 
abstract.’23*
Levinas cites Hegel’s argument that government in the realm of human law must act 
upon the potentially corrosive and destructive forces of the ‘individuals who, 
absorbed in their own way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after 
inviolable independence and security of the person, are made to feel in the task laid on 
them their lord and master, death.’239 Death appears as an absolute master, and such 
an appearance is significant for Levinas. How this notion of death becomes important 
for Hegel will not become clear until we have explained precisely in what the ‘ethical 
spirit’ of the family consists. We must understand the role death has in returning the 
family from its expansionary abstractness to an immediately ethical realm. As Levinas 
writes:
‘The family is. some-thing natural, it is the substratum of life from which the human 
law detaches itself. But family is also the immediate nature of spirit, and thus it is not 
pure nature; it has an ethical principle.’240
Our task now is to attempt to understand this ethical principle, the ethic proper to the 
family, and the role that death as its master plays in it. Hegel begins by arguing:
E. Levinas, (rod. Death and  Time, p.HI 
*  G.W.F. Hegel, Ibid, #455, pp 272-3 
24,1 E. Levinas. Ibid. p.K2
2 3 2
‘The Family is immediately determined as an ethical being, it is within itself an 
ethical entity only so far as it is not the natural relationship of its members, or so far 
as their connection is an immediate connection of separate, actual individuals, for the 
ethical principle is intrinsically universal, and this natural relationship is just as much 
a spiritual one, and it is only as a spiritual entity that it is ethical. We have to see what 
constitutes its peculiar ethical character. In the first place, because the ethical 
principle is intrinsically universal, the ethical connection between the members of the 
Family is not that o f  feeling, or the relationship of love.’241
Hegel argues that the fundamental ethical goal of the Family is to ‘create’ individual 
virtuous citizens. Indeed, it would seem that the principal function o f the family is to 
be an ethical means, where its authentic ethical goal would appear to be to sublate 
itself through ‘creating’ individuals capable of purely civic life. Its function would 
seem to consist, as Hegel argues, ‘in expelling the individual from the Family, 
subduing the natural aspect and separateness of his existence, and training him to be 
virtuous, to a life in and for the universal.’242 On this understanding the Family itself, 
as an ethical institution, aims wholly to foster the creation of the citizen. However, in 
this process of ‘creating’ citizens within the Natural realm of the Family there exists 
no truly ethical relationship at all -  there is there no relationship of free commitment 
and equal recognition. The question remains how it is that the necessarily ethically 
independent ‘citizen’ remains ethically related to the family that ‘created’ him or her 
as independent. Hegel expresses these difficulties thus:
‘The positive End peculiar to the Family is the individual as such.. The content of the 
ethical action must be substantial or whole and universal, therefore it can only be 
related to the whole individual or to the individual qua universal.’241
Since the ethical is in-itself universal, it cannot bear on any notion of contingent 
individuality (such as this specific existing family member) rather, it can only bear on 
the idea of individuality, on what individuality becomes as a shadow when it is finally 
liberated from all the accidents of life For Hegel the ethical principle or ‘deed’ proper
341 G W F Hegel. Ibid, #451. pp 268-9
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to the family concerns neither the citizen per se, nor the individual who is to become a 
citizen. Such an individual, he argues, ceases to count as this particular individual. 
Therefore, the ‘deed’ ultimately concerns ‘this particular individual who belongs to 
the Family, but is taken as a universal being freed from his sensuous, i.e. individual 
reality. The deed no longer concerns the living but the dead, the individual who, after 
a long succession of separate disconnected experiences, concentrates himself into a 
single completed shape, and has raised himself out of the unrest of the accidents of 
life into the calm of simple universality.’244 Death appears here as the movement of 
the specific individual into the universal. In merely living nature the species 
transcends the specific individual in a way that the negation appears wholly external. 
The specific individual does not carry his own death within himself and death appears 
as a natural negation: ‘This universality which the individual as such attains is pure 
being, death; it is a state which has been reached immediately, in the course of Nature, 
not the result of an action consciously done.’243 Death appears as a fact of pure nature 
in the spiritual world where the dead person is reduced to a pure thing, prey to 
elemental forces, to the earth, or to other living beings. However, this movement of 
the specific individual into the universal occurs within a community, which is why the 
primary ethical function o f the family is to restore to death its true meaning. Thus, the 
primary ethical function of the family is to remove death from nature and to make of 
it a spiritual act. Levinas will claim that here ‘the relationship with death is inscribed, 
or more precisely, with the dead one’.246 The family replaces the action of nature with 
its own. It gives meaning to death by substituting itself for nature and raises the dead 
to the universality of Spirit. Thus death itself becomes an action of consciousness. 
Hegel writes:
‘The duty of the member of a Family is on that account to add this aspect, in order 
that the individual’s ultimate being, too, shall not belong solely to Nature and remain 
something irrational, but shall be something done, and the right of consciousness be 
asserted in it.’247
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Burial, as a conscious act performed by the surviving family members, completes the 
record of a life of free rational activity with an act of ethical recognition. The essential 
truth that this free rational life belongs to a persistent communal ethical continuity 
must be maintained. As a mere material thing, the dead body returns through 
dissolution and putrefaction to the universal order of inorganic Being:
‘The dead individual, by having liberated his being from his action or his negative 
unity, is an empty singular, merely a passive being-for-another, at the mercy of every 
lower irrational individuality and the forces of abstract material elements, all of which 
are now more powerful than himself.’248
The survivors cannot allow the essential universality o f spirit to appear to be produced 
by nature, and they must act to make the ethical truth visible. Hegel characterised 
such a responsibility as an interruption of the work of nature itself, and as the 
‘rescuing’ of the dead individual from destruction. Thus it takes upon itself the act of 
destruction. The responsibility proper to the Family is to resist the power of the 
natural forces of dissolution and putrefaction by replacing its own power in its place. 
This power is the ritual or ceremony of burial, where the family ‘weds the blood- 
relation to the bosom of the earth, to the elemental imperishable individuality’.249 The 
family rescues the dead individual from the natural elemental destructive forces, and 
as such reinscribes him or her back into the ethical community ‘which prevails over 
and holds under control the forces o f  the particular material elements and the lower 
forms of life, which sought to unloose themselves against his and to destroy him’.290 
Levinas writes that ‘the act of burying is a relation with the deceased, and not with the 
cadaver’.251
The completion of a free existence in death must be recognised, and this act of 
recognition ultimately renders the free self into a ‘spirit’ by identifying it with the 
universal ethical community to which it naturally belonged, i.e. the Family. The 
ethical requirement that recognition must be accorded displays the ethic proper to the 
Family, and it is in the communal respect for the family cult of the dead that the true
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ethical substance comes to exist. As such, for Hegel, the obligation to bury the dead is 
an absolute and infinite responsibility. To claim that burial is essentially the very 
essence of Divine Law is to believe that no humanly constituted authority ought to 
interfere with the way that ‘custom’ has structured the very ‘feelings’ that exist as 
recognised bonds of kinship. For Hegel, the ceremony of burial is the only genuine 
ethical aspect of custom beyond the range of self-conscious human authority As an 
infinite responsibility or obligation, it must remain unconditional. He writes:
‘This last duty thus constitutes the perfect divine law, or the positive ethical action 
towards the individual. Every other relationship to him. . .belongs to human law and 
has the negative significance of raising the individual above his confinement within 
the natural community to which he in his [natural] existence belongs.’252
Levinas argues that within the act or ceremony of burial ‘there is an exceptional 
relationship of the living with the dead’. The burial rite is a deliberate relationship of 
the living with death, through their relationship with the deceased. With this notion of 
an infinite responsibility for the death of the Other Hegel’s thought approaches a 
certain proximity to Levinas’s notion of a thought of nothingness proper to death, a 
thought of the nothingness of death as a ‘responsibility according to the measure or 
the beyond-measure o f death. . . to the beyond-measure of the infinite’.255 There is at 
this moment in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Levinas claims, a notion of death as 
a scandal ‘measurable’ only through the affective qualities that the death of the other 
reveals as the infinity of the survivor’s responsibility. Levinas claims: ‘Here, death is 
thought and not simply described. It is a necessary moment in the conceptual progress 
of thought itself, and in this sense it is thought.’254 What Levinas admires about this 
moment in the Phenomenology o f Spirit is that death is not merely being described but 
that its negativity is being thought. It is thought as a necessary moment of the 
movement of Spirit toward itself, a necessary moment in the history of Spirit, and as 
such it is thought, Levinas claims, in the least reifying manner possible. However, in 
the midst of what he reveres as a thinking of death, Levinas wonders whether there is 
not something deeply unfounded in the description:
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‘We must wonder whether there is not, in these descriptions, a supplementary element 
-  already stemming from the fact that the region of death is identified with the earth -  
just as there is also something unfounded in the description, that is, the relationship of 
death and of blood In this composition of the idea of ground, or final ground, this 
ground of being and death, there is a certain phenomenal model that seems to remain 
in Hegel... A supplementary step is made when the return to the elements is 
interpreted as a return to the ground of being ’2”
The exemplary case would be, he argues, the relationship that Hegel surreptitiously 
establishes between death and blood. Burial of the dead is accomplished by the blood 
relatives despite the fact that we are clearly within the dimension of citizenship 
Likewise, Levinas wonders whether it is legitimate, i.e. whether it is adequate to the 
level of nothingness proper to death, to ‘recover’ or ‘raise up’ this exception in and 
through the funeral ceremony accomplished in the guise of a burial or in-humation, of 
a meeting of the deceased with what Hegel calls the ‘elementary individual’. Levinas 
questions the validity of this union of the deceased with the elemental, with the earth, 
as a return to the depths, to the very bottom of being beyond nothingness He asks:
‘Is Hegel not drawing from a symbol a meaning that does not escape the model of the 
world? Everything seems to be modelled on the relation of the living to the dead. 
There is the earth, where the blood relatives carry out the burial, the earth is 
something particular in reality (Hegel calls this the ‘elemental individual). But at the 
same time the earth is not a particular thing but an element, in which there is 
something other than things The earth refers to a fundamental where, to a stable 
ground by which precisely the earth is defined From there comes the temptation to 
take the ground of things for the ground of being Burial is interpreted as the return to 
the ground, and the ground of the earth as the ground of being Thus there is a 
passage from the phenomenal order to the nonphenomenal order of the earth, that is, a 
passage from the bottom of things to the bottom of being In this way, death is thought 
in the world as a moment of the grasping of self by self.’256
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Hegel ’s thinking of the nothingness of death in the Phenomenology o f Spirit, despite 
approaching a thought proper to death, remains for Levinas fundamentally 
conditioned by the fact that it is being thought of as a necessary moment in the history 
of Spirit. The thought of the nothingness of death is reduced to the status of a mere 
synchronic moment recovered within Hegel’s immanent phenomenology. Hegel’s 
evocation of a thought of the scandal of the nothingness of death as an infinite 
responsibility upon the survivor signifies an enduring diachronic moment. It signifies, 
for Levinas, an unrecoverable excess that Hegel’s argument concerning the ultimate 
union enacted by burial between the deceased and the depths of the earth (as the 
depths of being) functions to efface. For Hegel the nothingness of death, its scandal, is 
ultimately recovered by the unifying act of burial undertaken by the survivors (i.e the 
blood relatives or the ‘family’), and death becomes inscribed once more in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit as a necessary negative moment of the synchronic immanent 
order, a moment in the progress o f Spirit towards Absolute Knowledge. For Levinas 
the thought of the nothingness of death approached here by Hegel in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit demonstrates clearly the very essence of the negativity 
associated with Hegelian dialectic. For Levinas the Hegelian dialectic is a ‘dialectic in 
which diachronically traversed moments are recovered, that is, identified, sublimated, 
and conserved. . . the identity of the identical and the non-identical’.2:7 It is Levinas’s 
contention that Hegel’s dialectic ultimately functions to reduce the ‘scandal’ of the 
nothingness proper to death. Despite approaching a thinking o f death based on a 
thinking about the relationship with the deceased, Hegel ultimately effaces the 
significance of the very concreteness of the impossibility o f abandoning the other to 
his or her solitude, the impossibility of leaving him alone to bear the scandal of the 
nothingness of death. Within Hegel’s phenomenological dialectic there is a reduction 
o f what, for Levinas, can only be thought of as an irreducible diachronic interruption 
to a merely immanent vicissitude of totalising dialectic. By seeking to uncover and 
emphasise what he claims are moments of irreducible diachrony Levinas is attempting 
to articulate a justified and coherent resistance to Hegel’s attempt to construct a stable 
totality of the history of consciousness Levinas must be read, we claim, as 257
257 E. Levinas, ‘Philosophy and Awakening' in h'.nlre Nous: Essats xur le penser-d -t’autre (Editions 
Bernard Grasse! cl Fasqucllc. 1991) in English as Entre Nous - O n Thtnking-of-the-Other, translated by 
M.B. Smith and B. Harshav (London: The Athlonc Press, 1998), p.79
238
interrupting that process whereby consciousness acts to gather itself up into a unity or 
totality and become in ‘full possession of self
To conclude, Levinas argues that Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit approaches a 
thinking adequate to the radical excess or scandal of the nothingness proper to death 
However, insofar as death becomes reduced by Hegel’s account to a ‘moment in the 
appearance of the world’ and rendered ‘intelligible to the survivors, death loses its 
sense of transcendental excess, or its ‘sting’. It becomes reduced by customs that 
come to organise it, and which function to reduce the scandal of the death of the other 
as an intra-worldly event; ‘Hegel always focuses on death in an interpretation of the 
behaviour of the survivor. As a moment in the appearing of he world, death is 
intelligible.’258 The objections Levinas raises here to Hegel are important ones for 
they fundamentally share what Levinas will oppose in Hegel’s Science of Logic too 
and we will proceed by examining those objections as they are articulated in 
Levinas’ s lectures.
(ii) - Levinas's Reading o f Hegel’s ‘Logic ’
In the lectures on Hegel’s Science o f Logic given as part of his course ‘Death and 
Time’, Levinas claims that there is indeed a thinking o f ‘nothingness’. However, he 
claims that it is inadequate since it is conceived by Hegel as awaiting being, as 
desiring being or passing into being. Hegel’s thinking of nothingness is not, and 
cannot be, he claims, the result of a purely negative operation that repels being. In the 
lectures on ‘Ontotheology’, he claims that Hegelian ‘negation keeps, on the soles of 
its shoes, the dust of the ground it left behind it. All nothingness is the nothing of 
something, and this something, whose nothing remains nothingness, remains thought. 
Being and nothingness are linked.’259 Given such an understanding of Hegel’s notion 
o f nothingness L evinas’s initial question has a distinctly Schellingean flavour260, i.e. 
whether there is the presence of an implicit and illegitimate teleology operative in the 
Science o f Ixtgic.
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‘One may . . . wonder whether one is not supposing entities as already there. One may 
wonder whether the beginning is not, thus, the beginning of some thing, the beginning 
of that which begins This is a beginning, that has the structure of a something ,261
With this Schellingean question in mind Levinas begins a detailed analysis of the 
introductory remarks made by Hegel in the Science o f Logic regarding ‘beginning’.2“  
He immediately identifies Hegel’s arguments for the necessity of beginning 
philosophical science without extraneous determination:
‘Hegel says that the beginning cannot first be thought of as determinate. We must take 
the beginning in indétermination and in its immediacy. The beginning of philosophy 
thus becomes a philosophy of the beginning.’2“
We must ask whether Levinas is merely repeating the Schellingean form of critique 
with regard to Hegel’s Science of Ixtgic. As we outlined in our earlier examination of 
Schelling, Hegel argues in the Science o f Ixtgic that thought is no longer presupposed 
as an ability to establish relevant propositions regarding being.261 *64 Rather, he claims, 
thought is now able to articulate the actual structure of real Being by pursuing an 
absolutely presuppositionless speculative logical discourse. Thus Hegel begins 
philosophical science with the thought of pure being rather than the thought of 
nothing.; i.e. he begins with the thought of pure Being, of what is without any further 
determination:
‘The beginning must be an absolute... it may not presuppose anything, must not be 
mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the 
entire science Consequently, it must be purely and simply an immediacy, or rather 
merely immediacy itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to 
anything else, so too it cannot contain within itself any determination, any content; for
261 E. Levinas. Ibid, p.73
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any such would be a distinguishing and an inter-relationship of distinct moments, and 
consequently a mediation. The beginning there is pure being.'2bi
In order to distinguish the genuine radicality of Hegel’s thought of ‘beginning’ 
Levinas begins by raising Schellingean concerns regarding implicit teleology. This is 
performed by way of an account of Hegel’s own consideration of an alternative 
proposal of beginning other than with pure indeterminate being. In the remarks 
considered by Levinas, Hegel addresses an alternative demand regarding how 
philosophical science is to begin, this alternative demand is that a pure or absolute 
beginning be made just with the very notion o f ‘beginning’:
‘In that case, we have nothing but the beginning itself, and it remains to be seen what 
this is. . . thus we should have nothing at all beyond the general idea of a mere 
beginning as such. We have therefore only to see what is contained in such an 
idea’266
By thinking what is ‘contained’ in this notion of pure or absolute ‘beginning’ and 
what is implied by it, and by contrasting it with his own notion of an immanent 
presuppositionless beginning with pure being, Hegel is able to demonstrate the fact 
that beginning with ‘beginning’ contains an implicit teleology. With a notion of 
simple, immediate and pure beginning there is a notion of nothing from which there is 
to become something. He claims that there is not a pure nothing but a nothing from 
which something is to proceed, therefore being is already contained within such a 
notion of beginning. The point o f Hegel’s consideration here is that by attempting to 
begin with a notion of pure absolute beginning one begins with an unwarranted 
implicit notion of a ‘not-yet’: ‘The beginning points to something else -  it is a non- 
being which carries a reference to being as to an other, that which begins, as yet is 
not, it is only on the way to being.’267 The idea of ‘beginning’ contains an 
unwarranted moment of mediation, and as such is clearly illegitimate from Hegel’s 
presuppositionless perspective. For Hegel genuine beginning ought not to be already a 
first and an other, ‘for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies *2
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that an advance has already been made.’26* By concentrating initially upon these 
considerations by Hegel Levinas is able to distinguish his own subsequent critique 
from what we have identified as Schellingean critique. Levinas is able to demonstrate 
that he recognises Hegel’s thought to be not nearly as naive as Schelling had 
maintained. Indeed he recognises that it is in fact a good deal more sophisticated and 
‘is, in fact, much more radical than this.’269 He distinguishes Hegel’s actual beginning 
to philosophical science from the Schellingean approach that insists upon the presence 
of an implicit and inevitable teleology. Once he has differentiated himself from such 
an account, he is able to return to a much more faithful account of Hegel’s Science of 
Ixjgic and subsequently articulate a much more sophisticated, original and radical 
critique.
Levinas proceeds by outlining Hegel’s argument that by beginning with the thought of 
pure being (being without determination) thought will immediately and logically 
develop into the thought of becoming. This rests upon the fact that pure being is 
shown to immediately vanish into the thought o f  pure nothing: ‘There is nothing to be 
intuited in it. .. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither 
more nor less than nothing.’270 The thought of pure being vanishes into the thought of 
pure nothing. This is a transition to a different notion than pure being but equally one 
into which pure being vanishes. When one attempts to think that pure nothing, it is 
logically ‘simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all 
determination and content -  undifferentiatedness in itself.’271 The thought of pure 
nothing is shown to logically and immediately vanish back into the thought of pure 
being. A logical distinction initially emerges insofar as ‘it counts as a distinction 
whether something or nothing is intuited or thought’272, but that distinction 
immediately vanishes when thought. It vanishes because by thinking pure nothing 
‘nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking, or rather it is empty intuition and 
thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being.’272 Therefore 
the thought of pure nothing immediately vanishes back into the thought of pure being:
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‘Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, 
and thus altogether the same as, pure being.’274
What we have here is a speculative proposition or thinking, i.e. ‘Being is Nothing’, 
where two terms despite being conceptually differentiated by thought, cannot in fact 
be held apart and as such form an identity. Hence that which defines being also 
appears to define nothing. They are conceptually differentiated insofar as thought 
necessarily moves immanently from  thinking being to thinking nothing, and from 
nothing back to being. The logical moment, which is the immediate vanishing of one 
into another, indicates that they are conceptually differentiated but that thought cannot 
sustain them apart from one another. Thought must either, Hegel claims, remain at 
this level of an eternal vacillation or must come to consider the logic of the very 
movement by which each vanishes immediately into the other and then back again. 
This logical process of immediate vanishing, this vacillation, is an identity but not a 
static one. It would seem that it is not (as we demonstrated earlier with our analysis of 
Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s Science o f Logic) a matter of an unwarranted and naive 
introduction o f a notion of becoming, rather ‘becoming’ for Hegel describes the 
immanent movement of the differentiated moments of pure being and pure nothing:
‘Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the 
other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference 
which has equally immediately resolved itself. ’275
By coming to focus upon this movement thought is able to discern a logically 
immanent notion of what enables the two categories of pure nothing and pure being to 
be differentiated and sustained as related moments of ‘becoming’ This movement 
from being to nothing to becoming is, Hegel claims, purely immanent insofar as it 
does not rely upon an unwarranted and illegitimate interpolation of a teleological 
notion of a ‘not yet real being’ or ‘being to come’. Levinas’s recognition of this aspect 
of Hegel’s thinking represents (despite the fact that he does not make any explicit 
mention o f it) a fundamental rejection of a Schellingean approach to Hegel’s thought
214 Ibid
215 Ibid
243
in favour o f  on the one hand, a far more faithful understanding of what Hegel’s 
thought is, and on the other a much more radical and successful critical strategy.
This critical strategy rests upon Levinas’s accurate understanding of what Hegel 
understood the truth of Being and Nothing to be, i.e. their absolute difference. This 
notion of absolute difference is offered as a passage or a process -  ‘a movement of the 
disappearing of the one in the other. . . a movement wherein the two are different, but 
they are so by way of a difference which has dissolved just as immediately.’276 This 
passage, process or movement is what Hegel terms ‘Becoming’. Levinas claims that 
Hegel’s thought of Pure Being (a thought limited by nothing) and Pure Nothing (a 
thought limited by being) generates two distinct logical notions; i.e. the notions are 
generated reciprocally from each other. For Levinas this precise movement represents 
the very essence of Hegel’s view that the process or movement of thought rather than 
the reified abstractions of the understanding, is reality. Since Pure Being and Pure 
Nothing mutually implicate each other they cannot exist as abstracted, isolated or 
reified notions. Their truth is the process o f thinking them together speculatively. 
Levinas acknowledges that this process does not exclude contradiction but is 
contradiction. Thus it is not a matter of a contradiction between two abstract notions 
for the understanding but contradiction as a single notion for reason. Contradiction as 
a single notion is generated by reason’s ability to deny the negativity between the 
notions of Pure Being and Pure Nothing when abstractly considered and thus create a 
process, passage or movement. The notion of Pure Nothing signifies in Hegel’s 
Science o f Logic the non-existence or unsustainability of ‘nothingness in its pure 
state’ just as Pure Being signifies the non-existence of being in its pure state. The one 
and the other signify their impossibility and unsustainability as abstract notions, or, as 
Levinas claims, their ‘already-being-within-becoming’. Levinas acknowledges that 
for Hegel these notions appear as abstracted and opposed to one another simply 
because they have not yet been sufficiently thought:
‘To think that being goes into nothingness as separated and separable nothingness, is a 
thought insufficiently thought. There is no separable nothingness.’277
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For Hegel thought has yet to discover the corresponding negations that will de-reify 
these entities into ‘moments’ of ‘becoming’ and deprive them o f their abstract 
independence. ‘Becoming’ is the purely logical existence that signifies the non­
existence of being in its pure state and the non-existence of nothing in its pure state, 
by preceding them: ‘Becoming is the absolute, and, consequently, one cannot think 
before this.’278 Indeed, Levinas acknowledges Hegel’s claim that ‘One cannot think 
being and nothingness without becoming.’279 What this ultimately signifies is that the 
origin or substratum in Hegel is a process that creates everything else and that that 
origin or substratum is thought itself. Levinas’s identification of this substratum 
allows him to claim that Hegel’s thinking of Pure Nothing is always tied to being. In 
many ways it is paradigmatic for Levinas of how Hegelian negativity operates. Such 
negativity does not resemble the delirious skeptical negativity that Levinas associates 
with the pre-original proximity of the Other, but represents a constrained form of 
negativity always thought within the Same.
For Levinas Hegel’s identity of the difference between Pure Being and Nothing 
represents a speculative proposition, i.e. a thought of pure reason rather than an act of 
understanding that ‘separates’ notions. Hegel’s speculative identity cannot be 
justified, he claims, through definitions since Hegel demonstrates that every definition 
already presupposes the speculative identity. As Levinas writes, ‘every definition is 
an analysis, a separation, and presupposes the thought of the non-separable.’280 For 
Levinas the consequence of Hegel’s arguments are that we are unable to name a 
difference between Pure Being and Pure Nothing since such a differentiation would 
always entail reification and abstraction which themselves presuppose a pre-original 
speculative identity. Ultimately, Levinas claims:
‘Difference therefore does not turn on what they are in themselves. The difference 
appears here as that which embraces them: it is in becoming that the difference exists, 
and becoming is only possible by reason of this distinction.’281
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Clearly Hegel’s notion of Pure Nothing does not exceed the process, passage or 
movement of becoming that encompasses it at the same time as it comprehends Pure 
Being. Hegel writes:
‘Both are the same, becoming, and although they differ so in direction they 
interpenetrate and paralyse each other. The one is ceasing-to-be: being passes over 
into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of itself, transition into being, 
coming-to-be. This coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing passes over into 
being, but being equally sublates itself and is rather transition into nothing, is ceasing- 
to-be. They are not reciprocally sublated -  the one does not sublate the other 
externally -  but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of 
itself.’282
Hegel’s thinking o f Nothingness here represents for Levinas a paradigmatic instance 
of thinking the Same, and he simply asks whether ‘death is equivalent to this 
nothingness tied to being?’283 Clearly for Levinas it is not. For Levinas the 
nothingness proper to death is a total nothingness:‘In death, one does not make an 
abstraction of being -  it is of us that an abstraction is made.’284 The thought of 
nothingness proper to death is for Levinas an utter annihilation that cannot be thought 
adequately within the merely speculative proposition of an identity between Being 
and Nothing. This annihilation proper to death, for Levinas, signifies primarily 
through emotional and ethically affective categories such as anxiety and responsibility 
for the death of the Other. Thus Hegel’s account affirms the non-existence or 
understanding of this abstract Nothingness. In this sense Levinas argues that Hegel’s 
speculative proposition ultimately repeats, in a speculative mode, the Aristotelian 
definition of change, of the metabole. Thus, as it was for Aristotle, disappearing is 
only the inverse of coming-into-being, i.e. it is the same thing.
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IX -  Conclusion: A Persistent Skepticism
We have argued throughout this thesis that the essence of Hegel’s philosophy 
represents a radicalisation of Pyrrhonian skepticism and a reformulation of the critical 
negativity associated with the essence of that skepticism into the principle of 
immanent dialectic capable of generating an authentic philosophical science of the 
Real. We have argued that the 19th Century post-Hegelians sought to further radicalise 
skeptical negativity in an effort to articulate a notion necessarily excessive to Hegel’s 
philosophical science of the All. However, we sought to identify the way in which 
each of the three approaches adopted by Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard had 
significant weaknesses. These weaknesses concerned not only their failure to 
articulate a legitimate notion of skeptical opposition to Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy, but also their failure to fully comprehend Hegel’s thought, particularly 
the way in which he had aligned his thought with the critical essence of skepticism 
itself.
We have attempted to argue that Levinas’s thought, despite being located upon the 
post-Hegelian trajectory initiated by the 19111 Century post-Hegelians we have 
discussed, does not repeat their mistakes with regard to Hegel. We have attempted to 
provide an account of the development of Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy by 
explicitly aligning it with the critical and negative force of skeptical opposition to 
philosophical reason. Such an alignment has allowed us to counterpoise Levinas’s 
thought to that of Hegel’s in a clear and hopefully illuminating way. By understanding 
how Levinas radicalises the notion of skeptical opposition to philosophical reason 
with the notion o f the ethical affectivity of the Other we have tried to demonstrate 
how Levinas is able to argue that Hegel’s philosophy (itself a radical reformulation of 
the relationship between skepticism and reason) fails to adequately think the radically 
negative quality of the Other.
Through our analysis of Levinas’s lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit and 
the Science o f Logic we have attempted to demonstrate how Levinas argues that 
Hegel’s thought emerges from a pre-original identity, origin or substratum. This pre­
original substratum is the movement of becoming, and Levinas recognises the degree 
to which Hegel attempts to radically align his own philosophical thought with the
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pure immanent becoming of thought or reason. By aligning his philosophical science 
with the pre-original substratum of the movement of becoming in pure reason or 
thought, Levinas claims, Hegel’s thought merely displays a thinking of that 
substratum itself. For Levinas it is thus paradigmatic of a thought of the Same. It is 
the pure self-relation of absolute rationality grounded upon a pre-original substratum 
of becoming rather than a genuinely radical critical essence. The critical essence that 
Hegel identifies as inherent within pure immanence supposedly emerges from a 
radical reformulation of what Hegel takes to be the essence of the historical 
manifestation of genuine ancient Pyrrhonism. From Hegel’s reformulated perspective 
skepticism as an abstract negative force of opposition to reason becomes 
unsustainable, impossible and self-refuting. If such an abstract skeptical opposition is 
maintained it signifies nothing more for Hegel than a wilful naivety and dogmatism.
Levinas clearly understands this aspect of Hegel’s thought and the inevitable 
difficulties entailed by maintaining a skeptical opposition to pure speculative reason 
Yet he proceeds to develop a nuanced and sophisticated skeptical strategy that avoids 
the weaknesses and failures o f his I9lh Century predecessors This strategy, as we 
have tried to show, involves a radical re-alignment of the critical essence of 
skepticism with a notion of pre-original separation between the Same and the Other 
This pre-original separation is conceived as the essence of the persistent force of 
skepticism, but is not a separation maintained through mere wilful opposition to 
reason by the subject. Rather, for Levinas the pre-original separation is maintained by 
the alterity of the Other and thus the skeptical disruption comes from the pre-original 
obligation that the Other inscribes into Being and thought. For Levinas this notion of 
a pre-original separation is always more radical than the type of pre-original 
speculative identity of becoming thought by Hegelian Idealism. Yet he acknowledges 
that such separation can only ever be articulated in the language of reason, and that 
language clearly presupposes the type of pre-original identity that Hegel discloses 
For this reason Levinas argues that pre-original separation of the Same and the Other 
must be signified through an understanding of how the radical persistence of 
skepticism functions to constantly disrupt the pre-original identity of the rational 
discourse in which it itself becomes disclosed and refuted For Levinas by 
understanding how the genuine critical essence of skepticism persists and signifies an 
element beyond reason one is able to glimpse the radical separation of the Other that
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